United States v. Devonte Holston ( 2019 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-2626
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Devonte Darnell Holston
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport
    ____________
    Submitted: November 7, 2018
    Filed: July 15, 2019
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Following a guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
    of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), the district court sentenced Devonte Holston
    to 180 months imprisonment, finding that he qualified for the mandatory minimum
    imposed by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Holston’s
    armed career criminal classification was based on three prior convictions in
    Wisconsin state court for burglary of a building or dwelling, in violation of Wis. Stat.
    § 943.10(1m)(a), which the district court determined qualified as predicate violent
    felonies. Holston appealed, arguing these convictions could not serve as predicate
    offenses for the purposes of the ACCA because two of his offenses were committed
    on the same occasion and because § 943.10(1m)(a) listed alternative means, rather
    than elements, and did not meet the generic definition of burglary so as to qualify as
    a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B).
    On August 24, 2018, we entered an opinion affirming Holston’s sentence,
    holding that the two challenged convictions involved offenses committed on separate
    occasions and that the burglary statute under which Holston was convicted met the
    generic definition of burglary and was thus a violent felony. Our decision on the
    latter point was controlled by United States v. Lamb, 
    847 F.3d 928
    , 932, 934 (8th Cir.
    2017) (holding that § 943.10(1m)(a) fit within the generic definition of burglary and
    thus qualified as a violent felony), which Holston conceded controlled the issue.
    We subsequently granted Holston’s petition for panel rehearing based on the
    submission of a certified question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court by the Seventh
    Circuit in United States v. Franklin, 
    895 F.3d 954
    (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam),
    regarding whether burglary under § 943.10(1m)(a) identified alternative elements of
    burglary or identified alternative means of committing burglary. The Wisconsin
    Supreme Court has now answered this certified question, holding that the statute
    provides alternative means of committing one element of the crime of burglary. See
    Franklin v. United States, 
    928 N.W.2d 545
    (Wis. 2019).
    Given the recent changes in the legal landscape, we now consider anew
    Holston’s challenge to his ACCA classification. “We review de novo the district
    court’s determination of whether [Holston]’s criminal record qualified him as an
    Armed Career Criminal.” United States v. Willoughby, 
    653 F.3d 738
    , 741 (8th Cir.
    2011). Where a statute lists alternatively phrased items, the determination of whether
    -2-
    it lists elements or means is a matter of state law, and we look to “authoritative
    sources of state law[,]” like “a state court decision [that] definitively answers the
    question[.]” 
    Lamb, 847 F.3d at 931
    (alteration in original) (quoting Mathis v. United
    States, 
    136 S. Ct. 2243
    , 2256 (2016)). And where a state court answers a question of
    state law contrary to a previous decision of our Court, we no longer follow the
    previous panel decision. See Neidenbach v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 
    842 F.3d 560
    , 566
    (8th Cir. 2016) (“[A]bsent an intervening opinion by a [state] court, we are bound by
    a prior panel’s interpretation of state law.” (second alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). In Franklin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has provided
    a decision that definitively answers the question; however, that answer is in conflict
    with our Court’s previous decision in Lamb. Because Franklin is an “intervening
    opinion by a [state] court,” see 
    id., we are
    no longer bound to follow Lamb’s holding.
    Based on the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s determination that § 943.10(1m)(a)
    provides various means of committing one element of the burglary offense, we
    conclude that the definition of burglary in this section is broader than the generic
    definition of burglary for the purposes of the ACCA. Holston’s convictions under
    § 943.10(1m)(a) therefore do not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. We
    vacate Holston’s sentence and remand for resentencing without application of the
    ACCA.1
    ______________________________
    1
    The government concedes in a Rule 28(j) letter, filed June 21, 2019, that the
    sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing without the
    ACCA based upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s opinion in Franklin.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2626

Filed Date: 7/15/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/15/2019