United States v. Frederick Douglas ( 1996 )


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  •                                     ___________
    No. 95-3460
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                                  *   District Court for the
    *   Northern District of Iowa.
    Frederick Douglas,                       *         [PUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted:     June 18, 1996
    Filed:   June 24, 1996
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Frederick Douglas, a former federal inmate, appeals the period of
    supervised release imposed by the district court1 at resentencing.           We
    affirm.
    Douglas was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentenced to 120 months
    imprisonment and three years supervised release.     United States v. Douglas,
    
    964 F.2d 738
    , 739 (8th Cir. 1992).        After the district court denied his
    motion to reduce his sentence, we remanded for resentencing according to
    a clarifying Guidelines amendment.      United States v. Douglas, 
    64 F.3d 450
    ,
    451-53 (8th Cir. 1995).
    1
    The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Chief Judge, United States
    District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
    At his September 1995 resentencing, Douglas's Guidelines range was
    27 to 33 months, and the supervised release range was two to three years.
    Because Douglas had already served 46 months in prison, he requested that
    no supervised release be imposed, arguing that the time he had spent
    imprisoned beyond the Guidelines range should "qualif[y] as an intensive
    supervised release."   The government requested that the court impose three
    years of supervised release.
    The district court sentenced Douglas to 33 months' imprisonment with
    credit for time served, and two years supervised release.   In imposing the
    two-year term of supervised release, the court stated:
    I think that Mr. Douglas should be given some credit for the
    fact that he's actually served a sentence that's probably in
    excess of what he would have otherwise have served in computing
    supervised release, however, I'm not comfortable not putting
    Mr. Douglas on any supervised release given the fact that he
    has a history of committing offenses while on probation, and I
    believe that some period of transition back to the community is
    appropriate and that a two year term of supervised release is
    the term to be imposed in this case.
    Douglas was immediately placed on supervised release.
    On appeal, Douglas argues that his imprisonment and supervised
    release are separate parts of the same sentence for his offense conduct,
    and that the excess prison time he served should be credited against his
    supervised release term.    Douglas cites cases from other circuits which
    suggest that prison time served in excess of a defendant's revised sentence
    can be credited against the defendant's term of supervised release.      We
    have reviewed these cases, and others not cited by the parties, and are not
    persuaded they are correct.
    -2-
    Because Douglas was convicted of a Class C felony, see 18 U.S.C.
    §   3559(a)(3), the district court was without authority to impose a
    supervised release term less than two years, see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2)
    (for Class C felony, supervised release term "shall" be at least two
    years).
    The statute dealing with the release of a prisoner plainly states
    that supervised release "commences on the day the person is released from
    imprisonment," and "does not run during any period in which the person is
    imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal . . . crime."   See
    18 U.S.C. § 3624(e); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (sentence may include term of
    supervised release imposed after imprisonment); United States v. Watkins,
    
    14 F.3d 414
    , 415 (8th Cir. 1994).   We note that this is consistent with the
    distinctly different purposes of imprisonment and supervised release.    See
    United States v. Love, 
    19 F.3d 415
    , 417 & n.4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 434
    (1994); S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
    1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3306-08 (discussing purposes of supervised release,
    one of which is to ease transition into community).
    We conclude that the district court properly imposed a two-year term
    of supervised release.   Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-