Brian Moe v. MTD Products ( 1995 )


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  •                                  ___________
    No. 95-1938
    ___________
    Brian Moe; Thomas Moe; Saundra      *
    Moe,                                *
    *
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,      *
    *  Appeal from the United States
    v.                            *  District Court for the
    *  District of Minnesota
    MTD Products, Inc.,                 *
    *
    Defendant - Appellee.         *
    __________
    Submitted:       November 15, 1995
    Filed:    December 27, 1995
    __________
    Before HANSEN, LAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    __________
    MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
    This case arises from an accident in which the fingers of Brian Moe's
    right hand were amputated when he reached into the grass chute of a
    lawnmower manufactured by MTD Products, Inc.      He and his parents sued MTD
    1
    under several theories of recovery, alleging that a safety device on the
    mower was defectively designed and that MTD had failed to warn purchasers
    of the design problems.     The district court granted summary judgment
    dismissing all of the claims on the basis that they were preempted by the
    Consumer
    1
    The Moes pled strict liability, negligence, and breach of
    the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
    Product Safety Act (CPSA), 
    15 U.S.C. § 2051
     et seq.2      We affirm in part
    and reverse in part.
    I.
    On the morning of July 29, 1992, seventeen year old Brian Moe was
    mowing a neighbor's lawn using his father's walk-behind, self propelled
    mower.   Brian was an experienced operator of the mower, having mowed lawns
    with it for his family and neighbors for several years.    The mower became
    clogged with wet grass several times that morning, and Brian cleared it by
    releasing the mower's operator handle, bending over, and reaching into the
    side grass chute to unclog it.   He had been able to do this without injury
    because the mower was equipped with a safety device, called a blade
    brake/clutch system (BBC), that permitted the cutting blade to rotate only
    when the control lever on the operator handle was engaged.       The BBC was
    designed to stop the rotation of the cutting blade within three seconds of
    the release of the control lever.
    When Brian released the control lever the third or fourth time the
    mower became clogged, the cutting blade did not stop rotating.    He did not
    notice that the blade had continued to rotate, and when he reached his
    right hand into the grass chute, the fingers were severed.        After the
    accident, his sisters continued the mowing job.   At one point, the cutting
    blade completely stopped rotating, and it was discovered that the BBC
    control cable had broken.   This cable connected the control lever to the
    blade area.    The cable appeared to have frayed and broken, strand by
    strand, in an area where it passed through, and rubbed against, the
    throttle control housing,
    2
    In ruling from the bench, the court also expressed the view
    that the design defect claim could not succeed because the
    lawnmower had been altered, making proof of proximate causation
    impossible. This claim has been described by the Moes as one for
    a defectively designed product actually installed, and it asserts
    improper design of a safety device.
    2
    which was a black plastic box.
    Thomas Moe, Brian's father, had owned the mower for three years at
    the time of the accident and had repaired several of its parts.              In 1991,
    the mower handle had broken from the base, and Thomas Moe had it reattached
    by a welder.   The repaired handle was 1 3/8" longer than the original.
    II.
    The Moes claim that Brian's accident was caused by the design of the
    installed BBC and that it was defective because it routed the control cable
    in an unsafe manner, resulting in fraying.          They allege that the control
    cable frayed because it rubbed against the plastic of the throttle control
    housing and because its path included several sharp turns that increased
    the pressure on the cable.       MTD responds that the fraying was caused by the
    lengthening of the mower handle, which made the cable more taut and
    increased the stress on it.
    The Moes also claim that MTD failed to warn purchasers that the BBC
    design would cause the cable to fray.         Although the mower's grass chute had
    a label warning of the danger of injury to the fingers from a rotating
    blade, they believe that an additional label should have been placed on the
    mower handle warning that the cable might fray.               The owner's manual
    instructed the owner to inspect the control cable because "[i]f the cable
    becomes   frayed,   it   could    cause    the   blade   brake/clutch   to   operate
    improperly."   The Moes assert that this manual information was insufficient
    notice of the potential hazard.
    3
    The district court held that all of the Moes' claims3 were preempted
    by the CPSA.    That statute established the Consumer Protection Safety
    Commission (CPSC), 
    15 U.S.C. § 2053
    , authorized it to promulgate federal
    product safety standards for various products, 
    id.
     §§ 2056, 2058, and
    expressly preempted any non-identical state standards, id. § 2075.     The
    Moes argue that the CPSA preemption clause does not preempt their failure
    to warn or design defect claims.    MTD contends that the failure to warn
    claim is preempted by the federal statute, but agrees that the design
    defect claim is not.   It argues that summary judgment was also appropriate
    on that claim, however, because of undisputed evidence that the product had
    been substantially altered.
    III.
    The CPSA expressly states the intent of Congress to preempt state
    safety standards or regulations that are not identical to the federal
    standard:
    Whenever a consumer product safety standard under this chapter
    is in effect and applies to a risk of injury associated with a
    consumer product, no State or political subdivision of a State
    shall have any authority either to establish or to continue in
    effect any provision of a safety standard or regulation which
    prescribes any requirements as to the performance, composition,
    design, finish, construction, packaging, or labeling of such
    product which are designed to deal with the same risk of injury
    associated with such consumer product, unless such requirements
    are identical to the requirements of the Federal standard.
    
    15 U.S.C. § 2075
    (1).   If a federal standard establishes a labelling
    3
    The record indicates that the Moes also raised a claim that
    MTD should have installed an engine-kill system rather than the
    BBC. The Moes made clear at oral argument, however, that they
    are presently not pursuing such a claim. Since the CPSA has
    authorized installation of either an engine-kill system or a BBC,
    that claim would be preempted in any event. See footnote 4,
    infra.
    4
    requirement warning of injuries to the fingers from the mower blade, any
    state standard requiring different or additional warnings about the same
    risk of injury would thus be expressly preempted.
    The statute preempts not only positive enactments of state standards,
    but also common law tort actions that would have the effect of creating a
    state standard.   Allowing a jury to assess damages for MTD's failure to
    place a warning label on the mower handle would create a state standard or
    regulation requiring such a warning.   It is well established that "[state]
    regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as
    through some form of preventive relief."   Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
    
    112 S. Ct. 2608
    , 2620 (1992); Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 
    49 F.3d 430
    ,
    432 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 182
     (1995).
    The CPSC created a federal safety standard for lawnmowers when it
    promulgated a Safety Standard for Walk-Behind Power Lawn Mowers (Mower
    Standard), 
    16 C.F.R. § 1205
    , as authorized by the CPSA, 
    15 U.S.C. § 2056
    .
    In addition to setting out performance requirements for mowers,4 the Mower
    Standard requires that a warning label be placed on each mower's blade
    housing.    The label must contain both a written warning against blade
    contact injury and a depiction of a blade slicing into a hand.    
    16 C.F.R. § 1205.6
    .
    The Moes' failure to warn claim suggests that MTD should have warned
    consumers that the BBC cable might fray.   The risk of injury contemplated
    by such a warning is the same as that addressed by the
    4
    The Mower Standard requires that each mower pass a "foot
    probe" test, which in effect requires a protective shield
    extending from the blade housing. Each mower must also have a
    blade control system that permits the blade to rotate only if the
    operator presses on a special control on the mower handle. 
    16 C.F.R. § 1205.5
    (a). The manufacturer has an option of choosing
    between a BBC, similar to that in this case, or an engine-kill
    system, which stops the engine when a control lever is released.
    5
    labelling requirements in the Mower Standard -- injury to the hands by the
    cutting blade.     If the Moes' failure to warn claim were successful, it
    would create a state standard requiring additional warnings on lawn mowers
    or in owner manuals related to the same risk of injury addressed by the
    federal standard.    This claim is thus expressly preempted by the CPSA.
    The Moes argue that the savings clause in the CPSA preserves their
    failure to warn claim, but they read the clause too broadly.     The savings
    clause provides that "[c]ompliance with consumer product safety rules or
    other rules or orders under this Act shall not relieve any person from
    liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person."
    
    15 U.S.C. § 2074
    (a).     The goals and policies of a statute must guide the
    interpretation of its savings clause.     International Paper v. Ouellette,
    
    479 U.S. 481
    , 493 (1987).    A general remedies savings clause such as this
    "cannot be allowed to supersede the specific substantive pre-emption
    provision."    Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
    112 S. Ct. 2031
     (1992);
    Carstensen, 
    49 F.3d at 432
    .
    One purpose of the CPSA is to "develop uniform safety standards for
    consumer products and to minimize conflicting State and local regulations."
    
    15 U.S.C. § 2051
    (b)(3).      The statute's express preemption of mower
    standards that are not identical to a federal standard addressing the same
    risk of injury is consistent with this goal.   The savings clause should not
    be interpreted to subvert the preemption provision and should be read to
    save those claims that are not expressly preempted.       See Carstensen, 
    49 F.3d at 432
    .    The failure to warn claim is not preserved.
    The Moes' defective design claim is an example of the type of
    6
    claim the savings clause preserves, however.5        See 
    id.
       A successful tort
    action based on the defective design of an installed BBC would not create
    a different standard for mower safety or impose additional requirements on
    the manufacturer.      Instead it would create an incentive for manufacturers
    to install a BBC that works and is properly designed, and thus ensure that
    the federal standard has meaning.       The Moes' defective design claim is not
    preempted by the CPSA and should not have been dismissed on that ground.
    The question remains whether summary judgment was properly granted
    on the design defect claims on the alternate theory that the mower had been
    altered.      Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no disputed issues
    of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law.      Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).   All evidence and inferences must be viewed
    in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.        Anderson v. Liberty
    Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 250 (1986).           We review a grant of summary
    judgment de novo.
    MTD argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the design
    claim because the alteration of the mower handle makes it impossible for
    the Moes to establish causation.           Minnesota law requires a plaintiff
    asserting any theory of products liability to show a causal link between
    the alleged design defect and the injury.          Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 
    346 N.W.2d 616
    , 623 n. 3 (Minn. 1984) (strict liability); Hudson v. Snyder
    Body,       Inc., 
    326 N.W.2d 149
    , 157 (Minn. 1982) (negligence); Farr v.
    Armstrong Rubber Co.,
    5
    The Moes attempt to save their failure to warn claim by
    framing it in terms of their design defect claim. They argue
    that MTD had a duty to warn consumers that the product was
    designed in a manner that would cause the cable to fray. This
    does not change the analysis, however, because the warnings they
    seek would be designed to prevent the same risk of injury as
    those in the federal standard. The Moes do not suggest that the
    design defect creates any risk of injuries other than those from
    the cutting blade.
    7
    
    179 N.W.2d 64
    , 69 (Minn. 1970) (breach of warranty).    A plaintiff asserting
    strict   liability must also show that the injury was not caused by
    mishandling of the product.       Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg. Inc., 
    171 N.W.2d 201
    ,
    6
    206 (Minn. 1969).
    The record here shows that issues of material fact exist as to
    whether the BBC design caused Brian's injury.     The Moes claim that the BBC
    control cable frayed because it was routed through the plastic control
    housing that rubbed against the cable and because the cable's path included
    significant bends.       MTD claims that the cable frayed because the mower
    handle was lengthened, which increased the stress on the cable.      Although
    it is undisputed that the mower handle was lengthened, there is a dispute
    whether the increased length affected the BBC cable.          The MTD expert
    suggests that the additional length of the mower handle "contributed to
    cause the cable to break or the blade brake clutch mechanism to function
    improperly."    (App. 148).     The Moes' expert concludes that the increased
    length of the mower handle did not affect the cable stress because there
    was still "play" in the cable.          (App. 98-99).   Summary judgment was
    inappropriate because of the presence of real issues of material fact.
    MTD's reliance on Rients v. International Harvester Co., 
    346 N.W.2d 359
    , 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1984), is not
    persuasive.    The plaintiff in Rients was involved in a tractor accident and
    alleged that the front axle attachment was defectively designed.          
    Id.
    Summary judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed since the plaintiff
    could not prove a causal link between the design and the accident; there
    were many other possible causes.     Although one alternate cause was that the
    attachment had been significantly altered by the plaintiff, it was not the
    only possibility.       The tractor's brakes were worn, the
    6
    MTD also asserted misuse and alteration of the product as
    an affirmative defense.
    8
    steering gear was broken, and other parts were not functional or were bent.
    
    Id.
       In contrast, there is no dispute here that the frayed cable caused the
    accident, and there are only two theories about how the cable became
    frayed.    Based on the evidence in the record, it would not be "sheer
    speculation" for a jury in this case to find that the design, rather than
    the alteration, caused the fraying and the accident.     See 
    id.
    MTD also argues that the design defect claim cannot proceed under a
    strict liability theory because the plaintiffs cannot prove that the
    product reached them "without substantial change in the condition in which
    it was originally sold by the manufacturer."     Rients v. Int'l Harvester
    Co., 
    346 N.W.2d at
    362 (citing McCormack v. Handscraft Co., 
    154 N.W.2d 488
    ,
    499 (Minn. 1967)).     It asserts that the Moes cannot meet this burden
    because the mower was substantially altered when the handle was lengthened,
    but that repair took place after the product reached the Moes.     MTD does
    not suggest that the mower was altered in any way before it reached them,
    but cites Rients in support.     The plaintiff there failed to prove his
    strict liability theory, but he had bought the front axle attachment as a
    used part at least twenty years after it was manufactured.     Here, Thomas
    Moe purchased the mower new.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the dismissal of the preempted
    claims, but reverse the dismissal of the design defect claim and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    9