Gustavo Martinez v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. , 785 F.3d 1262 ( 2015 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-1213
    ___________________________
    Gustavo Martinez
    lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner
    v.
    Loretta E. Lynch1
    lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
    ___________________________
    No. 14-1926
    ___________________________
    Gustavo Martinez
    lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner
    v.
    Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General of the United States
    lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    1
    Loretta E. Lynch has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the
    United States and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 43(c).
    ____________
    Submitted: January 15, 2015
    Filed: May 12, 2015
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    KELLY, Circuit Judge.
    Gustavo Martinez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, sought to reopen his
    removal proceedings and obtain asylum under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(1), which the
    Immigration Judge (IJ) denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed
    the IJ’s denial of Martinez’s motion to reopen. Martinez then filed a motion for
    reconsideration, which the BIA denied. Martinez seeks review as to both his motion
    to reopen and his motion for reconsideration. Having jurisdiction to consider this
    appeal under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , we affirm.
    I. Background
    Martinez was born in Guatemala to his Mexican mother and a father he never
    knew. His mother left him in the care of a woman in Guatemala when she moved
    back to Mexico and eventually married an American and moved to the United States.
    As a teenager, Martinez was a member of a church youth group in Guatemala. He
    contends the gangs in the area committed violent acts and threatened violence against
    individuals in the community who refused to sell drugs for the gang. Martinez entered
    the United States on June 16, 1999, when he was 17, in order to join his mother.
    Martinez was issued a Notice to Appear by U.S. Border Patrol on June 18,
    1999. Martinez missed his second immigration hearing, and the immigration court
    issued an order that Martinez be removed, in absentia, in 2000. In April 2010,
    -2-
    Martinez filed his first motion to reopen his removal proceedings, which was
    eventually granted after an appeal to the BIA. On October 22, 2012, the IJ held a
    hearing and granted Martinez voluntary departure by February 19, 2013, and
    alternatively ordered that Martinez be removed to Guatemala.
    On February 20, 2013, Martinez filed a motion to reopen the October 2012
    removal proceedings, well past the 90-day deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
    The IJ found that Martinez failed to show changed country conditions after his
    October hearing to cure the untimeliness of his motion. On December 30, 2013, the
    BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Martinez’s motion to reopen.
    Martinez moved for reconsideration of the BIA’s December 2013 decision.
    With the motion, he included an affidavit from an aunt, who stated the gangs in
    Guatemala “now” single out members of the church youth group to which Martinez
    belonged when he lived in Guatemala. The BIA denied Martinez’s motion for
    reconsideration, concluding that Martinez failed to specify any errors of law or fact
    and that he failed to establish changed country conditions to support his underlying
    motion to reopen. Martinez timely appealed.2
    2
    On appeal, Martinez characterizes his arguments as “Due Process” claims,
    though they are more accurately characterized as claims that the BIA incorrectly
    determined that Martinez did not show changed country conditions to permit review
    of his motion to reopen. See Hunan v. Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 760
    , 763–64 (8th Cir.
    2008) (rejecting the claimant’s attempt to characterize factual questions as
    constitutional due process questions, because his due process arguments merely
    consisted of allegations that the BIA had incorrectly found he failed to show changed
    country conditions). To the extent Martinez argues the BIA failed to consider
    evidence before it in denying Martinez’s motion to reopen and motion to reconsider,
    we find this argument unsupported by the record, and we therefore reject this
    assertion. See 
    id. at 764
    .
    -3-
    II. Discussion3
    “We review the BIA’s decision, as it is the final agency decision; however, to
    the extent that the BIA adopted the findings or reasoning of the IJ, we also review the
    IJ’s decision as part of the final agency action.” Matul-Hernandez v. Holder, 
    685 F.3d 707
    , 710–11 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). We review “the BIA’s denial of the
    motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.” Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 
    407 F.3d 950
    , 951
    (8th Cir. 2005). We also review the BIA’s decision denying a motion to reconsider
    for an abuse of discretion. Al Milaji v. Mukasey, 
    551 F.3d 768
    , 774 (8th Cir. 2008).
    These motions are “disfavored because they undermine the government’s legitimate
    interest in finality, which is heightened in removal proceedings ‘where, as a general
    matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely
    to remain in the United States.’” Guled v. Mukasey, 
    515 F.3d 872
    , 882 (8th Cir.
    2008) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 323 (1992)). The BIA’s discretion on
    these motions is therefore broad. 
    Id.
    “The BIA abuses its discretion where it gives no rational explanation for its
    decision, departs from its established policies without explanation, relies on
    impermissible factors or legal error, or ignores or distorts the record evidence.” 
    Id.
    However, to the extent this court must review the BIA’s legal determinations, the
    standard of review is “de novo, according substantial deference to the BIA’s
    interpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers.” Matul-Hernandez, 685
    F.3d at 711 (quotation omitted).
    3
    The government argues Martinez waived any issues regarding changed country
    conditions and his motion for reconsideration on appeal by failing to argue the issues
    in his opening brief. We conclude he sufficiently set forth his arguments on appeal
    and will address them on the merits.
    -4-
    A.     Motion to Reopen
    On October 22, 2012, Martinez was ordered to be removed to Guatemala, and
    he filed a motion to reopen those removal proceedings on February 20, 2013.
    Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), a motion to reopen must be filed within 90
    days of the removal order. Martinez concedes his motion to reopen was therefore
    untimely. His untimeliness could be cured, however, if he demonstrated his motion
    was “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the
    country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not
    available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous
    proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
    The only evidence unavailable to Martinez until after his October 22, 2012,
    hearing, and therefore supportive of Martinez’s argument of changed country
    conditions, was the death of his friend Harwi Perez in Guatemala in February 2013.
    The BIA reasoned as follows:
    [Martinez] has not explained or shown whether Harwi Perez was
    involved in the same church youth group that he belonged to, or how he
    was similarly situated as him such that his death is material to the
    respondent’s asylum or withholding of removal claim. While the
    respondent suggests that Harwi Perez was killed because he refused to
    sell drugs, the article reported that there was an indication that the death
    was “an adjustment of accounts or personal vendetta . . . .”
    After an independent review of the record, we agree with the BIA’s assessment.
    Unfortunately, the type of violence suffered by Perez was occurring at the time of
    Martinez’s October 2012 hearing; and Martinez offered nothing to show that this
    particular death somehow reflected a change in country conditions in Guatemala.
    When denying a motion to reopen, the BIA does not abuse its discretion if it
    concludes “that the evidence reflects conditions substantially similar to those that
    existed at the time of [the petitioner’s removal] hearing.” Zhong Qin Zheng v.
    -5-
    Mukasey, 
    523 F.3d 893
    , 896 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Because Perez was a friend, his death was understandably a matter of personal
    concern to Martinez. However, Martinez failed to show that Perez’s death was
    evidence of changed country conditions in Guatemala following his hearing on
    October 22, 2012, so he did not cure the untimeliness of his motion to reopen his
    removal proceedings. It was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny Martinez’s
    motion to reopen.
    B.     Motion for Reconsideration
    In his motion for reconsideration, Martinez again argues he has shown changed
    country conditions and has supported his asylum application with sufficient evidence.
    A motion to reconsider must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order
    and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).
    In support of his motion for reconsideration, Martinez emphasized his aunt’s
    affidavit, in which she states the gangs “now” single out members of the church youth
    group because of their refusal to join the gangs. The aunt’s affidavit, however, also
    states that when Martinez lived in Guatemala, he “also refused to sell drugs for the
    MS 13 gang” and that the gangs in Guatemala “are very dangerous criminals that
    torture and kill innocent people that have refused to sell drugs for them.” The aunt’s
    affidavit thus supports the BIA’s decision because the problem Martinez fears is not
    a new one—gangs have been threatening and perpetrating violence against those who
    refuse to join their ranks since Martinez lived in Guatemala. Sadly, such conditions
    have plagued Guatemala since Martinez left for the United States, and they do not
    amount to “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” for
    purposes of reopening his removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
    Additionally, Martinez re-states his argument that Perez’s death illustrates
    changed country conditions. He contends that the evidence of Perez’s death, in
    -6-
    combination with the statements in his aunt’s affidavit, sufficiently tie Perez’s death
    to Martinez to demonstrate the harm Martinez would face if he returned to Guatemala.
    As the BIA recognized in its order denying Martinez’s motion for reconsideration,
    Perez’s death—even if he was killed because he refused to sell drugs for Guatemala
    gangs—did not establish changed country conditions since Martinez’s October 2012
    hearing. Rather, the arguments made by Martinez regarding Perez’s death were
    similar to the arguments Martinez made at that hearing—that gangs were harming
    those who refused to work for them.
    Martinez failed to “specify the errors of law or fact” in the BIA’s decision
    affirming the denial of his motion to reopen because of his failure to establish changed
    country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). The BIA did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Martinez’s motion for reconsideration.
    III. Conclusion
    For the reasons above, we affirm the BIA’s decisions on both of Martinez’s
    motions.
    ______________________________
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1213, 14-1926

Citation Numbers: 785 F.3d 1262

Judges: Colloton, Beam, Kelly

Filed Date: 5/12/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024