United States v. Joseph McDonald , 609 F. App'x 897 ( 2015 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-3430
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Joseph Tyler McDonald
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge
    ____________
    Submitted: July 7, 2015
    Filed: July 22, 2015
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    After a jury found Joseph McDonald guilty of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams
    or more of actual methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(A),
    and 846, and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual
    methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(A), the district court1
    sentenced him as a career offender to concurrent terms of 360 months in prison, to be
    followed by 10 years of supervised release. Following careful review, we reject the
    arguments raised by both counsel in a brief filed under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and by McDonald in a pro se supplemental brief.
    The first argument before us is that the district court refused to give a requested
    jury instruction on determining drug quantity in the possession-with-intent-to-
    distribute offense. This argument fails, because district courts are entitled to broad
    discretion in formulating jury instructions, see United States v. Robinson, 
    781 F.3d 453
    , 462-63 (8th Cir. 2015), and McDonald cannot show that he suffered any
    prejudice as a result of the court’s refusal to give his requested instruction, see United
    States v. Gutierrez, 
    367 F.3d 733
    , 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (errors regarding jury
    instructions do not require reversal unless they result in prejudice). Second, we
    conclude that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. See United States v.
    Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Third, we reject the remaining
    arguments, all raised in the pro se brief, because the arguments either were not raised
    below, or do not constitute grounds for reversal and do not warrant extended
    discussion.
    Finally, having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988), we affirm the judgment of the district court. We also deny
    McDonald’s motion for new counsel, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
    ______________________________
    1
    The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-3430

Citation Numbers: 609 F. App'x 897

Filed Date: 7/22/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023