United States v. John Lee Coffman ( 1998 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 98-1580EM
    _____________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * On Appeal from the
    v.                               * United States District Court
    * for the Eastern District
    * of Missouri.
    John Lee Coffman,                      *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 11, 1998
    Filed: July 1, 1998
    ___________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges,
    and PANNER,1 District Judge.
    ___________
    RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
    John Coffman was charged with possession of ephedrine with the intent to
    manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(1). The District
    Court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his home. Coffman pleaded
    1
    The Hon. Owen M. Panner, United States District Judge for the District of
    Oregon, sitting by designation.
    guilty, reserving the right to challenge the District Court’s evidentiary ruling. He now
    appeals that ruling. We affirm.
    I.
    The facts of the search and seizure are undisputed. In the course of tracking a
    federal drug fugitive, the government learned that Coffman was an associate of the
    fugitive. Two deputy United States Marshals went to Coffman’s residence to question
    him about the fugitive. Coffman invited them in. One deputy observed an empty
    handgun holster on a chair and asked Coffman if there were any weapons or other
    persons in his home. He “replied there were none and invited the deputy to look for
    himself.” Stipulation and Plea Agreement at 10. While one deputy talked with
    Coffman, the other found “45,000 dosage units of ephedrine under the defendant’s bed
    and a loaded Smith & Wesson .357 Magnum revolver under the defendant’s pillow,”
    
    id. (footnote omitted),
    which were then seized.
    Coffman was indicted for possession of ephedrine with the intent to manufacture
    methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)(1), and possession of a firearm
    by a person convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to
    suppress the drugs and gun, contending that they were unlawfully seized. On the
    Magistrate Judge’s2 recommendation, the District Court3 denied the motion. Coffman
    then pleaded guilty to the drug-related count, reserving his right to appeal the denial of
    the motion to suppress. The gun-related count was dismissed. He was sentenced to 120
    months of imprisonment.
    2
    The Hon. Thomas C. Mummert, III, United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    3
    The Hon. Jean Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    -2-
    II.
    We hold that the District Court’s determination that Coffman had voluntarily
    consented to the search of his home was not clearly erroneous. See United States v.
    Miller, 
    20 F.3d 926
    , 930 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    513 U.S. 886
    (1994). Coffman’s
    invitation to “ ‘go ahead and look around,’ ” Mem. of Magistrate Judge at 2, indicated
    consent. It was then the government’s burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
    evidence that this consent was voluntary. United States v. 
    Miller, 20 F.3d at 930
    .
    Here, neither “the characteristics of the accused” nor “the details of the environment,”
    
    id., evidenced involuntariness.
    At the evidentiary hearing, the deputies testified that
    Coffman had not been “under the influence of any drugs or alcohol,” and that they had
    not made “any threats or promises to get him to give . . . permission to search the
    residence.” Hr’g Tr. at 15. Nor does the Fourth Amendment require the deputies to
    have informed Coffman of his right to withhold consent to the search. Ohio v.
    Robinette, 
    519 U.S. 33
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 417
    , 421 (1996).
    Coffman further argues that the search exceeded the scope of his consent.
    However, there was no evidence that he told the deputies to limit their search to certain
    areas, or for people only. He said, “ ‘[G]o ahead and look around. You won’t find a
    thing.’ ” Mem. of Magistrate Judge at 2. We cannot agree that “the typical reasonable
    person” would have understood Coffman to be permitting only a limited search. See
    United States v. Martel-Martines, 
    988 F.2d 855
    , 858 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Florida v.
    Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. 248
    (1991)). It was not clear error for the Magistrate Judge to find,
    and the District Court to agree, that Coffman’s “consent to search was broad and
    unlimited.” Mem. of Magistrate Judge at 8.
    We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court.
    -3-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -4-