Harold E. Meadows v. Paul K. Delo ( 1996 )


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  •                                     ___________
    No. 95-3921
    ___________
    Harold E. Meadows,                       *
    *
    Appellant,                 *    Appeal from the United States
    *    District Court for the
    v.                                  *    Eastern District of Missouri.
    *
    Paul K. Delo,                            *
    *
    Appellee.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted:     September 9, 1996
    Filed:   November 1, 1996
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
    ___________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Harold Meadows appeals the judgment of the district court1 denying
    his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.       We affirm.
    I.
    In the early morning hours of August 16, 1986, Mark McClure, Bradley
    Vollmer, and Patricia Abram went to a drug dealer's house to purchase
    cocaine.   When the dealer took their money without giving them any drugs,
    the three stole what they believed was his car.        Later that morning, Harold
    Meadows met McClure and Vollmer, and the three arranged for a buyer for the
    stolen car.
    1
    The Honorable George F. Gunn, Jr., United States District
    Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the Report and
    Recommendation of the Honorable Terry I. Adelman, United States
    Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    That evening, Meadows, Vollmer, McClure, and Abram all met at James
    Drees's home.   While McClure was asleep in the house, Meadows and Vollmer
    were overheard discussing "getting rid of Mark McClure" because they feared
    he was going to report the car theft to the police.       Vollmer then asked
    Drees for a knife, and Drees complied.    Meadows and Vollmer told Drees they
    were going to kill McClure and throw his body in the river.
    Drees and Abram left Drees's residence for about an hour.     When they
    returned, Meadows, Vollmer, and McClure were no longer there.          Drees
    discovered a hole in the basement wall, and blood was found in the
    basement, along with a knife, a bucket of bloody water, and Vollmer's belt.
    A few days later, McClure's body was found near a canal on the Missouri
    River.
    Both Meadows and Vollmer were charged with first degree murder in
    connection with McClure's death.   Vollmer pleaded guilty and was sentenced
    to thirty years of incarceration.        Meadows pleaded not guilty and was
    tried.   At Meadows's trial, Drees testified that he heard Meadows and
    Vollmer discussing their plan to murder McClure and that Meadows told him
    the damage to his basement occurred when Meadows and Vollmer were trying
    to kill McClure.   Drees also stated that Meadows told him that Meadows and
    Vollmer took McClure's body to a canal on the Missouri River, where they
    weighted it down and dragged it into the river.     Abram likewise testified
    to hearing a conversation in which Meadows and Vollmer were talking about
    McClure, although she could not hear the specifics of that conversation.
    Another witness also testified that Meadows said he had choked McClure.
    Meadows maintained throughout his trial that he had no part in murdering
    McClure, but admitted to helping to dispose of McClure's body.
    Meadows was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without the
    possibility of parole.   His motion for post-conviction relief was denied.
    Meadows appealed the denial, along with his
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    conviction and sentence, in a consolidated appeal.   The Missouri Court of
    Appeals affirmed in all respects.   State v. Meadows, 
    785 S.W.2d 635
    (Mo.
    Ct. App. 1990).   Meadows then filed this section 2254 petition.2
    II.
    Meadows contends that his conviction is not supported by sufficient
    evidence.
    The standard for determining whether sufficient evidence exists to
    sustain Meadows's conviction is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).
    Meadows contends that the only incriminating evidence against him was the
    testimony of "junkies offered deals with the State."   Whether or not this
    characterization is accurate, it is without consequence.       It was for the
    jury to judge the witnesses' credibility.   Cf. United States v. E.R.B., 
    86 F.3d 129
    , 130 (8th Cir. 1996) (the court should not "substitute [its own]
    inclinations" regarding the credibility of witnesses).       We conclude that
    the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
    is sufficient to sustain Meadows's conviction.
    Meadows's second contention on appeal is that an affidavit by Vollmer
    constitutes newly discovered evidence that supports his claim of innocence.
    The test for newly discovered evidence is "whether the evidence could have
    been discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence."    Cornell v. Nix,
    
    976 F.2d 376
    , 380 (8th
    2
    The State has conceded that Meadows's motion to strike the
    State's addendum to its brief should be granted, and it is so
    ordered.
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    Cir. 1992).      Although the affidavit itself was not available until after
    Meadows's trial, the factual basis for it existed long before this appeal.
    Cf. Pickens v. Lockhart, 
    4 F.3d 1446
    , 1450 (8th Cir. 1993).                In addition,
    we   have held that "when a defendant who has chosen not to testify
    subsequently comes forward to offer testimony exculpating a codefendant,
    the evidence is not ``newly discovered.'"          United States v. Rogers, 
    982 F.2d 1241
    , 1245 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Offutt, 
    736 F.2d 1199
    ,
    1202 (8th Cir. 1984)).      Thus, Vollmer's affidavit is not newly discovered
    evidence.
    Even assuming, arguendo, that this affidavit is newly discovered
    evidence, Meadows's claim fails.          Meadows contends that his imprisonment
    violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he is actually
    innocent.     Although Meadows cites Schlup v. Delo, 
    115 S. Ct. 851
    (1995),
    his reliance on Schlup is misplaced.         This is not a case in which Meadows
    is attempting to use a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar
    in order to present other constitutional claims, as was the case in Schlup.
    Rather, this claim is analogous to the claim presented in Herrera v.
    Collins, 
    113 S. Ct. 853
    (1993).       The Herrera Court rejected free-standing
    claims of actual innocence as a basis for habeas review, stating, "[c]laims
    of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held
    to   state   a   ground   for   federal   habeas    relief   absent   an   independent
    constitutional     violation     occurring   in    the   underlying   state   criminal
    proceeding." 
    Id. at 860.
           Accordingly, Meadows's claim of innocence based
    on newly discovered evidence is not cognizable on habeas review.
    Meadows next asserts two claims of evidentiary error, contending that
    the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes and hearsay
    statements.
    Our review of alleged evidentiary errors is limited to determining
    whether such errors were so apparent that they "fatally
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    infected the trial and rendered it fundamentally unfair."            Troupe v.
    Groose, 
    72 F.3d 75
    , 76 (8th Cir. 1995).       To obtain habeas relief based on
    evidentiary error, Meadows must show "a reasonable probability that the
    error[s] affected the trial's outcome."         
    Id. Our review
    of the record
    satisfies us that both the hearsay statements and evidence of other crimes
    were properly admitted and thus did not render Meadows's trial unfair.
    Meadows's final claim is that he received ineffective assistance of
    counsel because of trial counsel's alleged concession that Meadows was
    involved in selling the stolen car.         During closing argument, Meadows's
    attorney stated, "Mr. Meadows did nothing, even by the State's own
    witnesses, his only involvement with the car was to make a phone call that
    didn't turn out to sell the car."
    We conclude that trial counsel's decision to attempt to downplay
    Meadows's involvement in any of the events surrounding McClure's death
    reflected an exercise of "sound trial strategy" falling well within the
    "wide-range    of   reasonable   professional   assistance."    Strickland   v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 689 (1984).
    The judgment is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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