James Bennett v. Richard Miles ( 2015 )


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  •                 United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-2124
    ___________________________
    James Bennett
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Richard H. Miles, President, CMS; Sally Powers, Vice President, CMS; Leon
    Vickers, Health Administrator; Stormi Moeller, Director of Nursing, JCCC, CMS;
    Gerald Jacobsen, Regional Manager, CMS; Jewel Cofield, Official Regional
    Administrator; Elizabeth Conley, D.O. Regional Medical Director, CMS; John J.
    Treu, General Counsel, CMS; Dr. Haas, CMS; Dr. Sands; Dr. Rex Hardman; Edith
    Vogel, Nurse, CMS; Correctional Medical Services; Dr. Thomas Baker, M.D.,
    Associate Medical Director, CMS; Pamala S. Swartz; Nanette M. Wavre; Martha
    R. Nolt
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
    ____________
    Submitted: January 6, 2015
    Filed: February 27, 2015
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Inmate James Bennett appeals following the district court’s adverse grant of
    summary judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
    and remand for further proceedings. Bennett brought the instant suit in July 2010. In
    his amended complaint, he sought damages and injunctive relief against Correctional
    Medical Services (CMS); Drs. Thomas Baker, Rex Hardman, and Harry Haas; Nurse
    Edith Vogel; and Health Services Administrator (HSA) Leon Vickers.1 Claiming
    Eighth Amendment violations, he alleged that he had reported serious symptoms from
    2005 through 2007, but it took two years for defendants to make a correct diagnosis
    of the cause for his symptoms, and that he had suffered permanent nerve damage
    despite undergoing surgery.
    We find no basis for reversing most of the orders Bennett challenges on appeal.
    Specifically, we conclude the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
    to Nurse Vogel and HSA Vickers because Bennett did not adequately counter their
    supporting evidence. See Barber v. C1Truck Driver Training, LLC, 
    656 F.3d 782
    ,
    791 (8th Cir. 2011) (nonmovant must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise genuine
    issue for trial, and may not rely upon mere denials or allegations). We also conclude
    the district court did not err in denying his motion to compel production of documents,
    see Kilpatrick v. King, 
    499 F.3d 759
    , 766 (8th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for gross abuse
    of discretion denial of motion to compel), or in denying without prejudice his motions
    for counsel, see Ward v. Smith, 
    721 F.3d 940
    , 942 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (there
    is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in civil cases; listing relevant criteria),
    although we ask the district court to reconsider on remand whether appointment of
    1
    Bennett does not sufficiently raise on appeal the district court’s preservice
    dismissal of defendants Richard Miles, Sally Powers, Stormi Moeller, Gerald
    Jacobsen, Jewel Cofield, Dr. Elizabeth Conley, John Treu, Dr. Sands, Pamala Swartz,
    and Martha Nolt, see Hess v. Ables, 
    714 F.3d 1048
    , 1051 n.2 (8th Cir. 2013); and he
    does not mention on appeal defendant Nanette Wavre, who was never served, see
    Young v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Co., 
    864 F.2d 81
    , 83 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
    (where only unserved defendant remains in action, order disposing of claims against
    served defendants is final appealable order).
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    counsel is warranted on the remaining claims. Further, contrary to Bennett’s
    suggestion on appeal, he did not move for appointment of a medical expert, but
    merely mentioned his alleged need for an expert in his last motion for counsel.
    We conclude, however, that questions of fact remained on Bennett’s deliberate
    indifference claims against Drs. Haas, Baker, and Hardman arising from his cervical
    spondylitic myelopathy.2 See Peterson v. Kopp, 
    754 F.3d 594
    , 598 (8th Cir. 2014)
    (reviewing de novo grant of summary judgment, viewing evidence in light most
    favorable to nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor);
    Wise v. Lappin, 
    674 F.3d 939
    , 941 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (determinations at
    summary judgment stage may not be based on credibility findings or weighing of
    evidence). First, there were conflicts between the physicians’ evidence–their
    attestations and declarations, and the medical record entries they offered in support–
    and Bennett’s attestations regarding his symptoms and complaints when he saw the
    physicians; and those conflicts were sufficient to raise questions of fact as to whether
    the physicians’ actions or failures to act constituted deliberate indifference. See
    Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 
    746 F.3d 384
    , 387 (8th Cir. 2014) (inmate must
    show that he suffered from objectively serious medical need defendants knew of but
    disregarded; deliberate indifference may be found where medical care is so
    inappropriate as to show intentional maltreatment). Second, the assessments and
    recommendations of outside orthopedist John Spears after Bennett’s initial visit in
    November 2007 indicated that the pressure on Bennett’s cervical spinal cord needed
    immediate attention to prevent further and permanent damage, suggesting that the
    pressure he had been experiencing had already caused damage; and Dr. Spears’s
    January 2010 note describing Bennett’s permanent neurological impairments two
    2
    Cervical spondylitic myelopathy is pressure on the spinal cord itself from
    degenerative changes, which can keep the brain from receiving sensory information
    or transmitting information to the voluntary muscles. Symptoms include clumsiness
    and difficulties ambulating. See Julia Barrett, Cervical Spondylosis, in 2 The Gale
    Encyclopedia of Medicine 923-24 (Laurie J. Fundukian et al., eds., 4th ed. 2011).
    -3-
    years after undergoing cervical surgery supported Bennett’s allegation that he suffered
    detrimental effects from the delay in diagnostic testing and the outside consultation.
    See Moots v Lombardi, 
    453 F.3d 1020
    , 1023 (8th Cir. 2006) (inmate complaining of
    delay in treatment must offer verifying medical evidence showing that delay had
    detrimental effect). Third, certain documents in the record indicated that Bennett’s
    deteriorating condition was obvious to laypersons or could have been diagnosed
    earlier: declarations from three other inmates described his deteriorating condition
    since 2005; a medical record entry supported his verified allegations that in November
    2006 prison staff informed medical staff that Bennett had been moved to a bottom
    bunk on the bottom walk and then to a handicapped cell, and also showed that prison
    staff had requested a medical assessment of Bennett’s need for accommodations; and
    a nurse practitioner’s notation documenting abnormal findings when she saw Bennett
    a few weeks after he saw Dr. Baker in October 2007 casts doubt on the declarations
    or attestations of the doctors that Bennett’s condition was not diagnosable earlier. See
    Vaughn v. Gray, 
    557 F.3d 904
    , 909 (8th Cir. 2009) (factfinder may determine that
    defendant deliberately disregarded serious medical need of which he was actually
    aware from very fact that medical need was obvious); Hartsfield v. Colburn, 
    371 F.3d 454
    , 457 (8th Cir. 2004) (where conditions inmate described would have been obvious
    to layperson, there was no need for inmate to submit verifying medical evidence to
    show detrimental effects of alleged delay in treatment); see also Wise, 
    674 F.3d at 941
    (court must accept as true facts stated in prisoner affidavits). We note that while the
    district court found, in granting summary judgment, that Bennett had misstated his
    medical condition, Bennett offered a reasonable explanation below that, as a
    layperson, he did not fully understand Dr. Spears’s explanation of his spinal condition,
    and the record showed that at one point multiple sclerosis was considered as a possible
    diagnosis.
    Finally, while we agree with the district court that Bennett did not state a claim
    against CMS in his complaint, see Jackson v. Nixon, 
    747 F.3d 537
    , 540-41 (8th Cir.
    2014) (reviewing de novo 28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissal); Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck
    -4-
    & Co., 
    984 F.2d 972
    , 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993) (corporate liability under § 1983),
    because Bennett’s added allegations in a supplement he offered with a motion for
    reconsideration appear sufficient to state a claim against CMS, cf. Burke v. N. D.
    Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 
    294 F.3d 1043
    , 1044 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
    (allegations against corporation providing prison medical care that its hepatitis C
    treatment protocol and its doctors’ complicity with prison medical director’s actions
    were damaging to inmate’s health stated § 1983 claim), we ask the district court on
    remand to revisit its ruling on Bennett’s motion for reconsideration.
    Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
    physician defendants, and in all other respects we affirm. We remand the case for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ______________________________
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