Bestrom v. Bankers Trust Co. (In Re Bestrom) ( 1997 )


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  •                         United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 96-3190
    ___________
    In re John C. Bestrom, debtor.         *
    *
    John C. Bestrom,                       *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    *
    v.                               * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    Bankers Trust Company, as              * District of Minnesota.
    Trustee for Holders of DLJ             *
    Mortgage Acceptance Corp.,             *
    Mortgage Pass-Through                  *
    Certificates, Assignee of              *
    Mortgagee, Quality Mortgage            *
    USA, Inc.,                             *
    *
    Appellee.                  *
    *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 12, 1997
    Filed: May 29, 1997
    ___________
    Before MAGILL,1 MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,2 Judge.
    ___________
    GOLDBERG, Judge.
    Appellant John C. Bestrom (“Bestrom”) seeks to rescind his mortgage agreement
    under the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1994) (“TILA”), without
    repaying the mortgage lender. Bestrom contends that he should not be required to
    repay the loan principal as a condition of exercising the recission rights under TILA
    because the lender failed to provide him with notice of his right to rescind the mortgage
    within 3 days of the consummation of the transaction, as required under TILA, 15
    U.S.C. § 1635(a), 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(b).
    In an adversary proceeding filed by Bestrom against Bankers Trust Company,
    assignee of Quality Mortgage USA, Inc. (“Quality Mortgage”), the bankruptcy court3
    denied Bestrom’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that TILA did not
    apply. The bankruptcy court found that the pre-bankruptcy loan made by Quality
    Mortgage constituted an acquisition loan to obtain title from the prior mortgage holder,
    First Bank, N.A. (“First Bank”), to whom Bestrom was already in default. Acquisition
    loans are specifically excepted from the recission provision of TILA. 15 U.S.C. §
    1
    The Honorable Frank J. Magill, was an active judge at the time that this case was submitted
    and assumed senior status on April 1, 1997, before the opinion was filed.
    2
    The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge, United States Court of International Trade,
    sitting by designation.
    3
    The Honorable Nancy C. Dreher, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge for the District of
    Minnesota.
    -2-
    1635(e)(1)(A). Bestrom appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the district court,
    and, on July 16, 1996, the district court affirmed.4
    In the instant appeal, Bestrom continues to argue that TILA applies to the loan
    transaction. Bestrom contends that the loan was not for the purpose of acquiring title
    to the property because First Bank never had legal title to the property in the first place.
    Therefore, as a matter of law, the Quality Mortgage loan that Bestrom used to pay
    down First Bank’s mortgage could not have been an acquisition loan within the
    meaning of TILA. Rather, according to Bestrom, the transaction was a refinancing of
    the property. We find that First Bank did have legal title to the property, and therefore,
    we affirm the district court.
    I.
    In 1976, Bestrom obtained a loan from First Bank to build his home (“the
    property”). At that time, he executed a security agreement and mortgage in favor of
    First Bank. As a result of financial difficulties, Bestrom defaulted on the payments to
    First Bank. First Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings in early 1993, which
    resulted in the bank purchasing the property at a publicly held auction on April 6, 1993.
    On the same day, First Bank recorded the Certificate of Sale in the Hennepin County
    Registrar of Titles. The public sale triggered Bestrom’s state law rights under Minn.
    Stat. Ann. § 580.23, subd. 1 (West 1988), to redeem the property within six months
    from the date of sale if Bestrom repaid the original loan.
    After the public sale, Bestrom and First Bank entered into several written
    agreements extending his state law rights of redemption in order to permit Bestrom to
    obtain the necessary financing to redeem the property. The last written agreement
    4
    The Honorable Michael J. Davis , United States District Court Judge for the District of
    Minnesota.
    -3-
    extended Bestrom’s rights of redemption to December 30, 1993. Bestrom failed to
    redeem the property, and, pursuant to Minn. Stat. Ann. § 580.12 (West 1988), the
    recording of the sale certificate operated as a conveyance to First Bank “of all the right,
    title, and interest” in the property upon expiration of the statutory period of redemption.
    On January 4, 1994, First Bank sought to gain possession of the property by
    commencing an unlawful detainer action in state court against Bestrom as a hold-over
    tenant. On January 20, 1994, the court issued a writ of restitution, which entitled First
    Bank to eject Bestrom from the property.
    During the state court proceedings, First Bank and Bestrom continued to discuss
    the possibility of Bestrom repurchasing the property. On January 25, 1994, Bestrom
    successfully completed the closing of a new loan from Quality Mortgage and began to
    execute a series of transactions designed to transfer the mortgage from First Bank to
    Quality Mortgage. Using the proceeds of the Quality Mortgage loan, Bestrom gave
    First Bank $285,000 to pay off the first mortgage. In return, First Bank conveyed its
    interest in the property to Bestrom by quit claim deed. Bestrom also borrowed an
    additional $85,222 from Quality Mortgage in order to satisfy a subordinate mortgage
    held by Citicorp and to pay the closing costs. Bestrom then executed a Mortgage (the
    “Mortgage”) and an Adjustable Rate Note (the “Note”) in favor of Quality Mortgage,
    thereby pledging the property as collateral.
    In connection with the loan agreement, Quality Mortgage prepared a federal
    Truth-In-Lending disclosure statement dated January 11, 1994. On January 18, 1994,
    Bestrom, who was represented by legal counsel at the time, signed a waiver of his
    TILA rights to rescind the Note and the Mortgage within 3 days of the signing of the
    loan agreement. Prior to the closing of the loan, Quality Mortgage again provided
    Bestrom with a federal Truth-in-Lending disclosure statement, dated January 20, 1994,
    which set forth the terms of the loan. This second disclosure statement did not give
    Bestrom notice of any TILA rights to rescind or cancel the transaction.
    -4-
    On April 15, 1994, Quality Mortgage assigned its interest in the Note and the
    Mortgage to Bankers Trust. Bestrom made four monthly mortgage payments under the
    Note and the Mortgage and then defaulted. Bankers Trust foreclosed its interest in the
    Mortgage and purchased the property at a publicly held sale on January 27, 1995.
    The second foreclosure and public sale caused Bestrom to take a number of legal
    actions designed to protect his interest in the property. By letter dated July 12, 1995,
    Bestrom attempted to exercise his federal rights to rescind the Mortgage transaction
    pursuant to TILA. On July 27, 1995, the date that his state law six-month period of
    redemption was due to expire, Bestrom filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the
    Bankruptcy Code, identified the property as his homestead, and claimed an exemption
    in it. On August 30, 1995, Bestrom filed this adversary proceeding against Bankers
    Trust, alleging that as a result of Quality Mortgage’s failure to provide him with notice
    of his right to rescind the January 25, 1994 Mortgage in violation of TILA, 15 U.S.C.
    § 1635(a), 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(b), the court should void the mortgage security interest,
    not require Bestrom to repay the loan, and award him penalties, costs and attorneys
    fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1640.
    The bankruptcy court held that TILA did not apply to the Mortgage transaction
    between Bestrom and Quality Mortgage because the court found that the loan was
    excepted from TILA’s coverage under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1)(A). This provision
    excepts a “residential mortgage transaction,” which is defined as “a transaction in
    which a mortgage . . . is created or retained against the consumer’s dwelling to finance
    the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w).
    The bankruptcy court determined that the loan transaction between Quality
    Mortgage and Bestrom came within the scope of the residential mortgage transaction
    exemption because Quality Mortgage’s loan was used to pay off the mortgage held by
    First Bank so that Bestrom could acquire title to the property.
    -5-
    II.
    Bestrom’s appeal rests on whether title to the property passed to First Bank as
    a result of the April 6, 1993 public sale, and whether title was re-acquired by Bestrom
    from First Bank as a result of the series of transactions commenced on January 25,
    1994. We review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions with respect to this issue
    de novo. Miller v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Miller), 
    16 F.3d 240
    , 242-43
    (8th Cir. 1994).
    Under Minnesota law, the rule is that once a purchaser acquires a property at a
    public sale and the redemption period expires, no further conveyance is necessary for
    the title to vest legally and equitably in the purchaser:
    The certificate shall be recorded within 20 days after such sale, and when so
    recorded, upon expiration of the time for redemption, shall operate as a
    conveyance to the purchaser or the purchaser’s assignee of all the right, title, and
    interest of the mortgagor in and to the premises named therein at the date of such
    mortgage, without any other conveyance.
    Minn. Stat. Ann. § 580.12 (West 1988).
    In Johnson v. First National Bank of Montevideo, 
    719 F.2d 270
    , 276 (8th Cir.
    1983), we stated:
    It is long-settled under Minnesota Law that foreclosure extinguishes the
    mortgage and that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale acquires a vested right
    to become the absolute owner of the property upon expiration of the redemption
    period, or, in lieu thereof, to receive the payment of the purchase price plus
    -6-
    interest. In Re Klein, 
    9 F. Supp. 57
    , 59 (D. Minn. 1934); In Re Stacy, 
    9 F. Supp. 61
    , 64 (D. Minn. 1934), and cases cited therein. The mortgagor,
    on the other hand, retains only the equity of redemption, plus the rights to
    possession, rents, and profits of the property during the period of
    redemption. 
    Id. See also
    Farmers and Merchants Bank of Preston v. Junge, 
    458 N.W.2d 698
    , 700
    (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“It is established law that title to property purchased at a
    mortgage foreclosure vests upon expiration of the redemption period.”).
    In the present case, First Bank gained title to the property because, after
    purchasing the property at the April 6, 1993 public sale and recording the certificate of
    sale the same day, Bestrom failed to redeem the property within the six month period
    of redemption. Thus, under Minn. Stat. Ann. § 580.12, First Bank acquired “all the
    right, title, and interest” in the property on October 6, 1993, the date that the statutory
    period of redemption expired, or on December 30, 1993, the date to which Bestrom’s
    statutory rights of redemption were extended by agreement of the parties. No further
    conveyance was necessary. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 580.12. Therefore, First Bank held
    legal title to the property before the series of transactions, initiated on January 25,
    1994, between Bestrom, First Bank and Quality Mortgage.
    Bestrom, nevertheless, contends that title never passed to First Bank after the
    April 6, 1993 sale because First Bank did not obtain a court order prior to registering
    title. Bestrom mistakenly relies on United States v. Ryan, 
    124 F. Supp. 1
    (D. Minn.
    1954), for support. Ryan involved the perfection of federal tax liens on real property
    under the title registration system in Minnesota. Ryan ruled that the Minnesota
    Registrar of Titles cannot recognize any involuntary transfer of property unless and
    until the Registrar receives a court order directing a particular action. Ryan, 124 F.
    Supp. at 5.
    -7-
    Bestrom is incorrect that passage of title following a foreclosure sale is
    contingent upon registration pursuant to a court order. First, the case upon which
    Bestrom relies for this position, Ryan, is inapposite to the present case because it
    involved perfection of federal tax liens, rather than transfer of title after a foreclosure
    sale.
    Second, Bestrom’s position conflicts with Minnesota’s statute governing
    registration after foreclosure sales. According to Minnesota’s statute,
    Any person who has, by an action or other proceeding to enforce or foreclose a
    mortgage, lien, or other charge upon registered land, become the owner in fee
    of the land, or any part thereof, may have the title registered.
    Minn. Stat. Ann. § 508.58 (West 1990).
    The plain language of Minn. Stat. Ann. § 508.58, clearly provides that a party
    who has become the owner of property following a mortgage foreclosure “may”
    subsequently register the title. Thus, even if the purchaser has not acquired a new
    certificate of title, the purchaser already possesses legal title to the property. Title fully
    vests when the statutory redemption period expires. See Johnson v. First National
    Bank of Montevideo, 
    719 F.2d 270
    , 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
    Therefore, the court holds that First Bank held legal title to the property at the
    expiration of the redemption period. The bankruptcy court and district court ruled
    according to law when they determined that the loan from Quality Mortgage was to
    acquire title to the property from First Bank and, therefore, TILA does not apply to the
    transaction.
    -8-
    III.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-3190

Judges: Magill, Murphy, Goldberg

Filed Date: 5/29/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024