United States v. Dal Thomas Carter ( 1999 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 99-2385
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,             * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Western
    v.                                 * District of Missouri.
    *
    Dal Thomas Carter,                       *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.            *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 16, 1999
    Filed: November 23, 1999
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    A jury found Dal Thomas Carter guilty of conspiracy to distribute
    methamphetamine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    . In this direct appeal, Carter raises
    a variety of arguments. We reject them all. First, viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a reasonable factfinder need not have had
    a reasonable doubt about the government's proof on any elements of the crime. See
    United States v. Jensen, 
    141 F.3d 830
    , 833 (8th Cir. 1998). Carter mainly attacks the
    credibility of a primary government witness, and her credibility was for the jury to
    evaluate. See United States v. Hayes, 
    120 F.3d 739
    , 744 (8th Cir. 1997). Second, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the definition of
    distribution includes sharing in response to the jury's request for supplemental
    instruction. See United States v. Hester, 
    140 F.3d 753
    , 760-61 (8th Cir. 1998); United
    States v. Fregoso, 
    60 F.3d 1314
    , 1325 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
    Slaughter, 
    128 F.3d 623
    , 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (standard of review). The district court
    also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Carter's untimely and factually
    unsupported proposed instruction that a buyer/seller relationship is not enough to
    establish conspiracy. Third, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court 's
    admission of expert testimony about the significance of plastic bags, syringes, a scale,
    and other items seized from Carter. See United States v. Ortega, 
    150 F.3d 937
    , 943
    (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
    119 S. Ct. 837
     (1999). Last, the district court properly
    exercised its discretion in refusing to permit the testimony of a defense expert who was
    not timely disclosed as required by the magistrate judge's omnibus disclosure order.
    See 
    id.
     We thus affirm Carter's conviction.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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