United States v. Steven B. Sewell ( 1996 )


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  •                         United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________
    No. 96-1401
    ___________
    United States of America,             *
    *
    Appellee,             *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                               *   District Court for the
    *   Eastern District of Missouri
    Steven B. Sewell,                     *
    *
    Appellant.            *
    ___________
    Submitted:     June 11, 1996
    Filed:     July 26, 1996
    ___________
    Before MAGILL, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and      DOTY*,
    District Judge.
    ___________
    DOTY, District Judge.
    *
    The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District
    Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by
    designation.
    I.
    Defendant Steven Sewell ("Sewell") appeals from his conviction
    under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1), for possessing a
    firearm as a thrice-convicted felon.1    We affirm.
    Sewell's conviction arises from a traffic stop made on or
    about February 24, 1995.   Defendant consented to a search of the
    passenger compartment, which revealed a loaded ammunition clip.
    Defendant claimed to have no knowledge of the origins of this clip.
    When asked whether there were any weapons in the trunk of the car,
    defendant denied that there were.    A subsequent search revealed a
    nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol which had been placed atop a
    pile of clothing in the trunk.       When this fact was brought to
    defendant's attention while he waited in a patrol car, he stated
    that the gun belonged to his brother and he had not known it was in
    his trunk.
    At trial, the government brought a motion in limine to exclude
    Sewell's statements as hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) and 802.
    In response, defendant argued that the statements were admissible
    within the exception for "excited utterances".        Fed. R. Evid.
    803(2).    The court orally granted the motion, stating that he
    didn't believe that a person denying knowledge of a firearm, when
    one is found, is an utterance that had been created by a physical
    shock, stress or nervous excitement absent testimony to that
    effect.
    1
    The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Judge, United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    -2-
    Defendant's continuing objection to the ruling was noted.
    Trial Transcript at 27.     Sewell testified on his own behalf, and
    stated that he did not have knowledge of the origins of the
    ammunition    clip.   However,   he   did   not   testify   regarding   his
    contemporaneous statement that he had not known the gun was in his
    car.    Sewell was convicted and sentenced.          He argues that his
    contemporaneous statement should have been admitted as an excited
    utterance, and the trial's court's refusal to do so "severely
    prejudiced" him.
    II.
    The parties agree that this court may reverse the trial court
    only upon a showing that it has abused its discretion in excluding
    the testimony as hearsay.     U.S. v. Martin, 
    59 F.3d 767
    , 769 (8th
    Cir. 1995).    No such showing has been made here.
    The justification for the "excited utterance" exception, as
    this Circuit has noted, derives from the teaching of experience
    that the stress of nervous excitement or physical shock "stills the
    reflective faculties," thus removing an impediment to truthfulness.
    U.S. v. Elem, 
    845 F.2d 170
    , 174 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting 6 Wigmore,
    Evidence § 1747, at 195 (Chadbourne rev. 1976)):
    Since this utterance is made under the immediate and
    uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the
    brief period when considerations of self-interest could
    not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned
    reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly
    trustworthy (or at least lacking the usual grounds for
    untrustworthiness), and thus expressing the real tenor of
    -3-
    the speaker's belief as to the facts just observed by
    him.
    
    Id. Defendant's argument
    that he was merely reacting naturally to
    the "shock" of an "extraordinarily startling event" - i.e., the
    discovery of a weapon in his possession - is unconvincing.            Where
    incriminating     evidence    is   discovered   in   one's   possession,   it
    requires only the briefest reflection to conclude that a denial and
    plea of ignorance is the best strategy.         This hardly comports with
    the spirit of disinterested witness which pervades the rule.          There
    is no evidence that the defendant's self-serving statement derived
    from an uncontrolled "excitement" experienced while learning of the
    evidence against him.        The trial court's ruling reflects reasoned
    consideration of the requirements of the rule and is correct.
    Affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-1401

Filed Date: 7/26/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015