United States v. John Bradford Bond ( 1998 )


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  •                            United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 97-1668
    ___________
    United States of America,                  *
    *
    Appellee,                    *
    *
    v.                                    * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Western
    John Bradford Bond,                        * District of Missouri.
    * [PUBLISH]
    Appellant.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 10, 1997
    Filed:        February 6, 1998
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, ROSS and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    John     Bradford    Bond    pleaded   guilty    to   conspiracy   to   distribute
    methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a) and 846, and was
    sentenced to 210 months imprisonment.                On appeal Bond challenges the
    voluntariness of his guilty plea and a sentence enhancement for his role
    in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).              We reject his arguments and
    affirm.
    Bond argues that his plea was involuntary because at the plea hearing
    his counsel estimated that Bond would be subject to a guidelines sentencing
    range of 121 to 151 months.        His argument is without merit.         A defense
    counsel's erroneous estimate of a guidelines sentence does not render an
    otherwise voluntary plea involuntary.         United States v. Rhodes, 
    913 F.2d 839
    , 843 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
    498 U.S. 1122
     (1991); cf. United
    States v. Fortney, 
    957 F.2d 629
    , 631 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) ("government's
    incorrect estimate of [defendant's] criminal history category" does not
    necessarily "render[] the guilty plea invalid"), cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 902
    (1992).       In this case, before accepting Bond's guilty plea, the district
    1
    court complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.            Among other
    things, the court advised Bond that the guidelines would determine his
    sentence unless the statute overrode the guidelines.            The court further
    advised that the statutory minimum sentence was ten years and the maximum
    sentence was life.      We note that "[i]n accepting [Bond's] guilty plea, the
    district court was not obligated to inform [Bond] of the applicable
    guideline range or the actual sentence he would receive."            United States
    v. Marks, 
    85 F.3d 396
    , 398 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 205
     (1996).
    Following his plea and before sentencing, Bond filed a pro se motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea.       At the sentencing hearing, the court asked
    Bond whether he wanted to be heard on the motion.         He said no and withdrew
    the motion.      On appeal Bond argues that the court erred in allowing him to
    withdraw his pro se motion, asserting that he had inadequate representation.
    We need not address this argument, since Bond failed to raise the issue
    below.       In any event, even if Bond's motion to
    1
    The Honorable Russell G. Clark, Senior Judge, United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri.
    -2-
    withdraw had been before the district court, the court would not have abused
    its discretion in rejecting it.        "A defendant's misapprehension of the
    application of the Guidelines to his sentencing does not constitute a fair
    and just reason for withdrawing a plea so long as the defendant was told the
    range of potential punishment and that the Guidelines would be applied to
    determine his sentence."      United States v. Burney, 
    75 F.3d 442
    , 445 (8th
    Cir. 1996). "This remains true even where such a misunderstanding is based
    on an erroneous estimation by defense counsel."      
    Id.
    In this case, it appears that counsel's miscalculation was based on
    his belief that Bond would not receive an enhancement for his role in the
    offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which provides a four-level enhancement
    "[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that
    involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive."      However,
    the plea agreement specifically informed Bond that the district court at the
    time of sentencing would decide whether the enhancement applied.
    Contrary to Bond's argument on appeal, the district court did not err
    in imposing the enhancement.      Bond does not challenge the scope of the
    activity, but argues that the government failed to prove that he was an
    organizer or leader.    We disagree.   "The terms 'organizer' and 'leader' are
    to be broadly interpreted."    United States v. Guerra, 
    113 F.3d 809
    , 820 (8th
    Cir. 1997).    "Factors the court should consider include the exercise of
    decision making authority, the nature of      participation in the commission
    of the offense, . . . and the degree of control and authority exercised over
    others."   U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, application note 4.   At the sentencing hearing,
    an undercover officer   testified that Bond "was at the top with individuals
    underneath that were distributing methamphetamine."        In particular, the
    officer noted that Bond "fronted" drugs,
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    maintained control over the proceeds, required distributors to "pair up" for
    safety, and directed the activities of a "mule."      Because the district
    court's finding that Bond was an organizer or leader is supported by the
    evidence, it is not erroneous.   See, e.g., Guerra, 
    113 F.3d at 820
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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