United States v. Justin Ray ( 2012 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 11-3260
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Justin Michael Ray
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: September 18, 2012
    Filed: October 2, 2012
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Justin Michael Ray, a mortgage broker, defrauded a mortgage company by
    helping his father falsify a loan application to buy Ray’s home, knowing his father
    would default. He pled guilty to bank fraud, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1344
     and
    2, and to engaging in monetary transactions using funds from specified unlawful
    activity, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1957
     and 2. The district court1 sentenced him to
    37 months’ imprisonment, enhancing his sentence for obstructing justice under
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Ray does not object to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement but
    appeals the denial of an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
    This court gives great deference to a district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-
    responsibility reduction, reviewing for clear error. United States v. Vega, 
    676 F.3d 708
    , 723 (8th Cir. 2012). An enhancement for obstructing justice “ordinarily
    indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.”
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Application Note 4. “There may, however, be extraordinary cases
    in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.” Id. “[W]hen the
    Commission refers to an ‘extraordinary case,’ it means a situation that is extremely
    rare and highly exceptional.” United States v. Honken, 
    184 F.3d 961
    , 970 (8th Cir.
    1999). In identifying those cases, courts are to consider the totality of circumstances.
    
    Id. at 968
    .
    Although “there is no magic formula,” the district court should consider
    the timing and nature of the defendant’s obstructive conduct, the degree
    of his acceptance of responsibility, whether his obstruction of justice
    was an isolated and early incident, whether he voluntarily terminated his
    obstructive conduct, whether he admitted and recanted his obstructive
    conduct, and whether he assisted in the investigation of his and others’
    offenses.
    United States v. Stoltenberg, 
    309 F.3d 499
    , 500 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting
    Honken, 
    184 F.3d at 969
    ).
    Ray pled guilty, admitted to relevant conduct, and assisted in investigating his
    and others’ offenses. However, he did not accept responsibility until he was arrested
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa.
    -2-
    – about five years after beginning his criminal activities, almost a year after providing
    (admitted) false statements to the FBI, and 15 days after trying to coordinate his
    explanations with his father’s in a recorded conversation. Ray challenges the district
    court’s reliance on the conversation, arguing it was obtained by means “akin to
    entrapment” – a tenuous claim since during the conversation, Ray said he had thought
    about explanations, generated those considered, and repeatedly returned to the topic.
    The record does not support Ray’s assertion that “but for the father’s efforts to coax
    a potentially obstructive explanation for the checks in question, Mr. Ray would not
    have engaged in any further obstructive conduct”; a reasonable observer could
    determine he intended to make false statements before the conversation. See United
    States v. Smith, 
    665 F.3d 951
    , 957 (8th Cir. 2011). But even ignoring the recorded
    conversation, his false statements to the FBI – not recanted until he was arrested
    about a year later – were sufficient obstruction of justice. The district court did not
    clearly err in determining that, by the totality of circumstances, Ray’s case was not
    extraordinary. The district court properly denied the acceptance-of-responsibility
    adjustment.
    The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-3260

Judges: Melloy, Beam, Benton

Filed Date: 10/2/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024