United States v. Steven Triplett ( 1998 )


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  •                           United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    Nos. 97-2233/2234
    ___________
    United States of America,                 *
    *
    Appellee,                    *
    * Appeals from the United States
    v.                                  * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Missouri.
    Steven Triplett,                          *
    *       [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 6, 1998
    Filed: April 15, 1998
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Steven Triplett was previously sentenced for the armed robbery of a United
    States Post Office, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2114
    (a) (1994); using a firearm during
    the robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1) (1994); and being a felon in
    possession of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (1994). In this appeal, he
    challenges the new sentence imposed on him following remand in his direct criminal
    appeal. See United States v. Triplett, 
    104 F.3d 1074
     (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 1837
    , 2445 (1997). Counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders
    v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). Triplett has been invited to file a pro se
    supplemental brief, but has failed to do so within the time allowed. We now grant
    counsel&s motion to withdraw, and affirm Triplett&s sentence.
    Counsel raises two issues in the Anders brief. First, she maintains the District
    Court violated Triplett&s due process rights when it departed upward to a total of 168
    months of imprisonment. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.4, comment.
    (n.2) (1997) (providing for upward departure in certain cases involving sentencing for
    both § 924(c)(1) offense and underlying offense). Relying on an isolated statement
    made by the District Court at resentencing, counsel maintains that the Court departed
    to the extent it did based on a mistaken belief or inaccurate information. After
    examining the resentencing transcript and the statement at issue--that the Court was
    going to sentence Triplett “consistent” with what the Court had done in the previous
    sentencing--it is plain to us that the Court was not operating under any mistaken belief
    or inaccurate information.
    Counsel also argues that the District Court erred in denying Triplett an
    acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    § 3E1.1 (1997) for the felon-in-possession conviction because, rather than putting the
    government to its burden of proof, Triplett waived his right to a jury trial on the charge
    and submitted it to the District Court based on his trial testimony related to the armed-
    robbery and use-of-a-firearm offenses. See Triplett, 
    104 F.3d at 1077
    . The District
    Court concluded that the adjustment was not appropriate because the felon-in-
    possession count had been grouped with the armed-robbery count under U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3D1.2(a) (1997), the armed robbery was the basis for
    establishing the applicable offense level for the grouped counts, and Triplett therefore
    received no additional time for the felon-in-possession violation. The Court determined
    it would be inappropriate under the circumstances to award the reduction, given that
    Triplett had not accepted responsibility for the armed robbery. We conclude the Court
    did not clearly err in denying the reduction. See United States v. Nam Xuan Ngo, No.
    97-2198, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1997) (standard of review); cf. United States
    -2-
    v. Giwah, 
    84 F.3d 109
    , 113 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument that § 3E1.1 adjustment
    should apply to credit-card-fraud violation committed by defendant who was also
    convicted of other offenses; because sentence did not change if credit-card conviction
    was thrown out, it was irrelevant whether defendant accepted responsibility for credit-
    card count).
    We also reject Triplett&s contention that denial of the reduction violated his due
    process rights, because withholding the reduction did not amount to punishment. Cf.
    United States v. McQuay, 
    7 F.3d 800
    , 802-03 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that because
    § 3E1.1 reduction "merely formalizes and clarifies a tradition of leniency extended to
    defendants who express genuine remorse and accept responsibility for their wrongs,"
    withholding reduction based on defendant&s choice to remain silent does not punish
    defendant for exercising such right).
    Upon review of the record in accordance with Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80
    (1988), we conclude no nonfrivolous issues exist.
    Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant counsel&s motion to withdraw.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-