Matthew Barnett v. Wendy Kelley , 698 F. App'x 324 ( 2017 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-1483
    ___________________________
    Matthew W. Barnett
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Dexter Payne,
    Assistant Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Peggy S. Durham,
    Grievance Coordinator, Arkansas Department of Correction; R. Ramsey,
    Classification Member, Grimes Unit, ADC
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    Grimes Correctional Unit
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant
    Pearce, Classification Member, Grimes Unit, ADC; Arkansas Department of Correction
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Batesville
    ____________
    Submitted: October 5, 2017
    Filed: October 11, 2017
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Matthew Barnett, currently incarcerated at the Grimes Unit of the Arkansas
    Department of Correction (ADC), appeals following the district court’s1 adverse grant
    of judgment on the pleadings. Barnett brought this pro se action against the ADC and
    various ADC employees, asserting violations of the Due Process Clause, Equal
    Protection Clause, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and section
    504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA). He alleged that from January 2015 until
    November 2016 he was denied consideration for the ADC’s work-release program
    because he suffers from grand-mal seizures and that defendants’ justification—that
    his transfer eligibility (TE) date had passed and he was scheduled to appear before the
    parole board in October 2016—was a pretext for disability discrimination. On
    appeal, Barnett argues that the district court erred in granting judgment prior to
    discovery, in dismissing each of his claims, and in denying his postjudgment motion
    to join additional parties.
    For the following reasons, we affirm. See Montin v. Moore, 
    846 F.3d 289
    , 293
    (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review). First, ruling on the motion was not premature.
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (party may move for judgment on pleadings after pleadings
    are closed). Second, we agree with the district court that Barnett’s due-process claim
    failed because he lacks a protected liberty interest in being considered for work
    release. See Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 
    826 F.2d 791
    , 793-94 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
    1
    The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the
    Honorable Beth Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of
    Arkansas.
    -2-
    His equal-protection claim likewise failed because he did not identify differential
    treatment of similarly situated individuals. See Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 
    614 F.3d 495
    , 500 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, to state an equal-protection claim,
    plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants treated them differently from similarly
    situated individuals).
    As to the ADA and RA claims, after careful review of the pleadings, we hold
    that Barnett did not plead sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that he was
    denied consideration for work release because of his disability, rather than because
    he was about to appear for a parole hearing. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678,
    682 (2009) (complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state claim that is
    plausible on its face; as between an “obvious alternative explanation” and the
    purposeful, invidious discrimination Iqbal asked Court to infer, discrimination was
    not a plausible conclusion); De Boise v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 
    760 F.3d 892
    , 899 (8th Cir.
    2014) (Title II plaintiff must demonstrate that he is a qualified individual with a
    disability who was denied participation in or the benefits of services, programs, or
    activities of a public entity because of his disability). Finally, we conclude that the
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying Barnett’s joinder motion. See Int’l Bhd.
    of Teamsters v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 
    84 F.3d 299
    , 302 (8th Cir. 1996)
    (standard of review).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1483

Citation Numbers: 698 F. App'x 324

Judges: Gruender, Benton, Kelly

Filed Date: 10/11/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024