United States v. Craig Goettsch , 812 F.3d 1169 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 15-1358
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Craig Goettsch
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
    ____________
    Submitted: January 11, 2016
    Filed: February 10, 2016
    ____________
    Before MURPHY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
    Craig Goettsch pled guilty to possession of child pornography and was
    sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. The district court1 also placed Goettsch on
    five years of supervised release and imposed a special condition restricting his use of
    1
    The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Arkansas.
    electronic devices and the internet. Goettsch appeals seeking to vacate or modify this
    special condition, and we affirm.
    I.
    On May 12, 2013 government officers identified a computer which was
    engaged in the distribution of child pornography using a file sharing program on the
    internet. Government officials conducted an investigation and determined that Craig
    Goettsch owned the computer they had identified. Based on this information, the
    government obtained a warrant to search Goettsch's computer and his home where the
    computer had been located. The officers executed the search on January 21, 2014 and
    recovered two computers and a USB flash drive.
    Officers met with Goettsch at his workplace in a conference room on January
    22, 2014. When they asked Goettsch if he knew why they had executed a search
    warrant in his home, Goettsch replied that it probably had to do with the "child porn"
    on his computer. He admitted to viewing and storing child pornography for the past
    10 years on his computer. A forensic examination of his laptop and USB flash drive
    uncovered 500 images of child pornography, 300 images of child erotica, and 100
    videos of child pornography, some of which portrayed "sadistic or masochistic
    conduct" according to the presentence investigation report. The government charged
    Goettsch with four counts of receipt of child pornography and one count of
    possessing child pornography.        See 
    18 U.S.C. § 2252
    (a)(2), (b)(1); 
    id.
    § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2).
    On October 2, 2014, Goettsch pled guilty to possessing child pornography, and
    the remaining counts were dismissed. During the sentencing hearing on January 28,
    2015 the district court made an individualized inquiry into the facts and
    circumstances underlying Goettsch's charges and referenced the presentence
    investigation report which detailed his criminal activity and the content of the child
    -2-
    pornography in his possession. The court sentenced Goettsch to 60 months
    imprisonment and imposed five special conditions of supervised release. One of the
    special conditions stated that “[e]xcept for purposes of employment, [Goettsch] shall
    not possess, use or have access to a computer or any other electronic device that has
    internet or photographic capabilities, without the express prior written approval of the
    U.S. Probation Office.” Goettsch appeals the validity of this special condition.
    II.
    We review a district court’s imposition of the terms and conditions of
    supervised release for plain error where, as here, the defendant failed to object to the
    terms at his sentencing hearing. See United States v. Ristine, 
    335 F.3d 692
    , 694 (8th
    Cir. 2003). Although a sentencing judge has wide discretion when imposing the
    terms of supervised release, the court's discretion is limited by "the requirement that
    the conditions be reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors, involve no greater
    deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, and are consistent with any
    pertinent policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission."
    United States v. Koch, 
    625 F.3d 470
    , 481 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
    omitted); see also 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (d).
    Goettsch argues that the court plainly erred by imposing a restriction on his use
    of the internet and electronic devices because the special condition was not
    reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of his offense, his history and
    characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the public from
    further crimes he might commit, or his educational, vocational, medical or other
    correctional needs.2 See 
    id.
     § 3583(d)(1). He also claims that the condition
    unreasonably deprives him of his First Amendment rights. In Ristine we identified
    two relevant factors for determining the propriety of a restriction on computer and
    2
    We grant Goettsch's pending motion to supplement the record.
    -3-
    internet use. See 
    335 F.3d at 696
    . We look to whether there was evidence
    demonstrating that "the defendant did more than merely possess child pornography,"
    and whether the restriction amounts to a total ban on internet and computer use. 
    Id.
    Cf. United States v. Morais, 
    670 F.3d 889
    , 896 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding there is no
    "per se rule that a district court may never impose a prior-approval Internet use
    restriction based on a defendant's receipt and possession of child pornography").
    The record demonstrates that for the past decade Goettsch actively downloaded
    thousands of child pornography images, some of which involved "depictions of
    violence" and portrayed children younger than 12 years old. See 
    id.
     at 896–97.
    Goettsch also shared files over the internet through a file sharing program. The
    computer and internet restriction imposed by the district court in this case is
    reasonable because it is not a total ban on internet and computer use. Goettsch may
    access computers for employment purposes and may obtain permission from his
    probation officer to use a computer for any other legitimate personal purpose. See
    Koch, 
    625 F.3d at 482
    . We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in
    imposing a special condition limiting Goettsch's computer use and internet access.
    We therefore affirm Goettsch's sentence.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1358

Citation Numbers: 812 F.3d 1169, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2261, 2016 WL 520294

Judges: Murphy, Smith, Benton

Filed Date: 2/10/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024