National Labor Relations Board v. EYM King of Missouri, LLC , 696 F. App'x 759 ( 2017 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-3415
    ___________________________
    National Labor Relations Board
    lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner
    v.
    EYM King of Missouri, LLC, doing business as Burger King
    lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
    ____________
    National Labor Relations Board
    ____________
    Submitted: April 6, 2017
    Filed: June 21, 2017
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    In a National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") proceeding EYM
    King of Missouri, LLC was found to have violated the National Labor Relations Act
    by declining to hire Terrance Wise for having engaged in protected labor activity. The
    NLRB petitioned this court for enforcement of its order. We conclude that substantial
    evidence supports the Board's order and we therefore grant the application for
    enforcement.
    I.
    In March 2015, EYM King acquired numerous Burger King franchises in
    Kansas City, Missouri from Strategic Restaurants Acquisitions Company, LLC.
    These acquisitions included a Burger King located at 1102 East 47th Street ("47th
    Street store"). EYM King retained the 47th Street store's general manager, LaReda
    Hayes, and gave her permission to rehire Strategic employees. Hayes rehired most of
    the Strategic employees but not Terrance Wise, a well known labor organizer who had
    been working at various Burger King stores for over 11 years and at the 47th Street
    store since early 2012.
    Hayes told Wise that he was not being rehired because of a change in his
    schedule availability and his insubordination. Wise had filled out an application form
    that indicated he was no longer available to work overnight on Saturdays or any time
    on Sundays. During his time at the 47th Street store Wise had received a few
    disciplinary warnings. One of these warnings occurred on April 21, 2014 for arriving
    to work one hour late, and a second warning occurred on May 5, 2014 for arriving
    fifteen minutes late. He had also received a warning on May 6, 2014 for not calling
    in more than three hours before his shift to inform supervisors that he was running a
    little late. Although Wise received no further formal warnings, he was twice verbally
    counseled by Hayes for cooking too much food.
    Wise participated in the Workers' Organizing Committee–Kansas City which
    advocated that fast food employees receive a minimum wage of $15 per hour, a
    request referred to as the "Fight for $15." Wise had assumed a leadership role in the
    labor organization and was responsible for bringing the "Fight for $15" campaign to
    the 47th Street store. He also assisted with bringing other unfair labor practice
    charges against the store in May 2014. Hayes was aware of these activities.
    -2-
    The NLRB's general counsel filed a complaint with the Board alleging that
    EYM King had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act
    by refusing to hire Wise.1 An administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a hearing at
    which Hayes testified that her decision not to hire Wise was based on his limited
    availability, several instances of insubordination, and his record of tardiness. Hayes
    told the ALJ that the extent of Wise's behavioral problems were not documented
    because after May 2014 Strategic had directed her to report to human resources any
    negative behavior by Wise (and other individuals involved with the Workers'
    Organizing Committee). Strategic would then determine an appropriate response.
    Hayes testified that she emailed Strategic a number of times about Wise's behavior,
    but never received a response. She eventually stopped these reports.
    The ALJ found that Hayes was not "an overall credible witness" and that her
    stated reasons for declining to hire Wise were implausible. The ALJ then concluded
    that the decision not to hire Wise was motivated in part by his involvement in
    protected labor activities, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board
    agreed with these determinations and affirmed.
    II.
    We will enforce an order of the Board "if it correctly applied the law and its
    findings are based upon substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Wright Elec.,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    200 F.3d 1162
    , 1166 (8th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is "such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion." Cintas Corp. v. NLRB, 
    589 F.3d 905
    , 912 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
    NLRB v. La-Z-Boy Midwest, 
    390 F.3d 1054
    , 1058 (8th Cir. 2004)). Under this
    1
    Before the ALJ and the Board this complaint was consolidated with two others.
    The Board severed one of the other cases for further consideration, and dismissed the
    charges in the second. Accordingly, only Wise's case is before the court.
    -3-
    deferential standard of review, "we may not preempt the Board's choice between two
    fairly conflicting views" of the evidence. JHP & Assocs., LLC v. NLRB, 
    360 F.3d 904
    , 911 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, the
    Board may not base its decision on "suspicion, surmise, implications, or plainly
    incredible evidence." Nichols Aluminum, LLC v. NLRB, 
    797 F.3d 548
    , 553 (8th Cir.
    2015) (quoting Concepts & Designs, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    101 F.3d 1243
    , 1245 (8th Cir.
    1996)). When reviewing for substantial evidence, "we give great deference to the
    credibility determinations made by the ALJ." Wright Elec., 
    200 F.3d at 1166
    .
    Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, certain
    discrimination in the hiring of employees is an unfair labor practice. Wright Elec.,
    
    200 F.3d at
    1167–68; see 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(3). Based on the Wright Line2 standard,
    the Board has adopted a three part test for a refusal to hire violation under
    Section 8(a)(3). The general counsel must first show (1) "that the respondent was
    hiring, or had concrete plans to hire," (2) "that the applicant[] had experience or
    training relevant to the . . requirements of the position[]," and (3) "that anti [labor
    organization] animus contributed to the decision not to hire the applicant[]." FES, 
    331 N.L.R.B. 9
    , 12 (2000). The burden then shifts to the respondent "to show that it
    would not have hired the applicant[] even in the absence of [his] [labor organization]
    activity or affiliation." 
    Id.
    Since, EYM King does not dispute that it was hiring or that Wise was qualified
    for the position, we must determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board's
    determination that Wise's involvement in the Workers' Organizing Committee was a
    motivating factor in EYM King's decision not to hire him. "Motivation 'is a question
    of fact that may be inferred from both direct and circumstantial evidence.'" NLRB v.
    RELCO Locomotives, Inc., 
    734 F.3d 764
    , 780 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Concepts &
    2
    Wright Line, 
    251 N.L.R.B. 1083
    , 1089 (1980), enforced, 
    662 F.2d 899
     (1st Cir.
    1981).
    -4-
    Designs, 
    101 F.3d at 1245
    ). We have observed that both "implausible explanations
    and false or shifting reasons support a finding of illegal motivation." York Prods.,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    881 F.2d 542
    , 545 (8th Cir. 1989). When "an employer's explanation
    fails to withstand scrutiny, it is considered pretextual," 
    id.
     at 545–56, thereby
    providing a "substantial reason to reject" the argument that the employer would have
    taken the same action regardless of any protected activity, RELCO, 734 F.3d at 782.
    Hayes testified that she declined to hire Wise because of his change in schedule,
    tardiness, and insubordination.        Substantial evidence supports the Board's
    determination that these reasons were pretextual. First, Wise did not dramatically
    change his availability, as EYM King argues. Although he had recently started
    working night shifts, he had been working primarily day shifts at the beginning of
    2015, and he only limited his availability for two nights and one day per week.
    Second, Hayes had a minor disciplinary record spread out over years of working at
    Burger King (indeed, all of his formal warnings were issued in April and May 2014).
    Hayes also had not disciplined Wise for some of his allegedly insubordinate behavior
    before she had allegedly received a directive from Strategic telling her to run all
    discipline through human resources. See Hall v. NLRB, 
    941 F.2d 684
    , 688 (8th Cir.
    1991) (concluding that lack of "prior warning or reprimand" supported a finding of
    unlawful motivation). Finally, Hayes provided vague and inconsistent testimony
    throughout the hearing, including testimony that she both did and "did not" inform
    human resources about an incident in which Wise allegedly took hamburgers after a
    shift. Hayes' implausible explanations for her hiring decision provide substantial
    circumstantial evidence to support the Board's determination that it was based on an
    improper motivation.
    EYM King argues that the Board erred by declining to credit Hayes' testimony
    that in May 2014 she received a directive from Strategic that precluded her from
    -5-
    disciplining Wise without the approval of human resources. EYM King argues that
    since it lacked control over Strategic's human resource policies, the Board could not
    make an adverse inference based on Hayes' failure to produce the relevant directive.
    See Rockingham Mach.-Lunex Co. v. NLRB, 
    665 F.2d 303
    , 304 (8th Cir. 1981)
    (stating that "when a party has relevant evidence within its control which it fails to
    produce, that failure gives rise to an inference that the evidence is unfavorable to the
    party"). Nevertheless, the record does not show that the Board assumed that any
    Strategic human resource directive would be unfavorable to EYM King and thereby
    drew an adverse inference. Instead, the Board observed that Hayes had failed to
    provide evidence to corroborate her version of some events. Cf. Khrystotodorov v.
    Mukasey, 
    551 F.3d 775
    , 782 (8th Cir. 2008) (observing that credibility and
    corroboration are sometimes intertwined). Further, even if we were to conclude that
    the Board erred by declining to credit Hayes' testimony about the directive, there is
    other substantial evidence to support the Board's determination that Hayes'
    explanation for not hiring Wise was pretextual. See Locke v. Kansas City Power &
    Light Co., 
    660 F.2d 359
    , 365 (8th Cir. 1981) (concluding that error regarding burden
    of proof was harmless because substantial evidence supported finding of pretext).
    That determination was also supported by Hayes' demeanor at the hearing and, as
    discussed above, her vague and inconsistent testimony.
    We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board's
    determination that EYM King refused to hire Wise because of his participation in
    protected labor activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor
    Relations Act.
    III.
    For these reasons we grant enforcement of the Board's order.
    ____________________
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