United States v. Simon Frank Weise ( 1997 )


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  •                          United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 97-1099MN
    _____________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellant,           * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the District
    v.                                 * of Minnesota.
    *
    Simon Frank Weise,                       *
    *
    Appellee.            *
    _____________
    Submitted: October 24, 1997
    Filed: October 30, 1997
    _____________
    Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
    _____________
    FAGG, Circuit Judge.
    A jury convicted Simon Frank Weise of second-degree murder within Indian
    country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1153 (1994). At Weise’s initial
    sentencing, the district court departed downward from the applicable Guidelines range
    of 168 to 210 months and sentenced Weise to 121 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 5K2.0. The district court based the §
    5K2.0 departure on Weise’s record of steady employment and maintenance of family
    ties and responsibilities despite the difficulties of life on the Red Lake Reservation.
    See United States v. Big Crow, 
    898 F.2d 1326
    , 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990). The district
    court also concluded Weise’s conduct was aberrant behavior warranting departure.
    The Government appealed the § 5K2.0 departure decision. We held Weise’s conduct
    was not aberrant behavior supporting departure. See United States v. Weise, 
    89 F.3d 502
    , 507 (8th Cir. 1996). We also held the record was inadequate to support departure
    based on Big Crow and remanded to the district court for a refined assessment on an
    expanded record. See 
    id. On remand,
    the district court held an evidentiary hearing
    and again departed downward under § 5K2.0 to a sentence of 121 months. The
    Government once more appeals. We reverse and remand for imposition of a sentence
    within the applicable Guidelines range.
    U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 permits district courts to depart downward from the
    applicable Guidelines range if the court finds a “mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
    to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
    formulating the [G]uidelines.” See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (statutory authority
    for departure). The Commission names certain potential mitigating factors in the
    Guidelines and either forbids, discourages, or encourages their consideration. See
    Koon v. United States, 
    116 S. Ct. 2035
    , 2044-45 (1996). Factors that can never be
    bases for departure include race, creed, religion, socioeconomic status, U.S.S.G. §
    5H1.10; lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a
    disadvantaged upbringing, 
    id. § 5H1.12;
    drug or alcohol dependence, 
    id. § 5H1.4;
    and
    economic hardship, 
    id. § 5K2.12.
    See 
    Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2044
    . The Guidelines
    discourage consideration of a defendant’s employment record, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.5;
    family ties and responsibilities and community ties, 
    id. § 5H1.6;
    education and
    vocational skills, 
    id. § 5H1.2;
    and civic, charitable, or public service record, 
    id. § 5H1.11.
    See 
    Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045
    . Discouraged factors should be relied on only
    in exceptional cases, when “the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some
    other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.”
    
    Id. To warrant
    departure based on a discouraged, encouraged, or unmentioned factor,
    “the factor, as occurring in the particular circumstances, [must] take[] the case outside
    the heartland of the applicable Guideline.” 
    Id. at 2051.
    -2-
    At resentencing, the district court again based its departure decision on the view
    that Weise’s conduct was aberrant behavior, an unmentioned factor for a serious crime
    like murder. See United States v. Kalb, 
    105 F.3d 426
    , 429 (8th Cir. 1997). The district
    court was not free to revisit aberrant behavior, however, because we foreclosed it in
    the first appeal of Weise’s sentence. There, we held Weise’s conduct was not aberrant
    behavior as defined in our earlier case law. See 
    Weise, 89 F.3d at 507
    . Thus, the
    district court improperly considered the factor of aberrant behavior for departure
    purposes at both of Weise’s sentencings.
    The district court also based its departure at resentencing on other grounds:
    Weise’s employment history, his family ties, his reputation in the community, and the
    “extraordinary problems and difficulties [he] struggled against and overcame on the
    Red Lake Reservation.” Although Weise’s family was loving and supportive and had
    all the necessities, the district court stressed that Weise’s parents were very poor and
    sometimes abandoned their children overnight when abusing alcohol. The family of
    eight lived in a small, one-room house without electricity. The district court was
    impressed that, despite Weise’s disadvantaged upbringing and the reservation’s poor
    economic conditions, including an unemployment rate around 60%, Weise had worked
    steadily for about four and a half years for an employer willing to rehire him, never
    gone on welfare, and provided for four children and his long-time companion. The
    district court acknowledged its belief that if Weise did not live on an Indian reservation,
    his case would not fall outside the Guidelines heartland.
    We conclude the district court abused its discretion in granting the downward
    departure on these additional grounds. The district court could not use the prohibited
    factors of Weise’s race, socioeconomic status, economic hardship, or disadvantaged
    upbringing as bases for departure under § 5K2.0. See 
    Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2044
    -45.
    Even taking Weise’s presence on the reservation as an unmentioned factor, the record
    does not show that anything about the reservation environment skewed Weise’s
    opportunities in a way that was strikingly different from families of similar means and
    -3-
    circumstances living elsewhere. The district court’s other reasons for departure--
    Weise’s reputation in the community, stable employment history, and family ties and
    responsibilities--are discouraged factors that warrant departure only in extraordinary
    circumstances. See 
    id. at 2045.
    The record does not support departure based on
    Weise’s community reputation. Unlike the situation in Big Crow, no community
    leaders sent unsolicited letters to the sentencing court on Weise’s behalf. 
    See 898 F.2d at 1332
    . At most, a tribal prosecutor testified at resentencing that he was surprised to
    hear Weise was charged with homicide because Weise’s lengthy tribal record consisted
    of misdemeanor charges and, unlike most tribal defendants, Weise acted responsibly
    by often pleading guilty. Other individuals testified Weise is a good mechanic, a
    reliable worker, and nonviolent whether sober or intoxicated. This is simply not
    enough to establish Weise’s standing in the community. Weise’s family ties and
    responsibilities and stable employment are insufficiently unusual to warrant departure.
    See United States v. White Buffalo, 
    10 F.3d 575
    , 577 (8th Cir. 1993). Although we
    give substantial deference to a district court’s determination that a discouraged factor
    justifies departure because it is present in some unusual or exceptional way, see 
    Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046-47
    , in Weise’s case we conclude the district court abused its
    discretion in determining these factors are “present to an exceptional degree” and
    nothing makes his case exceptionally “different from the ordinary case where the
    factor[s] [are] present,” 
    id. at 2045.
    Having analyzed the potential departure factors singly and in combination, we
    conclude the district court abused its discretion in deciding Weise’s case lies outside
    the heartland of the applicable Guideline. We thus reverse and remand to the district
    court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    -4-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-1099

Filed Date: 10/30/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015