United States v. Gaylen Jackson ( 1999 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 98-2662
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * District of Minnesota.
    Gaylen Maurice Jackson,                *
    *    [PUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: December 15, 1998
    Filed: February 17, 1999
    ___________
    Before MCMILLIAN, LAY and HALL,1 Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    On March 17, 1998, a jury found Gaylen Maurice Jackson guilty of violating
    18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm. Jackson was sentenced
    to 240 months in prison and five years of supervised release. On appeal, Jackson
    asserts that police officers seized him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
    1
    The Honorable Cynthia H. Hall, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
    Circuit, sitting by designation.
    and that the resulting evidence seized and statements made should be suppressed as
    fruits of the poisonous tree. The fundamental issue involved in this appeal is whether
    the police officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and interrogate the
    defendant.
    On September 10, 1997, Minneapolis Police Officers Thomas Mack and
    Francisco Porras were dispatched to investigate shots that were fired in the rear of
    2640 Blaisdell Avenue South in Minneapolis. The uniformed officers were driving
    a marked patrol car and entered an alley behind Blaisdell Avenue within one minute
    after receiving the dispatch, turning off the lights of the squad car as they entered the
    alley. As the squad car pulled into the alley, the officers noticed the defendant riding
    a bicycle in the area behind 2640 Blaisdell. After Jackson saw the car, he began to
    pedal his bicycle away from the marked squad car and continued to look over his
    shoulder at the car. Jackson then jumped off his bicycle and began to run. The
    officers noticed that the defendant held his left hip area as he ran as though he were
    preventing an object from falling. The officers then stopped their car, identified
    themselves as police officers and ordered Jackson to stop. Jackson continued to flee
    until Officer Mack eventually tackled him. As Officer Mack conducted a pat down
    search, Jackson stated, “It’s in my waistband.” Tr. at 90. Officer Porras saw the
    handle of a chrome plated handgun sticking out of Jackson’s waistband and seized
    it. The officers then placed Jackson under arrest and took him to the police station
    where he was booked. The next day, Jackson gave a statement, after receiving
    Miranda warnings, in which he admitted that he was carrying a gun that evening and
    that he was a convicted felon.
    Jackson urges that the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to detain
    him for an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968), and that, as
    such, the gun and the statements were fruits of the illegal seizure. Relying on
    California v. Hodari D., Jackson asserts and the government agrees that Jackson was
    seized at the moment Officer Mack tackled him. See California v. Hodari D., 499
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    U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (seizure occurs when there is physical application of force by
    the officer or submission to the officer’s assertion of authority). Therefore, we must
    determine whether the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Jackson
    at the time Officer Mack tackled him.
    We agree with the government that the officers possessed particularized
    reasonable suspicion under the circumstances to stop and briefly detain Jackson for
    questioning. The officers responded within one minute to a call that shots had been
    fired at an address located in a high-crime neighborhood. Defendant was behind the
    area where the shots had been fired and nervously began to flee the area when the
    police approached in a marked squad car. He continued to look back at the squad car
    as he fled, and eventually dropped his bike and ran. The officers noticed that he
    appeared to be clutching something at his left side. As the officers took chase, they
    announced that they were officers and yelled at Jackson to stop. Yet, Jackson
    continued to flee.2 This court has considered similar circumstances and found that
    they supplied reasonable articulable suspicion. See United States v. Atlas, 
    94 F.3d 447
    , 450-51 (8th Cir. 1996) (considering the dangerousness of the area and the
    defendant’s nervous reaction to find reasonable suspicion); United States v.
    Bloomfield, 
    40 F.3d 910
    (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (considering defendant’s
    nervousness contributing factor to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Raino, 
    980 F.2d 1148
    , 1150 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed where
    officers were responding to late-night call that shots had been fired in precisely the
    area where the defendant’s car was parked and the defendant pulled away and
    appeared nervous as officers approached). Under these circumstances, the officers’
    suspicion was reasonable and justified stopping Jackson for further investigation.
    2
    Jackson argues that he did not know he was being followed by police officers
    and that, as such, his flight was a reasonable and typical reaction to being followed
    by unknown individuals in a bad neighborhood. We reject his contention because the
    officers were driving a marked squad car, they were wearing their uniforms and they
    identified themselves as police officers as they chased him on foot.
    -3-
    Furthermore, it was reasonable for Officer Mack to tackle Jackson to effect the
    investigative stop. We do not believe the tackle exceeded the amount of force
    appropriate under the circumstances. See United States v. Seelye, 
    815 F.2d 48
    (8th
    Cir. 1987); Tom v. Voida, 
    963 F.2d 952
    , 958 (7th Cir. 1992). Once police have the
    reasonable suspicion needed to justify an investigatory stop they may use the forcible
    means necessary to effectuate that stop as long as their actions are reasonable under
    the circumstances. United States v. Weaver, 
    8 F.3d 1240
    , 1244 (7th Cir. 1993); Tom
    v. Voida, 
    963 F.2d 952
    , 958 (7th Cir. 1992).
    The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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