Collins Ex Rel. Campbell v. Bellinghausen , 153 F.3d 591 ( 1998 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 97-3255
    ___________
    Karen Collins, and on behalf of       *
    Edna Mae Campbell,                    *
    *
    Plaintiff/Appellee,     *
    *
    v.                              *
    *
    Gary Bellinghausen,                   *
    *
    Defendant/Appellant,    *
    *
    Joyce Lewis,                          *   Appeals from the United States
    *   District Court for the
    Defendant,              *   Northern District of Iowa.
    *
    Rick Meyer, Lena Knight,              *
    *
    Defendants,             *
    *
    David Willis,                         *
    *
    Defendant/Appellant,    *
    *
    James Comstock,                       *
    *
    Defendant,              *
    *
    Angela Knipple,                       *
    *
    Defendant/Appellant.    *
    __________
    No. 97-3256
    __________
    Karen Collins, and on behalf of        *
    Edna Mae Campbell,                     *
    *
    Plaintiff/Appellee,        *
    *
    v.                               *
    *
    Gary Bellinghausen,                    *
    *
    Defendant,                 *
    *
    Joyce Lewis,                           *
    *
    Defendant/Appellant,       *
    *
    Rick Meyer, Lena Knight, David Willis, *
    James Comstock, Angela Knipple,        *
    *
    Defendants.                *
    __________
    No. 97-3257
    __________
    Karen Collins, and on behalf of       *
    Edna Mae Campbell,                    *
    *
    Plaintiff/Appellee,     *
    *
    v.                              *
    *
    -2-
    Gary Bellinghausen, Joyce Lewis,     *
    Rick Meyer, Lena Knight, David       *
    Willis,                              *
    *
    Defendants,               *
    *
    James Comstock,                      *
    *
    Defendant/Appellant,      *
    *
    Angela Knipple,                      *
    *
    Defendant.                *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 9, 1998
    Filed: August 10, 1998
    ___________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD,1 Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, and
    LIMBAUGH2, District Judge.
    ___________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Karen Collins, individually, and on behalf of the estate of her grandmother, Edna
    Mae Campbell, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several state and local
    1
    The Honorable Richard S. Arnold stepped down as Chief Judge of the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at the close of business on April 17,
    1998. He has been succeeded by the Honorable Pasco M. Bowman II.
    2
    The HONORABLE STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    -3-
    officials.3 The appellants appeal from the denial of their respective motions for
    summary judgment. We reverse.
    I.
    Edna Campbell, born in 1904, was hospitalized in Lake City, Iowa, in March of
    1992. The discharge summary prepared by her doctor noted that Campbell was
    suffering from a number of physical problems, including diabetes, CVA with left-sided
    hemiplegia, blindness secondary to CVA, and atherosclerotic heart disease. On March
    20, 1992, Campbell entered the Shady Oaks Rest Home in Lake City with the assistance
    of Lena Knight, to whom Campbell had given a power of attorney a year earlier.
    Collins came to Lake City from her home in California in April of 1992. She
    stayed in Campbell’s house and visited her grandmother at the rest home. Collins
    became dissatisfied with the care that Campbell was receiving at Shady Oaks. On July
    10, 1992, Collins removed Campbell from Shady Oaks without consulting the staff on
    the pretext of taking her for an automobile ride. Collins took Campbell to a hospital in
    nearby Fort Dodge for a physical examination. On July 13, Campbell’s treating
    physician released her to Collins’s care with instructions that Campbell be taken to see
    defendant Dr. James Comstock later that afternoon. Collins did not take Campbell to
    see Dr. Comstock, however, choosing instead to take her back to Campbell’s home.
    That same day, the Iowa Department of Human Services received a report that
    Campbell had not appeared for her scheduled appointment with Dr. Comstock that
    afternoon. Defendant Joyce Lewis, an Iowa state investigator, initiated an investigation
    3
    Collins’s pro se complaint also included claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    §§ 1985, and 1986. The district court, after determining that these claims lacked a
    jurisdictional basis, considered only Collins’s section 1983 claim.
    -4-
    into the matter. Lewis asked defendant Angela Knipple, a Lake City police officer, to
    visit Campbell’s home. Knipple went to the home, spoke with Collins, observed that
    Campbell was sleeping on a couch, and reported her observations to Lewis. Lewis then
    sent Knipple back to verify if Campbell was receiving her medication. Collins was
    either unable or unwilling to locate any of the medication and told Knipple that she was
    not giving Campbell all of the medicine. Upon receiving Knipple’s second report,
    Lewis decided to visit the Campbell residence herself to gather more information.
    Accordingly, Lewis went to the Campbell home the next morning, July 14. Although
    much of the conversation between Collins and Lewis is in dispute, it is undisputed that
    Lewis was unable to gather much information from Collins, who was largely
    uncooperative. Collins did inform Lewis that Kay Blessington, a public health nurse,
    had recently visited the Campbell home. After leaving the Campbell home, Lewis made
    unsuccessful attempts to contact Blessington.
    Lewis then consulted with defendant David Willis, the Calhoun County Attorney,
    about the findings she and Knipple had made. Willis, in turn, contacted Dr. Comstock
    in his capacity as Calhoun County Medical Examiner. After Dr. Comstock opined that
    Campbell was a possible victim of abuse, Willis ordered that Campbell be removed
    from her home. Lewis, Knipple, and two ambulance drivers went to the Campbell
    residence to remove Campbell from her home. Defendant Gary Bellinghausen, a Lake
    City police officer who lived across the street from the Campbell residence, agreed to
    assist Knipple in the removal. Upon the officers’ entrance into the home, Collins
    vigorously resisted their attempts to remove Campbell, going so far as to sit on
    Campbell’s head as she lay on a gurney. Collins screamed at the officers and struck
    Officer Bellinghausen in the chest several times.
    After Campbell was examined at a hospital, Officers Knipple and Bellinghausen
    filed affidavits recounting the details of the removal. Later that day, a local magistrate
    reviewed the affidavits, found probable cause to believe that Collins was seriously
    mentally impaired and was likely to injure herself or others if allowed to remain at
    -5-
    liberty, and ordered the county sheriff to take Collins into custody for involuntary
    commitment. Collins was subsequently removed from the Campbell residence and
    detained at the Mental Health Institute in Cherokee, Iowa. She was evaluated by a
    doctor on July 18. After a hearing on July 20, a state district court judge ordered that
    Collins be released.
    Collins then encountered resistance when she tried to contact Campbell, who had
    been admitted to the Gowrie Care Center. Lena Knight had directed the Gowrie staff
    to deny Collins’s requests for visitation. Collins later filed a petition to be appointed
    Campbell’s guardian, but she removed Campbell from the state before a hearing could
    be held. Campbell died in California the following year.
    Collins then filed this action, alleging three causes of action: (1) that the removal
    of Campbell from her home violated both Campbell’s and Collins’s constitutional rights;
    (2) that Collins’s constitutional rights were violated by the institution of the involuntary
    commitment proceedings against her; and (3) that Collins’s constitutional rights were
    violated by the interference with her attempts to have further contact with her
    grandmother.
    The district court dismissed some of the defendants, granted partial summary
    judgment to Willis, and denied summary judgment to the remaining defendants. After
    the district court’s action, all of the appellants remained as defendants in Collins’s first
    claim; Knipple, Bellinghausen, Lewis, and Comstock remained as defendants in
    Collins’s second claim; and Lewis remained as the sole defendant in Collins’s third
    claim.
    -6-
    II.
    We review a denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard
    that governed the district court’s decision. See Buckley v. Rogerson, 
    133 F.3d 1125
    ,
    1126 (8th Cir. 1998). We disagree with Collins’s assertion that Johnson v. Jones 
    115 S. Ct. 2151
    (1995), and Behrens v. Pelletier, 
    116 S. Ct. 834
    (1996), require a more
    deferential standard of review in cases involving the denial of summary judgment on
    qualified immunity grounds. As we observed in Heidemann v. Rother, our analysis in
    qualified immunity cases includes a traditional de novo review of the record,
    “characterized by [Johnson and Behrens] as a determination of ‘what facts the district
    court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.’” 
    84 F.3d 1021
    , 1027 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
    Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 842
    ). “Oftentimes it is,
    of course, merely a theoretical supposition that the district court ‘assumed’ any
    particular facts in deciding to deny a motion for summary judgment on qualified
    immunity grounds.” 
    Id. We affirm
    if the facts, viewed in this light, show no genuine
    issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law. See Johnston v. Warren County Fair Ass’n, Inc., 
    110 F.3d 36
    , 38 (8th Cir. 1997).
    III.
    Although we do not agree with Collins’s argument that Johnson and Behrens alter
    our standard of review, those decisions do require us to determine whether we have
    jurisdiction to consider this appeal. A district court’s denial of a motion for summary
    judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable. See Reece v. Groose,
    
    60 F.3d 487
    , 489 (8th Cir. 1995). Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of
    disputes related to abstract issues of law concerning qualified immunity, and we may
    not consider sufficiency of evidence arguments merely because they arise in a qualified
    immunity context. See 
    Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 842
    . Because the individual defendants
    argue that their actions were reasonable in light of their knowledge at the time of the
    alleged transgressions, we conclude that the issues
    -7-
    presented here are immediately appealable. “Johnson permits a [public official] to claim
    on appeal that all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported
    for purposes of summary judgment met the Harlow [v. Fitzgerald] standard of ‘objective
    legal reasonableness.’” Id.; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982)
    (detailing standard of objectively reasonable conduct).
    Collins contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider Dr. Comstock’s proffered
    qualified immunity defense. Comstock relied on Iowa statutes and the defense of
    absolute prosecutorial immunity in his motion for summary judgment. Although
    Comstock asserted a qualified immunity defense during the summary judgment hearing,
    the district court did not specifically address the issue in its opinion. Comstock has
    requested a remand to the district court for a ruling on his assertion of qualified
    immunity. Given the undisputed facts and the well-defined legal issues involved,
    however, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over Dr. Comstock’s claim of qualified
    immunity and that a remand is unnecessary.
    IV.
    Qualified immunity protects state actors from civil liability when “their conduct
    does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
    reasonable person would have known.” 
    Reece, 60 F.3d at 491
    (quoting 
    Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818
    ). In ruling upon a defense of qualified immunity, we first determine whether
    the law that the defendant is accused of having violated was clearly established and then
    examine the information possessed by the defendant at the time of the alleged violation.
    See 
    id. at 489
    (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 641 (1987)). Thus, the
    determination of a qualified immunity defense is “fact-intensive.” See 
    id. at 490.
    -8-
    A.
    Collins alleges that the removal of Campbell from her home was a violation of
    Campbell’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures. Warrantless
    entries “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few
    specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Mincey v. Arizona, 
    437 U.S. 385
    , 390 (1978). We conclude that the situation at the Campbell residence fell within
    one of those exceptions, for the Mincey Court recognized that “the Fourth Amendment
    does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they
    reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” 
    Id. at 392.
    See
    also United States v. Morales, 
    737 F.2d 761
    , 764-65 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
    Selberg, 
    630 F.2d 1292
    , 1295 (8th Cir. 1980). The defendants’ knowledge of
    Campbell’s frail and apparently deteriorating physical condition, her missed
    appointment with Dr. Comstock, Collins’s unwillingness or inability to locate
    Campbell’s medication for Knipple, and Collins’s lack of cooperation during Lewis’s
    visit was sufficient to lead them to reasonably believe that Campbell was in need of
    immediate aid.
    Invoking the Fourteenth Amendment, Collins argues that her grandmother’s
    removal was an unconstitutional disruption of family integrity. Although parents and
    children have a recognized liberty interest in the “care and companionship of each
    other,” the present case presents novel facts. Myers v. Norris, 
    810 F.2d 1437
    , 1462
    (8th Cir. 1987). We have held that child abuse investigators who have otherwise
    disrupted family integrity nevertheless are entitled to qualified immunity if their actions
    are properly founded upon a reasonable suspicion of child abuse. See Manzano v.
    South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Serv., 
    60 F.3d 505
    , 511 (8th Cir. 1995); 
    Myers, 810 F.2d at 1463
    . Assuming that the removal of Campbell from her home implicates the
    Fourteenth Amendment, we conclude that the information available to the defendants
    was more than sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that Campbell’s health was
    in jeopardy.
    -9-
    B.
    Collins alleges that Knipple, Bellinghausen, Lewis, and Comstock violated her
    constitutional rights when they participated in the initiation of emergency commitment
    proceedings against her. At the time of Collins’s commitment, it was clearly established
    that liberty from bodily restraint is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
    Fourteenth Amendment. See 
    Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1028
    (citing Youngberg v. Romeo,
    
    457 U.S. 307
    , 316 (1982). This liberty interest is implicated in involuntary commitment
    proceedings. See 
    id. Collins contends
    that Iowa Code § 229.11 imposes the additional
    standard of probable cause. Whatever the requirements of Iowa law, they are irrelevant
    to the issues in this case, for “a violation of state law, without more, does not state a
    claim under the federal Constitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Bagley v. Rogerson, 
    5 F.3d 325
    , 328 (8th Cir.1993). See also Marler v. Missouri State Bd. of Optometry, 
    102 F.3d 1453
    , 1457 (8th Cir. 1996). Rather, our inquiry “generally turns on the ‘objective legal
    reasonableness’ of the action.” 
    Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639
    (quoting 
    Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818
    -19).
    Considering the facts in a light most favorable to Collins, we conclude that a
    reasonable person could have believed that Collins would constitute a danger to
    Campbell or herself if she were allowed to remain at liberty. The appellants’ actions
    were reasonable given their knowledge that Collins had removed her grandmother from
    Shady Oaks under a pretext and without consulting with the medical staff, had violently
    resisted Campbell’s removal from the home, and had generally behaved in a way that
    would lead the appellants to believe that she would again attempt to remove her
    grandmother from a treatment facility. On these facts, the defendants are entitled to
    qualified immunity.
    -10-
    C.
    Collins alleges that Lewis, acting in her capacity as a state abuse investigator,
    actively assisted Lena Knight in interfering with Collins’s visitation rights at the Gowrie
    Care Center. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Collins, however,
    Lewis’s actions involved, at most, a discussion with Knight regarding the possible
    detrimental effects that Collins’s visitation would have on Campbell. Such conduct
    does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See 
    Manzano, 60 F.3d at 512
    (no
    constitutional violation when abuse investigator advised mother to seek protection order
    separating father from daughter).
    Conclusion
    After-acquired information not infrequently casts a different light on a situation
    in which public officials acted on the basis of their then-available knowledge. Those
    actions are not to be judged in the light of that after-acquired knowledge, however, and
    what we recently said in a somewhat similar case bears repeating here: “Public officials
    facing situations like this must take quick and decisive action to mitigate risks to health
    and safety. This is precisely the kind of good faith discretionary official action that
    qualified immunity is intended to protect.” King v. Beavers, No. 97-3295, slip op. at
    9 (8th Cir. July 9, 1998).
    The order denying Knipple, Bellinghausen, Lewis, Willis, and Comstock
    summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court with
    instructions to grant summary judgment in their favor.4
    4
    We express our appreciation to appointed counsel for his efforts on Collins’s
    behalf.
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    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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