United States v. Christopher Long , 651 F. App'x 566 ( 2016 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-1005
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Christopher S. Long
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin
    ____________
    Submitted: June 2, 2016
    Filed: June 7, 2016
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before MURPHY, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Christopher Long appeals after he pleaded guilty to a felon-in-possession
    charge and the District Court1 imposed a sentence of ninety-six months in prison and
    1
    The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri.
    three years of supervised release, varying downward from the advisory U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines range. Long’s counsel has moved to withdraw, and in a brief
    filed under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), counsel raises two issues:
    whether Long’s prior conviction under Missouri Revised Statutes section
    571.030.1(4) was a “crime of violence” for purposes of calculating his offense level
    under Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(2) and whether the sentence is substantively
    unreasonable. In a pro se supplemental brief, Long joins counsel in challenging the
    designation of his prior conviction as a crime of violence and also requests prior-
    custody credit.
    We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the court did not err in
    determining that the section 571.030.1(4) offense was a “crime of violence” under the
    Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1) (defining “crime
    of violence”); United States v. Pulliam, 
    566 F.3d 784
    , 788 (8th Cir.) (holding that
    § 571.030.1(4) “meets the statutory definition of violent felony in [18 U.S.C.]
    § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because it involves the ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use of
    physical force against the person of another’”), cert. denied, 
    558 U.S. 1035
    (2009);
    United States v. Vincent, 
    575 F.3d 820
    , 826 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The statutory definition
    of ‘violent felony’ is viewed as interchangeable with the guidelines definition of
    ‘crime of violence.’” (citations to quoted cases omitted)), cert. denied, 
    560 U.S. 927
    (2010). We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
    vary downward any more than it did. See United States v. Lazarski, 
    560 F.3d 731
    ,
    733–34 (8th Cir. 2009). Finally, Long must raise any issue of prior-custody credit
    with the Bureau of Prisons. See United States v. Iversen, 
    90 F.3d 1340
    , 1344 (8th
    Cir.1996).
    We have reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    (1988), and
    we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, we grant
    counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we deny Long’s pending motions.
    ______________________________
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1005

Citation Numbers: 651 F. App'x 566

Judges: Murphy, Bowman, Benton

Filed Date: 6/7/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024