David Martin v. Nancy A. Berryhill , 698 F. App'x 856 ( 2017 )


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  •                United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-3624
    ___________________________
    David Martin
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
    lllllllllllllllllllllAppellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro
    ____________
    Submitted: October 4, 2017
    Filed: October 17, 2017
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    David Martin appeals from the order of the District Court1 affirming the
    Commissioner’s decision denying him disability insurance benefits and supplemental
    security income. In his decision, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that
    Martin’s subjective complaints were not entirely credible. Based on the testimony of
    a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ also found that jobs existed in significant numbers
    nationally that Martin could perform with his residual functional capacity (RFC) for
    less than a full range of sedentary work.2 Martin generally argues that the ALJ erred
    in finding that he was not disabled, contending that any physical exertion exacerbates
    his condition.
    We agree with the District Court that substantial evidence on the record as a
    whole supports the ALJ’s determination that although Martin suffered from some
    degree of pain and limitation, the record failed to show a medical condition that was
    completely disabling. See Perks v. Astrue, 
    687 F.3d 1086
    , 1091, 1093 (8th Cir. 2012)
    (standards of review). We defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination because it was
    supported by multiple valid reasons. See Casey v. Astrue, 
    503 F.3d 687
    , 696 (8th Cir.
    2007). Further, we conclude that the ALJ properly formulated Martin’s RFC and
    because the ALJ’s hypothetical included the impairments and limitations that were
    supported by the record, it was proper for the ALJ to rely on the VE’s response to find
    that Martin is not disabled. See Boyd v. Colvin, 
    831 F.3d 1015
    , 1020 (8th Cir. 2016)
    (noting that the ALJ is responsible for determining a claimant’s RFC based on all
    1
    The Honorable Joe J. Volpe, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent
    of the parties under 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    2
    Martin is not entitled to benefits based on his claim that he is unable to find
    the jobs identified by the vocational expert. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566
    (c);
    416.966(c) (explaining that a claimant is not disabled if his RFC and vocational
    abilities enable him to do work that exists nationally, even if he remains unemployed
    due to, inter alia, inability to get work, lack of work in his local area, or no job
    openings).
    -2-
    relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and
    others, and the claimant’s description of his limitations); Hensley v. Colvin, 
    829 F.3d 926
    , 932 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Because a claimant’s RFC is a medical question, an ALJ’s
    assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability
    to function in the workplace.” (citation to quoted case omitted)); Milam v. Colvin,
    
    794 F.3d 978
    , 985–86 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Testimony from a VE based on a properly
    phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence.” (citation to quoted
    case omitted)).
    The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-3624

Citation Numbers: 698 F. App'x 856

Judges: Wollman, Bowman, Colloton

Filed Date: 10/17/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024