Benny L. Wheeler v. St. Louis SW Railway ( 1996 )


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  •                                    ___________
    No. 95-4042
    ___________
    Benny L. Wheeler,                  *
    *
    Appellant,              *
    *    Appeal from the United States
    v.                           *    District Court for the
    *    Eastern District of Missouri.
    St. Louis Southwestern Railway     *
    Company; Southern Pacific          *
    Transportation Company,            *
    *
    Appellees.              *
    ___________
    Submitted:     May 15, 1996
    Filed:   July 26, 1996
    ___________
    Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Benny Wheeler appeals the district court's1 order dismissing his
    claim for severance benefits against St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.         We affirm.
    I.
    Benny Wheeler was employed by the St. Louis Southwestern Railway
    Company (Railway) as a locomotive engineer and was a member of the
    Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE), a railroad union that represents
    engineers.   Pursuant to a national agreement with the United Transportation
    Union (UTU), Wheeler also acquired seniority as a conductor, brakeman, and
    switchman.   The UTU is also
    1
    The Honorable Steven Limbaugh, United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    a railroad union that represents employees in train and yard service.2
    In 1992, Railway developed a severance plan to reduce, on a voluntary
    basis, employees working as conductors, brakemen, and switchmen.                Wheeler
    retired from active service on July 1, 1992, and applied for a $60,000 buy-
    out under the severance plan.      Railway denied Wheeler's application on the
    basis that he was not an eligible employee under the plan.
    Wheeler   appealed    the   denial   of   his   application        to   the   plan
    administrator.     After the plan administrator denied his claim, Wheeler
    filed suit in Missouri state court.         Railway removed the case to federal
    court, alleging that the claim was alternatively governed by the Railway
    Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (RLA) and the Employee Retirement
    Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140 et seq. (ERISA).            The district court
    denied Wheeler's motion to remand the case to state court.                Railway then
    moved for summary judgment on the ground that the case was preempted by the
    RLA.   The district court found that Wheeler's claim for severance benefits
    was subject to arbitration under the RLA.              Concluding that it lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, the district court treated
    Railway's motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and dismissed
    the action.
    II.
    From 1988   through    1991,   Railway    and   the   UTU   were    involved    in
    negotiations between the nation's railroads and the railroad unions
    involving, inter alia, reduction in crew consist.            Crew consist refers to
    the number of employees necessary to safely operate a train.               The parties
    failed to reach agreement, and in order to
    2
    Included in this category of employees are conductors,
    brakemen, and switchmen.
    -2-
    avoid a nationwide strike by the unions, President George Bush appointed
    Presidential Emergency Board 219 (the Board) to investigate the disputes
    and make recommendations.              On January 15, 1991, the Board found that the
    railroads had valid reasons for proposing a reduction in crew consist and
    recommended that the individual parties negotiate at the local level.
    Despite the Board's recommendations, some of the railroads and unions
    failed to reach agreement.             In response to this failure, Congress enacted
    Public Law 102-29, which imposed the recommendations submitted by the
    Board.        Settlement of Railroad Labor-Management Disputes, Pub. L. No. 102-
    29, 105 Stat. 169 (1991).                 In accordance with this legislation, an
    arbitration panel was appointed to resolve the crew consist dispute between
    Railway and the UTU.          On December 31, 1991, the panel issued its decision,
    known as the "Witt Award."3              Pursuant to the Witt Award, train and yard
    service employees would receive a $60,000 buy-out if they voluntarily
    retired          from   service   by   March   31,    1992.      The   Witt   Award   became a
    congressionally-mandated collective bargaining agreement in response to
    Public Law 102-29.4
    III.
    Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will not be granted
    lightly.           Bowe v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
    974 F.2d 101
    , 103 (8th Cir.
    1992), cert. denied, 
    507 U.S. 992
    (1993).                     Dismissal is proper, however,
    when a facial attack on a complaint's alleged basis for subject matter
    jurisdiction shows there is no basis for jurisdiction.                        
    Id. 3 The
    Award was named after the panel's chairperson, Helen
    Witt.
    4
    Public Law 102-29 provided that the recommendations of the
    Board shall be binding on the parties and "shall have the same
    effect as though arrived at by agreement of the parties under the
    Railway Labor Act . . . ." Pub. L. No. 102-29, § 1(3).
    -3-
    The issue is whether Wheeler's claim is preempted by the RLA.               In
    enacting the RLA, Congress attempted "``to promote stability in labor-
    management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving
    labor disputes.'"    Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, 
    40 F.3d 269
    , 272 (8th
    Cir. 1994) (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 
    114 S. Ct. 2239
    ,
    2243    (1994)).    To   accomplish   this    goal,   the   RLA    imposes   mandatory
    arbitration for "minor" disputes.      
    Id. Controversy over
    the meaning of an
    existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation is
    one example of a "minor" dispute.             
    Taggart, 40 F.3d at 272
    (citing
    Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R.R., 
    353 U.S. 30
    , 33
    (1957)).    In other words, the RLA preempts "state law claims that involve
    minor disputes because such disputes are subject to mandatory arbitration."
    
    Taggart, 40 F.3d at 272
    .
    Wheeler argues that he is not seeking benefits pursuant to the
    collectively-bargained Witt Award but rather under Railway's severance
    plan.     He claims that because the severance plan was not drafted pursuant
    to the Witt Award, it is not a collective bargaining agreement subject to
    the arbitration provisions of the RLA.           He contends that the plan was
    drafted solely by Railway and was thus not "bargained" for at all.                  He
    further argues that the plan itself permits court adjudication of his
    claim.
    We find Wheeler's contentions unpersuasive for several reasons.
    First, the plan specifically refers to both Public Law 102-29 and the Witt
    Award.5    Moreover, the plan simply mirrors the
    5
    The specific         language       contained      in    the   Summary   Plan
    Description states:
    This program is intended to make available a choice
    between voluntary separation and dismissal allowance
    benefits to train and yard service employees in Company
    service, in accordance with the Crew Consist Arbitration
    Award dated December 31, 1991 issued pursuant to Public
    Law No. 102-29.
    -4-
    provisions set out in the Witt Award.             For example, both the plan and the
    Witt Award provide for a $60,000 buy-out for train and yard service
    employees who apply for voluntary resignations before March 31, 1992.                  The
    plan merely provides in greater detail the procedures employees must follow
    to apply for severance benefits.
    That Railway drafted the plan does not preclude the plan from being
    a collective bargaining agreement.         Collective bargaining agreements take
    several forms under the RLA.        In this case, it is clear that the plan arose
    as a result of Congress' action in enacting Public Law 102-29 and the
    subsequent Witt Award.         Wheeler's claim for severance benefits is precisely
    the type of dispute the RLA's arbitration provisions were intended to
    cover.
    We find unpersuasive Wheeler's argument that the Supreme Court's
    recent decision in Norris lends support to his position that the claim is
    not preempted by the RLA.         In Norris, the Supreme Court held that the RLA
    does not preempt state law rights that are independent of the collective
    bargaining agreement.      
    Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2248-49
    .         In Wheeler's case,
    however, any severance benefits to which he may be entitled arise solely
    from the provisions of the plan.         Thus, Norris is inapposite.          See 
    id. at 2248
       ("[W]here   the   resolution     of   a    state-law   claim   depends    on   an
    interpretation      of   the    collective-bargaining     agreement,    the    claim    is
    preempted."); see also 
    Taggart, 40 F.3d at 273
    .
    Finally, Wheeler argues that the plan itself provides that a claim
    for denial of benefits may be brought in state or federal court.                    This
    language, however, appears in the section of the plan entitled "ERISA
    Requirements."       It is well-recognized that ERISA does not provide an
    alternative to the RLA.        
    Bowe, 974 F.2d at 103
    .     "Despite [ERISA's] express
    provision allowing suits over the coverage and application of [employee
    benefit] plans to be brought in federal court, ERISA was not intended to,
    nor did it, preempt the mandatory arbitration provisions of Railway Labor
    Act."    
    Id. -5- (internal
    quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
    The order of dismissal is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -6-