Michael Argello v. City of Lincoln ( 1998 )


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  •                           United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 97-2615NE
    _____________
    Michael Argello,                        *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * On Appeal from the
    v.                                * United States District Court
    * for the District of
    * Nebraska.
    City of Lincoln, A Home Rule            *
    Charter City,                           *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 9, 1998
    Filed: May 13, 1998
    ___________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD,1 Chief Judge, HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and
    LIMBAUGH,2 District Judge.
    ___________
    RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.
    1
    The Hon. Richard S. Arnold stepped down as Chief Judge of the United States
    Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at the close of business on April 17, 1998. He
    has been succeeded by the Hon. Pasco M. Bowman II.
    2
    The Hon. Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    and Western Districts of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    The question presented is the constitutionality, under the First Amendment, of an
    ordinance of the City of Lincoln, Nebraska. The ordinance reads as follows:
    It shall be unlawful for any person to exercise, carry on,
    advertise, or engage in the business or profession of
    clairvoyancy, palmistry, phrenology, mind reading,
    fortunetelling, or any other business, profession, or art of
    revealing or pretending to reveal past or future events in the
    life of another.
    Lincoln, Neb. Municipal Ordinances § 9.40.030 (1997). The District Court3 held the
    ordinance invalid. We affirm, largely for the reasons given in the thorough and well-
    reasoned opinion of the District Court.
    The ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech. As such, it can be upheld
    only if it is supported by a compelling state interest. No such interest appears here. If
    the citizens of Lincoln wish to have their fortunes told, or to believe in palm-reading or
    phrenology, they are free to do so under our system of government, and to patronize
    establishments or “professionals” who purport to be versed in such arts. Government
    is not free to declare certain beliefs – for example, that someone can see into the future
    – forbidden. Citizens are at liberty to believe that the earth is flat, that magic is real, and
    that some people are prophets. See Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 
    959 F. Supp. 1040
    (E.D. Wis. 1997), where the Court said:
    The line between beliefs (or opinions) and facts is blurry at
    best. What seems like a provable fact to one person is only
    an opinion to another: paleontologists like Stephen J. Gould
    3
    The Hon. Thomas D. Thalken, United States Magistrate Judge for the District
    of Nebraska, sitting by agreement of the parties under 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    -2-
    think that evolution is a scientific fact, while creationists think
    it is only a false belief. Throughout history, many societies
    have decided that the government should arbitrate truth and
    falsehood, fact and opinion; their record is not comforting.
    Doubting the government’s talent for or benefit from
    declaring what is true and what is not, the United States took
    a different approach; the First Amendment forbids the
    government from arbitrating truth and fiction. A person is
    free to write and sell books declaring the earth is flat . . ..
    
    Id. at 1041
    . In short, government may not prohibit a certain kind of speech simply
    because it disagrees with it.
    The City contends that the ordinance can be upheld as a regulation of commercial
    speech. It reads the ordinance as limited to fortunetelling for pay. The ordinance is not
    so limited on its face, nor has any court of Nebraska given it such a limiting construction.
    Even if it were so limited, we do not believe this proscription would fall into the
    commercial-speech category. The speech itself, fortunetelling, is not commercial simply
    because someone pays for it. The speech covered by the ordinance, for the most part,
    does not simply propose a commercial transaction. Rather, it is the transaction. The
    speech itself is what the “client” is paying for. As Judge Thalken aptly remarked:
    “There is a distinct difference between the offer to tell a fortune (‘I’ll tell your fortune
    for twenty dollars.’), which is commercial speech, and the actual telling of the fortune
    (‘I see in your future . . ..’), which is not.” Michael Argello v. City of Lincoln,
    Nebraska, No. 4:95CV3457 (D. Neb.) (order filed May 14, 1997), at p. 9.
    Nor can the ordinance be upheld as a prohibition against fraud. It does not require
    that fortunetellers know that they are conveying false information, or that they have no
    power of seeing into the future. For all we know, certain persons genuinely
    -3-
    believe that they have such powers. In this belief they may be mistaken, but that is not
    a decision that government is free to make under our Constitution.
    The District Court also took the view that the ordinance is overbroad, but we need
    not pursue this aspect of the analysis. Enough has been said already to indicate our
    reasons for affirmance.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-2615

Filed Date: 5/13/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015