Venture Properties v. First Southern Bank ( 1996 )


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  •                                _____________
    No. 95-1819EA
    _____________
    Venture Properties, Inc.,            *
    *
    Appellant,          *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                              *   District Court for the Eastern
    *   District of Arkansas.
    First Southern Bank,                 *
    *
    Appellee.           *
    _____________
    Submitted:   November 17, 1995
    Filed: March 7, 1996
    _____________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit
    Judge, and FAGG, Circuit Judge.
    _____________
    FAGG, Circuit Judge.
    Venture Properties, Inc. (Venture) appeals following a jury verdict
    in favor of First Southern Bank (First Southern) on Venture's usury claim.
    We affirm.
    Venture owed a total of about $2 million on two promissory notes.
    After the notes came due and Venture was unable to pay, the creditors
    holding the notes offered to accept $1.3 million in full satisfaction of
    the debts if Venture could make the payment by the end of the year.
    Because Venture did not have $1.3 million available, Venture worked out a
    special arrangement with First Southern, an Arkansas bank.    First Southern
    bought the promissory notes from Venture's creditors for $1.3 million.
    Venture agreed to make three monthly payments of $20,000 to First Southern
    and then purchase the notes for about $1.34 million.    Although Venture made
    the monthly payments as agreed, Venture had not raised enough money
    to purchase the notes from First Southern at the end of the three months.
    First Southern then imposed some financial penalties on Venture, and
    Venture protested.     In the following weeks Venture was able to raise some
    capital, the parties reached a compromise about how much Venture owed, and
    First Southern accepted about $1.4 million as payment in full.
    Venture   then    brought   this    lawsuit,   contending   the   financial
    arrangement with First Southern was in essence a usurious $1.3 million loan
    from First Southern to Venture.    Based on all the payments Venture made to
    First Southern, Venture calculated the "loan" had an annual interest rate
    of almost 30% that greatly exceeded the maximum interest rate permitted by
    federal usury law.     See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1994).      First Southern argued
    its arrangement with Venture was not a loan, but a legitimate purchase and
    sale agreement not subject to usury restrictions.          First Southern also
    raised several affirmative defenses.      A jury returned a general verdict in
    favor of First Southern and the district court entered judgment on the
    verdict.
    On appeal, Venture argues the district court should have granted
    Venture's motion for judgment as a matter of law.         We disagree.    Because
    First Southern is located in Arkansas, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d allowed First
    Southern to charge the maximum interest rate that Arkansas law would permit
    on   the   transaction with Venture, and § 1831d requires us to apply
    Arkansas's entire substantive law of usury to determine what that rate was.
    See First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 
    509 F.2d 872
    , 876 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding
    12 U.S.C. § 85 incorporates state substantive usury law);         Greenwood Trust
    Co. v. Massachusetts, 
    971 F.2d 818
    , 826-27 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating 12
    U.S.C. § 1831d parallels 12 U.S.C. § 85 and should be interpreted the same
    way), cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 1052
    (1993).      Under Arkansas law, purchase and
    sale agreements are not subject to any usury restrictions unless the
    agreements are merely disguised loans.          General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
    Robbins, 
    414 F.2d 208
    , 209-210 (8th
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    Cir. 1969);     Estate of Traylor v. Harmon, 
    576 S.W.2d 201
    , 202-03 (Ark.
    1979) (en banc);    Haley v. Greenhaw, 
    360 S.W.2d 753
    , 756-57 (Ark. 1962).
    Whether a purchase agreement is actually a disguised loan is a question of
    fact, 
    Haley, 360 S.W.2d at 758
    , and First Southern presented sufficient
    evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude the agreement in this case was
    not a loan and thus was not usurious.               For example, First Southern
    officials testified they refused Venture's request for a loan and proposed
    the purchase and sale agreement as an alternative.           See Geominerals Corp.
    v. Grace, 
    338 S.W.2d 935
    , 938 (Ark. 1960).          First Southern also presented
    evidence that neither Venture nor First Southern treated the transaction
    as a loan in their financial records.     See 
    id. at 938-39.
          In our view, the
    district court properly denied Venture's motion for judgment as a matter
    of law and allowed the jury to determine the transaction's true nature.
    Venture     also   challenges   several   of    the    district   court's   jury
    instructions.    After carefully reviewing Arkansas usury cases, we conclude
    the district court correctly instructed the jury that Venture was required
    to prove usury by clear and convincing evidence.               See Renfro v. Swift
    Eckrich, Inc., 
    53 F.3d 1460
    , 1466 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Smith v. MRCC
    Partnership, 
    792 S.W.2d 301
    , 305 (Ark. 1990)).             Venture cannot shift the
    burden of proof to First Southern because the transaction was not usurious
    on its face.    Medford v. Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 
    691 S.W.2d 857
    , 858-59
    (Ark. 1985).    Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    framing the jury instruction about discounting or by rejecting Venture's
    proposed instruction about profit, because the jury instructions as a whole
    fairly and adequately explain the applicable law.             See Resolution Trust
    Corp. v. Eason, 
    17 F.3d 1126
    , 1132 (8th Cir. 1994).
    We also reject Venture's contention that the district court should
    not have instructed the jury to consider First Southern's affirmative
    defenses of compromise and settlement, accord and
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    satisfaction, and estoppel.   Unlike Venture, we believe the record would
    allow a reasonable jury to conclude Venture settled its usury claim against
    First Southern when Venture negotiated the final "payment in full" for the
    notes, and then Venture changed its position and filed a usury claim.
    Thus, the district court correctly submitted the affirmative defenses to
    the jury.
    Venture also claims the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 39 and abused its discretion by granting First Southern's
    untimely request for a jury trial.       We need not consider whether the
    district court committed a procedural error because any error would be
    harmless.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.      Venture has not asserted it was
    prejudiced by the district court's decision to conduct a jury trial rather
    than a bench trial, and the record does not reveal any prejudice.    
    Id. Having decided
    Venture received a fair trial in the district court,
    we affirm the judgment for First Southern.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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