United States v. Jason Schumacher ( 2019 )


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  •                 United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 18-2209
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Jason Michael Schumacher
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque
    ____________
    Submitted: April 15, 2019
    Filed: July 8, 2019
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Jason Schumacher pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled
    substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846, and 851.
    Schumacher appeals his sentence, alleging that the district court1 committed
    procedural error. We affirm.
    Between July 2017 and his arrest on November 30, 2017, Schumacher engaged
    in a conspiracy to traffic at least 16.5 pounds of ice methamphetamine into the
    Northern District of Iowa.2 After he pleaded guilty, the district court determined that
    his advisory sentencing guidelines range was 360 months to life in prison. At
    Schumacher’s sentencing hearing, the district court emphasized that it had “carefully
    considered each and every [sentencing] factor” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). At the
    Government’s recommendation, it sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, the
    bottom of the guidelines range.
    On appeal, Schumacher does not argue that the district court erred in
    calculating and applying the sentencing guidelines. Instead, he claims for the first
    time that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider “the need to avoid
    unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
    been found guilty of similar conduct,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
    “A district court commits procedural error if it fails to consider the § 3553(a)
    factors.” United States v. Barron, 
    557 F.3d 866
    , 868 (8th Cir. 2009). Because
    Schumacher did not object at sentencing to the adequacy of the district court’s
    consideration of the factors, our review is for plain error. See 
    id. “Under plain
    error
    review, the party seeking relief must show that there was an error, the error is clear
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    2
    “Methamphetamine generally comes in two forms: powder or crystalline form.
    The crystalline form is called ‘ice’ and is a purer form of methamphetamine. To be
    called ‘ice’ methamphetamine, the methamphetamine has to be at least 90% pure.”
    United States v. Becker, 
    534 F.3d 952
    , 954 n.5 (8th Cir. 2008).
    -2-
    or obvious under current law, [and] the error affected the party’s substantial rights.”
    United States v. Jackson, 
    909 F.3d 922
    , 924 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). “We will reverse only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity
    or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Schumacher claims that the district court failed to consider how other judges
    in the same district sentence defendants for distributing purer forms of drugs, such
    as ice methamphetamine. But “avoidance of unwarranted disparities was clearly
    considered by the Sentencing Commission when setting the Guidelines ranges.” Gall
    v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 54 (2007). Thus, because the district court “correctly
    calculated and carefully reviewed the Guidelines range, [it] necessarily gave
    significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.”
    See 
    id. Similarly, the
    district court was not required to consider policy disagreements
    that other judges in the same district have with the advisory guidelines for purer
    forms of drugs. See United States v. Manning, 
    738 F.3d 937
    , 947 (8th Cir. 2014)
    (“[W]hile a district court may choose to deviate from the guidelines because of a
    policy disagreement, a district court is not required to do so.” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)); see also United States v. Roberson, 
    517 F.3d 990
    , 995 (8th Cir.
    2008) (declining to require district courts to consider arguments for lighter sentences
    based on the 100:1 disparity between crack and powder cocaine under the
    guidelines); United States v. Sholds, 
    827 F.3d 758
    , 760-61 (8th Cir. 2016). For these
    reasons, the district court also did not, as Schumacher claims, give “undue weight”
    to the guidelines relative to the sentences and policy preferences of other judges in
    the district.
    -3-
    Thus, the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, when imposing
    Schumacher’s sentence. We affirm.3
    ______________________________
    3
    To the extent Schumacher also claims that his sentence was substantively
    unreasonable, we likewise affirm. Our review in that instance is for an abuse of
    discretion. 
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    . Because the district court imposed a within-
    guidelines sentence, we may apply a presumption of reasonableness. 
    Id. For the
    reasons already described, and considering that the district court imposed a sentence
    at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range, Schumacher has not overcome that
    presumption. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion, and
    Schumacher’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable.
    -4-