United States v. Daniel Ray , 772 F.3d 824 ( 2014 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-1711
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Daniel T. Ray
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
    ____________
    Submitted: November 11, 2014
    Filed: November 18, 2014
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    RILEY, Chief Judge.
    A grand jury indicted Daniel T. Ray for possessing with intent to distribute at
    least five grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
    (b)(1)(B)(viii), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of this drug trafficking crime
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). While on pretrial release, Ray was to reside at a
    residential drug treatment facility and follow facility rules. On October 17, 2013, at
    Ray’s request, the magistrate judge ordered Ray to appear for a change-of-plea
    hearing on November 7, 2013. Three days before the hearing, Ray slipped away from
    the treatment facility after curfew and did not return. With Ray still missing on
    November 6, 2013, the magistrate judge issued a warrant for his arrest. Ray did not
    appear at the November 7 hearing. Arrested the next day, Ray ultimately pled guilty
    to both counts. The district court1 sentenced Ray to 160 months imprisonment (100
    months for methamphetamine possession and a consecutive 60 months for firearm
    possession). Ray appeals his sentence.
    I.     DISCUSSION
    A.    Obstruction-of-Justice Enhancement
    Ray argues the district court procedurally erred by applying a two-level
    obstruction-of-justice enhancement in United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.
    or Guidelines) § 3C1.1. The enhancement applies to, among other things, “escaping
    or attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to
    appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E). By
    absconding from the drug treatment facility in violation of his pretrial release
    conditions, Ray escaped “from custody” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. See
    Hayes v. United States, 
    281 F.3d 724
    , 725 (8th Cir. 2002).
    Ray also satisfied § 3C1.1 by failing to appear at his court ordered change-of-
    plea hearing. Ray claims he was at the courthouse on the day of the hearing and left
    without appearing in court. He argues his nonappearance “did not cause the court . . .
    any material delay or expense.” But unlike United States v. Peters, 
    394 F.3d 1103
    (8th Cir. 2005), to which Ray compares his case, Ray’s plea hearing was scheduled
    weeks in advance, he gave no explanation for his absence, and he never requested a
    continuance. Compare 
    Peters, 394 F.3d at 1106
    (excusing the defendant’s failure to
    appear at the hearing scheduled on short notice where the defendant had informed her
    1
    The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District
    of Nebraska.
    -2-
    attorney of her inability to attend the hearing, leading her attorney to move
    successfully for a continuance). Ray’s plea hearing was cancelled and rescheduled
    because Ray chose not to attend, leaving the magistrate judge sitting on the bench
    waiting for Ray to appear. Ray’s actions also forced the government to expend time
    and manpower to apprehend him and required an additional revocation hearing before
    the rescheduled plea hearing. The delay and extra work were material. The district
    court did not err in applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    B.    Sentence Reasonableness
    Challenging only the 100 months in prison he received for possession of
    methamphetamine, Ray urges the district court gave “too little weight to the traumatic
    effects of his dysfunctional upbringing” and “overestimat[ed] the likelihood Ray
    would commit future crimes.” Ray’s calculated advisory Guidelines range was 100
    to 125 months (offense level 25, category V). “A sentence,” like Ray’s, “which falls
    within the guideline range is presumed to be reasonable, and district courts are
    allowed ‘wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some
    factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.’” United
    States v. Callaway, 
    762 F.3d 754
    , 760 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
    Maxwell, 
    664 F.3d 240
    , 247 (8th Cir. 2011)). Our careful review of the record shows
    Ray cannot overcome this presumption, and the district court did not abuse its
    considerable discretion. See Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51-52 (2007)
    (standard of review). The district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors and fairly
    reasoned as follows:
    The defendant . . . [has] been a troubled young man, young boy, for a
    very long time. There is a very substantial risk that this young man will
    commit additional crimes. Therefore, a long prison sentence . . . taking
    him out of circulation for a long period of time, I believe, is required.
    -3-
    II.   CONCLUSION
    We affirm.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1711

Citation Numbers: 772 F.3d 824, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21759, 2014 WL 6450041

Judges: Riley, Beam, Gruender

Filed Date: 11/18/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024