David R. Rauenhorst v. U.S. Dept. of Trans. ( 1996 )


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  •                            _______________
    No. 95-2841
    _______________
    David R. Rauenhorst,              *
    *
    Petitioner,                  *
    *
    v.                           *   On Petition for Review from
    *   Federal Highway
    United States Department of       *   Administration.
    Transportation, Federal           *
    Highway Administration,           *
    *
    Respondent.                  *
    _______________
    Submitted: May 15, 1996
    Filed: September 12, 1996
    _______________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and
    VAN SICKLE*, Senior District Judge.
    _______________
    VAN SICKLE, Senior District Judge.
    David   Rauenhorst   seeks   review   of   the   Federal   Highway
    Administration's (FHWA) decision to deny his request for a waiver
    from the federal licensing standards for commercial truck drivers.
    *
    The HONORABLE BRUCE M. VAN SICKLE, Senior United States
    District Judge for the District of North Dakota,
    sitting by designation.
    We reverse the decision of the FHWA and direct the FHWA to consider
    2
    the application on its merits.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Petitioner seeks review of the FHWA's decision to deny his
    application for a waiver of the federal regulation which requires
    binocular vision in order to qualify for a commercial driver's
    license.    Waivers are permitted if the Secretary of Transportation
    or his agent "decides that the waiver is consistent with the public
    interest and safe operation of commercial motor vehicles." 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e)(1).
    The current relevant federal regulation, which has been in
    existence since 1937 in some form, denies commercial licenses for
    truckers who lack 20/40 (Snellen) vision in each eye with or
    without corrective lenses.1     
    49 C.F.R. § 391.41
    (b)(10) (emphasis
    added).     The current rule has been unchanged since 1971. 
    57 Fed. Reg. 6793
    , 6794 (Feb. 28, 1992).   For many years, however, drivers
    obtained commercial licenses under state laws even though they had
    the required vision in only one eye.    These monocular drivers did
    not have accidents at greater rates than drivers with the requisite
    vision in both eyes.
    1
    In 1862, a Dutch ophthalmologist, Snellen, devised the
    familiar eye chart used to measure visual acuity. The principal
    may be expressed as:
    visual acuity =       distance at which the letter is read
    distance at which letter should normally
    be read
    Thus, 20/20 vision means a subject has read a letter at 20
    feet that was designed to be read at 20 feet. 20/40 vision means
    that a letter which should normally be read at 40 feet must be
    brought in to 20 feet before it is recognized. Thomas D. Duane,
    Clinical Ophthalmology, vol. 1, 30.
    3
    In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to prevent
    discrimination against the disabled, including a provision to
    4
    prevent discrimination against the disabled in federally assisted
    programs. 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    (a).        In 1978, Congress expanded this
    section to preclude discrimination in "any program or activity
    conducted by any Executive agency." 
    Id.
     No "otherwise qualified
    individual with handicaps" would be subject to discrimination
    solely because of that handicap. 
    Id.
     To answer the question of
    whether an individual is "otherwise qualified", the trier of fact
    will have to conduct an individualized inquiry in most cases.
    School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 
    480 U.S. 273
    , 287
    (1987).
    In accordance with the 1978 amendment to 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    (a),
    the Department of Transportation (DOT) conducted a review of
    monocular drivers in 1982.        This study indicated that monocular
    drivers should be permitted to receive commercial licenses as long
    as they drove within their limitations.      The DOT, however, did not
    commence a formal process to amend the regulation.
    In 1984, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Safety Act (MCSA)
    in order to federalize traffic safety laws and to curtail the
    development   of   inconsistent   safety   regulations   in   neighboring
    states.   While some states had allowed monocular drivers to operate
    commercial vehicles under state law, the federalization process
    began to limit job opportunities for these individuals due to 
    49 C.F.R. § 391.41
    (b)(10).2    See 
    59 Fed. Reg. 50887
    , 50888 (Oct. 6,
    1994) ("Adoption of the federal standard by many States, along with
    stepped-up enforcement at both the State and Federal levels,
    exposed these drivers to disqualification determinations . . . .
    Congress has insisted on uniform standards consistent with Federal
    2
    In fact, more than 5,000 "unqualified" drivers were removed
    from interstate driving positions by the 1984 MCSA and other
    enforcement measures. 
    59 Fed. Reg. 50887
    , 50888 (Oct. 6, 1994).
    5
    regulations issued pursuant to the MCSA of 1984."). This Act
    contained the provisions authorizing the Secretary of
    6
    Transportation to waive a regulation if it was in the public
    interest and consistent with safety. 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e).     The
    Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation cautioned
    that the waiver provision "should be used with extreme care and
    should only be used if the Secretary has developed sufficient
    information to provide adequate assurance that such waiver will not
    adversely affect the safe operation of commercial motor vehicles."
    S. Rep. No. 424, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1994).
    In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was signed
    into law in order to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
    mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
    with disabilities." 
    42 U.S.C. § 12101
    (b)(1). It was stated in the
    House of Representatives Education and Labor Committee report on
    the bill that within two years of the effective date of the ADA,
    the DOT would review its regulations regarding qualifications for
    drivers of certain vehicle classifications.    H.R. Rep. No. 485,
    101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 57 (1990).     Congress expected
    that the DOT would make the necessary changes to its regulations
    in order to end unwarranted discrimination against the disabled.3
    3
    The full relevant statement was as follows:
    In light of this legislation [the ADA], the Committee
    expects that within two years from the date of enactment (the
    effective date of Title I of this legislation), the Secretary of
    Transportation will undertake a thorough review of these
    regulations to ascertain whether the standards conform with
    current knowledge about the capabilities of persons with
    disabilities and currently available technological aids and
    devices and whether such regulations are valid under this Act.
    The Committee expects that the agency will make any necessary
    changes within the two year period to bring such regulations into
    compliance with the law. (of course, a non-discrimination
    obligation on the part of the Department of Transportation also
    exists currently under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
    1973.). H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt., 2, at 57
    (1990).
    7
    
    Id.
    The FHWA initiated an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on
    8
    possible changes to its vision requirements.                   Concurrently, the
    FHWA contracted with Ketron, Inc. to "study the relationship
    between visual disorders and commercial vehicle motor safety." 
    57 Fed. Reg. 23370
     (Jun. 3, 1992).
    In order to determine what the safety standards for truck
    drivers should be, the FHWA decided to conduct a study in which
    they could compare experienced, visually-challenged drivers versus
    drivers who met the federal standards.             On March 25, 1992, the FHWA
    published a notice of intent to issue waivers for disabled drivers
    who   met   state    safety    standards     but   not   federal      regulations,
    pursuant to the 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e) waiver provision.                 To qualify
    as a driver one must have possessed 20/40 (Snellen) vision in the
    better eye.    The FHWA found that there was a public interest in
    furthering     the     employment       of   qualified         individuals   with
    disabilities and the strict nature of the qualifications of the
    waivers would allow the FHWA to make sure they were consistent with
    the safe operation of motor vehicles. 
    57 Fed. Reg. 23370
    , 23371
    (Jun. 3, 1992).      See 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e).
    On July 16, 1992, the FHWA declared that it would give waivers
    to this limited group of experienced commercial drivers with clean
    safety records.       Petitioner never applied to be a member of this
    test group.   He maintains that he was not aware of this program at
    the   time.    The    deadline    for    applications      was    extended   from
    September 21, 1992 until December 31, 1992.               Therefore, a driver
    had nine months between the notice of intent for the commencement
    of the waiver program and the application deadline.                    Over 3,700
    applications were received and the FHWA granted waivers to 2,411
    drivers. 
    59 Fed. Reg. 50887
     (Oct. 6, 1994).
    The   United    States   Court    of   Appeals     for    the   District   of
    Columbia Circuit vacated the waiver program and remanded the rule
    creating it in Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. Federal
    9
    Highway Admin., 
    28 F. 3d 1288
     (D.C. Cir. 1994).   The court
    reasoned
    10
    that since the FHWA acknowledged that its recent study failed to
    provide sufficient foundation upon which to propose a satisfactory
    vision standard for drivers, it was arbitrary and capricious for
    the FHWA to propose a waiver program as the agency could not
    satisfactorily determine whether the waiver would be contrary to
    public    interest   and   consistent    with   the   safe   operation     of
    commercial vehicles. 
    Id. at 1294
    .           See 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e).
    However,     those   who   had   already   been   issued     waivers     were
    "grandfathered" and continued to drive commercial vehicles after
    the court's decision. 
    59 Fed. Reg. 50887
    , 50889 (Oct. 6, 1994).
    On remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the
    District of Columbia Circuit, the FHWA invited additional public
    comment and conducted a thorough review of the evidence.               In an
    October 6, 1994 Notice of Determination, the FHWA announced that
    there was additional evidence to justify the issuance of waivers to
    experienced monocular drivers with clean safety records.                 Both
    information provided by the states and the FHWA's waiver study had
    demonstrated that the safety performance of monocular drivers
    actually exceeded the safety performance of drivers as a whole. 
    59 Fed. Reg. 50887
    , 50890 (Oct. 6, 1994).4 The statistics confirmed
    that the granting of the waivers was consistent with public safety
    and that the public interest of making sure that commercial drivers
    were physically capable to drive these vehicles was met.               
    Id. at 50891
    .     After receiving comments from almost twenty interested
    parties, the FHWA made a final determination validating the waiver
    program on November 17, 1994. 
    59 Fed. Reg. 59386
     (Nov. 17, 1994).
    4
    The FHWA had revoked the waivers of 201 drivers of those
    originally approved, 180 of which were terminated due to the
    driver's failure to submit a monthly driving report on time and
    21 of which were ended for failure to submit to a complete
    medical examination. 
    59 Fed. Reg. 50887
    , 50890 (Oct. 6, 1994).
    11
    On February 22, 1995, the petitioner filed an application for
    a waiver of the vision requirements of 
    49 C.F.R. § 391.41
    (b)(10).
    12
    He had driven for 22 years and for over 1 million miles without an
    accident.    But on May 24, 1995, the FHWA Administrator denied the
    petitioner's request.       The Administrator reasoned that even if a
    waiver was crafted so as to fit only the petitioner, the precedent
    created by this waiver would be the destruction of the relevant
    federal regulation.       Thus, anyone who shared characteristics with
    the petitioner would be subject to the new lower waiver standard,
    not   the   requirement    within   the    Code    of    Federal   Regulations.
    Furthermore,    the   Administrator       felt    that   a   finding   that   the
    petitioner had many years of accident-free driving was not enough
    for the Administrator to determine if the public interest was being
    protected due to Congress' historical concern with driver safety.
    In essence, the Administrator believed that he could not justify
    the withdrawal of a 60 year old federal regulation based on one
    individual's petition.
    The petitioner appeals the FHWA's denial of his petition for
    a waiver of 
    49 C.F.R. § 391.41
    (b) (10) so that he may legally
    operate a commercial vehicle.
    II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency action shall
    not be set aside unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A); Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 
    28 F. 3d at 1293
    .
    The scope of review is "narrow and a court is not to substitute its
    judgment for that of the agency."            Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of
    United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43
    (1983); Atlantic      Tele-Network,    Inc.      v.   Federal   Communications
    Comm'n, 
    59 F.3d 1384
    , 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that review is
    "highly deferential"); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 
    986 F.2d 13
    1568, 1571 (9th Cir. 1993); see Mueller v. United States Envtl.
    Protection Agency, 
    994 F.2d 1354
    , 1356 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
    Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
    401 U.S. 402
    , 416
    14
    (1971) ) ("As long as the [agency] considered all of the relevant
    factors and its decision contains no clear error of judgment, we
    will not substitute our judgment."). The agency, however, "must
    examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
    for its action." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 
    463 U.S. at 43
    ; see
    Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 
    419 U.S. 281
    , 285 (1974) ("The agency must articulate a rational
    connection between the facts found and the choice made.") (citation
    omitted).
    III.     DISCUSSION
    Our key question is:       does the history of known factors and
    lapse of time reflect, on the part of the FHWA, an abuse of
    discretion, or arbitrary and capricious action not in accordance
    with law?
    By the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 
    49 Stat. 543
    , 546-7 (1935),
    Congress authorized federal regulation of motor carrier safety.
    Under this original act, the Secretary of Transportation "may
    prescribe requirements for . . . (1) qualifications of employees of
    a motor carrier." 
    49 U.S.C. § 31502
    (b).        In 1966, the Department of
    Transportation        inherited   the   regulatory   authority   from   the
    Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
    In 1937, the ICC issued its initial vision standard which
    required "[g]ood eyesight in both eyes either without glasses or by
    correction with glasses." 49 C.F.R. 192.3 (1938).        Since the 1930s,
    the vision standard has been made more stringent.           In 1939, the
    standard was made more specific, requiring 20/40 (Snellen) in one
    eye and 20/100 (Snellen) in the other. 
    49 C.F.R. § 192.3
    (b) (Supp.
    1939).    The standard was amended in 1952 to require 20/40 (Snellen)
    15
    vision in each eye, corrected or uncorrected. 
    17 Fed. Reg. 4424
    (1952).   "Field   of   vision"   requirements   and   the   ability   to
    distinguish colors were added in 1964.     See 
    57 Fed. Reg. 6793
    ,
    16
    6794 (Feb. 28, 1992).
    In 1970, the current vision standard was adopted "in light of
    discussions with the Administration's medical advisers." 
    35 Fed. Reg. 6458
     (1970).    Under this standard, an individual is qualified
    to drive a commercial vehicle if that person:
    has distant visual acuity of at least 20/40 (Snellen) in
    each eye without corrective lenses or visual acuity
    separately corrected 20/40 (Snellen) or better with
    corrective lenses, distant binocular acuity of at least
    20/40 (Snellen) in both eyes with or without corrective
    lenses, field of vision of at least 70 degrees in the
    horizontal Meridian in each eye, and the ability to
    recognize the colors of traffic signals and devices
    showing standard red, green, and amber. 
    49 C.F.R. § 391.41
    (b)(10).
    In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act.        Section 504
    of that Act originally prohibited private employers participating
    in federally funded programs from discrimination against "otherwise
    qualified persons." In 1978, Congress passed the Rehabilitation
    Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments,
    and expanded section 504 to read:
    No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ...
    shall, solely by reason of his or her disability ... be
    subjected to discrimination ... under any program or
    activity conducted by any Executive Agency. 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    (a).
    The 1978 amendment also required each executive agency to
    "promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out"
    section    504's   requirements.   The   DOT   initially   responded   by
    commissioning Bartow Associates to conduct a comprehensive review
    of the evidence supporting vision standards applicable to monocular
    drivers.    The Monocular Driver: A Review of Distant Visual Acuity
    Risk Analysis Data (Bartow Study) (Sept., 1982).       The study found
    that previous research reporting a connection between monocular
    driving and safety had been based upon "small sample size and
    17
    dubious   methodologies."   
    Id. at 1
    .   "Potentially   spurious
    relationships, small samples, lack of controls, and the potential
    18
    dominance of other variables reduces the validity of much of the
    past research . . . In several studies, including one of 14,000
    drivers, the most consistent result was a failure to find a direct
    relationship between poor static visual acuity performance and high
    accident rates for young and middle-aged drivers." 
    Id. at 29
    .                   The
    Bartow    Study    further     found   that    "recent     studies    that    have
    correlated accident involvement measures with measures of visual
    field    have     consistently    failed     [to   obtain]    any    significant
    relationships." 
    Id. at 20
    .
    According to the Bartow Study, much previous research had been
    flawed, because it failed to recognize that disabled drivers learn
    to drive within their limits.          Monocular drivers learn effectively
    to use visual cues which do not depend upon binocular vision.
    Unfortunately, many previous studies used binocular drivers with
    one eye closed as subjects.        Thus, the drivers used in these flawed
    studies were actually learning to drive with a single good eye
    during the experiment itself.          Other studies used subjects who had
    recently lost a single eye and, therefore, had not adjusted to
    their disability.         The Bartow Study concluded that the critical
    issue in safe driving is the driver's ability to recognize the
    limits of his capabilities and to drive within those capabilities.
    In    1990,    Congress,    seeking      to   eliminate    continued
    discrimination       against     persons      with    physical       and     mental
    disabilities, passed the Americans with Disabilities Act.                  By H.R.
    Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 57 (1990), the
    agency was directed to "make any necessary changes within the two
    year period to bring such regulations into compliance with the
    law."    As of this writing, the regulations have not been corrected.
    In 1992, the FHWA employed Ketron, Inc., to study the
    relationship between visual disorders and commercial motor vehicle
    19
    safety.
    20
    The Ketron study found that:
    A review and critical evaluation were conducted on the most
    significant scientific research directed at investigating the
    relationship between visual performance and driving for
    passenger, commercial, and aged/visually impaired motor
    vehicle operators.      Many studies relating visual test
    performance to correlates of driver safety, such as accident
    and violation rates, have been reported since the last major
    revision of the CMV vision standard in 1970. Reports on new
    testing methods were reviewed, including contrast sensitivity,
    glare sensitivity, low-light visual acuity, and dynamic visual
    acuity. In general agreement with studies reported prior to
    1970, these newer studies were able to demonstrate only weak
    relationships between measures of vision and correlates of
    driver safety.    No study involving purely visual measures
    reported an empirical ability to identify unsafe drivers at a
    level that was substantially greater than had previously been
    demonstrated for tests currently called for in the standard or
    for new tests.
    And, also:
    Review of the historical research performed to provide a more
    adequate empirical specification of the vision standard both
    for drivers of passenger cars and CMV's suggests a fundamental
    limitation in terms of providing valid cutoff points for
    screening purposes. Numerous studies have shown that visual
    deficits are rarely the primary cause of major accidents.
    Typically, many factors are found to contribute.
    However, despite these firm findings, and without any evidence
    to support its being presented, the Ketron study opined that:
    "Thus, no new study or synthesis of studies provided a definitive
    basis for extensive changes to the current CMV visual standard."
    U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Fed. Highway Admin., Visual Disorders
    and Commercial Drivers (Nov., 1989) p. IV.
    In March of 1992, the FHWA undertook to select a group of
    monocular drivers to be licensed for a period of three years, or
    more if needed, to assist in the testing and redrafting of the
    vision requirements. 
    57 Fed. Reg. 10295
     (Mar. 25, 1992).   The test
    21
    program in its final form provides waivers only to drivers with
    22
    good driving records for at least three years and with vision in
    one eye meeting the existing federal standard of at least 20/40
    (Snellen). 
    57 Fed. Reg. 23,370
     (Jun. 3, 1992)
    For the test program, the FHWA declared the following
    standards:
    1.   The applicant must produce proof from an optometrist or
    ophthalmologist certifying that the applicant's visual
    deficiency had not worsened since his last examination by
    the state licensing agency, and that:
    2.   vision in one eye is at least 20/40 (Snellen), corrected
    or uncorrected,
    3.   the applicant is able to perform the driving tasks to
    operate a commercial motor vehicle
    4.   hold a valid state commercial drivers license (CDL) or a
    non-CDL license to operate a commercial vehicle (CMV)
    issued after April, 1990
    5.   have three years recent experience driving a CMV without:
    a.   license suspension or revocation
    b.   involvement in a reportable accident in which the
    applicant received a citation for a moving
    violation
    c.   conviction for driving a CMV while intoxicated,
    leaving the scene of an accident involving a CMV;
    or
    d.   more than two convictions for any other moving
    violation in a cmv.
    
    57 Fed. Reg. 31458
    , 31460 (Jul. 16, 1992); see Advocates for
    Highway Safety, 
    28 F.3d at 1290-91
    .
    In September of 1992, interested parties filed in the United
    States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit a
    petition for review which challenged the waiver program.                In
    Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 
    28 F.3d 1288
    , decided in
    August of 1994, the court held that the case arose under the MCSA
    of 1984 which directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue
    regulations   establishing   "minimal    federal   safety   standards   to
    ensure that. . . the physical condition of operators of commercial
    motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate such vehicles
    safely." 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (a)(3).      The Court held that the FHWA had
    failed to place into the record evidence to establish that it had
    23
    made a prior determination that a waiver was "consistent with the
    safe operation of commercial motor vehicles." Advocates for
    24
    Highway and Auto Safety, 
    28 F.3d at 1293-94
    .
    In September of 1994, this court decided the case of Breth v.
    United States Dep't of Transp., 
    36 F.3d 1100
    , 
    1994 WL 487354
     (8th
    Cir. 1994).5    The petitioner filed a petition for review of a
    decision of the FHWA denying his petitions for admittance into the
    waiver program and for an individual waiver.         This court held that
    after the    decision   in   Advocates   for    Highway   and   Auto   Safety
    terminated the test program, the only issue was the propriety of
    the Administrator's denial of the petition for an individual
    waiver.    See 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e)(1).        This court sent the matter
    back to the Administrator because he did not articulate his reasons
    for denial of the petition.
    Following the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in
    Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, the FHWA reviewed its
    evidence and concluded that, referring to available state evidence
    and its own records, it should, and did, reissue the waivers to the
    existing experimental group of drivers.         In so doing, it continued
    its study program and complied with the dictate that agencies
    should be engaged in a continuous process of examining their
    policies and assuring the results of the new data were correctly
    taken into account. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears,
    Roebuck & Co., 
    421 U.S. 132
    , 151 (1975).
    In justification for the reissuance of the waivers, the agency
    based its requirement that drivers participating in the study have
    a three-year safe driving record upon studies which indicated that
    5
    Although unpublished, this court feels it is relevant to
    these proceedings. See Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(k) ("Parties may
    also cite an unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has
    persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of
    this or another court would serve as well.")
    25
    past experience could predict future performance, especially when
    combined with other factors such as geography, mileage driven, and
    26
    conviction history. See 
    59 Fed. Reg. 50888
     (1994).                  "Statistical
    studies",    the    FHWA    continued,    "support   the     proposition   that
    accident-free performance combined with low numbers of traffic
    violations over a three-year period is [a] reliable predictor of
    continued safe performance over a similar period in the future."
    The agency also relied upon the medical community's determination
    that people with vision impairments can often compensate for that
    impairment over a period of time. 
    Id.
     The FHWA concluded that "the
    driving performance of individuals participating in the vision
    waiver program is better than the driving performance of all
    commercial vehicle drivers collectively." FHWA Interim Monitoring
    Report on the Drivers of Commercial Motor Vehicles, 3 (1994).
    In February of 1995, Rauenhorst, the petitioner herein,
    applied for a waiver.         In his application, he showed that he had
    monocular vision, that he had driven commercial vehicles for 22
    years, and had driven more than a million accident-free miles.               His
    application was denied.        The Administrator reasoned that it could
    not conduct an individual determination of an appropriate waiver
    because anyone else meeting the criteria under which such a waiver
    is issued would thereafter be likewise entitled to a waiver.
    Although each waiver issued under 31136(e) would be crafted so
    narrowly as to fit only the immediate applicant, it actually
    becomes    the     new,    lower   standard   upon   which    all    subsequent
    applications will be judged.             Administrative Decision p 6. The
    Administrator reasoned that anyone else meeting the criteria under
    which a waiver was issued would also be entitled to a waiver under
    
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e), thus actually creating a new lower standard
    than that published in the Code of Federal Regulations.
    This reasoning completely defeats any statutory provision for
    waivers for cause.          It cements in place obsolete or inaccurate
    administrative standards, even when these standards are replaced by
    27
    new benchmarks which are carefully drafted to assure that
    28
    improvements and developments in the equipment of the vehicles and
    additional developments as to the nature and adaptations to a
    disability   can   and    do    compensate       successfully    for   certain
    disabilities.      The   reasoning    of   the    Administrator's      decision
    distorts the purpose of an authorization in the basic statute for
    the granting of waivers.
    After the petitioner in Breth's claim was remanded to the
    FHWA, the agency did not issue an administrative decision granting
    Breth a permanent waiver under 
    49 U.S.C. § 31136
    (e).             But the FHWA
    did enter into a compromise settlement agreement that allowed Breth
    to   participate   in    the    reconstituted      waiver   study      program.
    Respondent's Brief, 44.        Given the waiver provisions of the MCSA
    and the mandates of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the FHWA
    cannot now maintain that, despite this petitioner's compliance with
    the limitations imposed upon Breth, the granting of a waiver of the
    vision regulation for commercial drivers should automatically be
    denied in Rauenhorst's case.
    To justify its position, the FHWA relies on Buck v. United
    States Dep't of Transp., 
    56 F.3d 1406
     (D.C. Cir. 1995), and Ward v.
    Skinner, 
    943 F.2d 157
     (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
    503 U.S. 959
    (1992).   Buck falls into the same category as Advocates for Highway
    and Auto Safety.   Buck involved three deaf truck drivers who sought
    a waiver of the FHWA's minimum hearing requirement.             But the agency
    had insufficient empirical evidence to justify a wholesale change.
    In that case, the FHWA properly required that the petition be
    denied.
    In Ward, an epileptic commercial vehicle operator who took an
    anti-convulsant medicine to control his epilepsy, challenged a
    refusal to grant a waiver.           The FHWA found that it could not
    conclude that allowing an epileptic a license to operate a truck
    29
    was consistent with the public interest and the safe operation of
    motor vehicles.
    30
    Certainly, an element in any safety program involving disabled
    persons requires judgment calls related to the type of disability.
    For example, a condition imposed upon the monocular drivers now
    given waivers is that they establish that their visual acuity is
    stabilized.    In this respect, as in the case of deafness, this may
    be a not unusual condition.     But the control of epileptic seizures
    by a tightly-disciplined taking of drugs may well represent a
    greater risk.
    The government claims that applying tests or standards to
    determine that a waiver is appropriate in a particular instance
    amounts to a rulemaking.            Therefore, the government contends,
    granting relief under those standards should first be handled
    through a formal rulemaking proceeding.             But 6 years ago, in 1990
    Congress expressed its will that the applicable standards be
    redrafted to assure that the Americans with Disabilities Act
    furnished relief for disabled persons being denied access to those
    activities within their capacity to perform.           The administrator can
    hardly justify settling the lawsuit with Breth by granting a waiver
    unless Breth's capacity to do commercial driving assures reasonable
    safety to other highway users.         Until the administrative standard
    for waivers to monocular drivers is revised to reflect the current
    knowledge     the   administrator    must   grant    separate,   individually
    tailored waivers.      Inevitably specific waivers must be grounded on
    specific tests or standards.          Otherwise, administrators would be
    granting waivers not as a matter of the employee's capacity to
    function, but as a matter of the administrator's personal whim.
    In this case, the Administrator has produced a decision which
    is arbitrary and capricious and otherwise not in accordance with
    law.   The FHWA has failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation
    for its action in this matter.         The decision not to evaluate the
    31
    Rauenhorst application on its merits is reversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    32