Walter Garrett v. L. Clarke ( 1998 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 97-2789
    ___________
    Walter Garrett,                            *
    *
    Appellant,                   *
    *
    v.                                  * On Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    L. Clarke, Sgt.; D. Epps, #144;            * Eastern District of Missouri.
    F. West, Maj. #63; Pinelawn                *
    Police Department; City of                 *
    Pinelawn,                                  *
    *
    Appellees.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 27, 1998
    Filed: June 26, 1998
    ___________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, FAGG, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
    Walter Garrett claims three City of Pine Lawn, Missouri, police officers illegally
    searched his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
    District Court dismissed Garrett&s complaint against the officers and the City of Pine
    Lawn as barred by the statute of limitations. We conclude that the complaint was
    timely, and reverse the District Court&s dismissal as to the individual police officers, but
    we affirm the dismissal as to the City of Pine Lawn on other grounds.
    I.
    Garrett claims the search occurred on September 30, 1991. At some point after
    this date, Garrett became an inmate in a Missouri prison. On September 23, 1996, he
    mailed his complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis from prison to the
    District Court. The District Court clerk&s office stamped the complaint “received” on
    September 24, 1996, but returned it to Garrett with a letter stating that he had not
    submitted a certified copy of his prison account statement as required by 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
    § 804(a)(1)(F), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-73 (1996). Garrett responded by mailing his
    complaint and an uncertified account statement to the District Court. The District Court
    clerk&s office received the complaint on October 2, 1996, and again returned it with
    instructions to supply a certified statement. On October 16, 1996, Garrett mailed the
    complaint and a certified account statement, which the District Court received the next
    day. The complaint bears both October 17, 1996, and September 24, 1996, date stamps.
    The District Court concluded that Garrett had not filed his complaint until October 17,
    1996, when the District Court clerk received his complaint accompanied by a certified
    prison account statement, and dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), finding it barred by the five-year Missouri statute of limitations. See
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (1994); Chandler v. Presiding Judge, 
    838 F.2d 977
    , 978-79
    (8th Cir. 1988).
    II.
    We conclude that the District Court erred in finding the complaint barred by the
    statute of limitations. For purposes of the statute of limitations, the filing of a complaint
    commences a federal cause of action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; Lyons v. Goodson, 
    787 F.2d 411
    , 412 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The Prison Litigation Reform Act does not say
    that a prison account statement must be supplied when the complaint is filed. Instead,
    the prisoner should be allowed to file the complaint, and then supply a prison
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    account statement within a reasonable time. Cf. Henderson v. Norris, 
    129 F.3d 481
    ,
    484-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (district court to notify prisoner to supply prison
    account statement within thirty days of filing appeal in forma pauperis; court can provide
    more time for good cause). Because Garrett presented his complaint to the District
    Court clerk for filing before the statute of limitations ran, we conclude his action is
    timely.
    The defendants argue that Garrett did not allege that he suffered any personal
    injury or actual damages, but instead asserted that his wife and mother, who were
    present during the search, suffered emotional injury. We agree with the defendants that
    Garrett may not base his Section 1983 action on a violation of the rights of third parties.
    See Miner v. Brackney, 
    719 F.2d 954
    , 956 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied,
    
    467 U.S. 1259
    (1984). It is clear, however, that Garrett claims a violation of his own
    Fourth Amendment rights through an illegal search of his home. If Garrett proves this
    claim, he is entitled to a finding of liability and nominal damages even if he cannot prove
    actual damages. See Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 
    794 F.2d 330
    ,
    339 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
    480 U.S. 918
    (1987).
    We affirm the District Court&s dismissal with respect to the City of Pine Lawn. A
    city is not vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the acts of its employees. See
    Parrish v. Luckie, 
    963 F.2d 201
    , 204 (8th Cir. 1992). To impose liability on the City of
    Pine Lawn, Garrett must “identify either an official municipal policy or a widespread
    custom or practice that caused [his] injury.” See Springdale Educ. Ass&n v. Springdale
    Sch. Dist., 
    133 F.3d 649
    , 651 (8th Cir. 1998). Garrett&s complaint fails to state a claim
    against the City of Pine Lawn because it merely names it as a defendant without
    identifying any such policy, custom, or practice.
    Accordingly, we reverse the District Court&s dismissal as to the individual police
    officers, but affirm the dismissal as to the City of Pine Lawn. We remand to the District
    Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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