Donald Bass v. Sutran, Inc. ( 2000 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 00-1124
    ___________
    Donald Bass; Amalgamated Transit         *
    Workers Union, Local 1356,               *
    *
    Appellees,                 *
    *
    v.                                *
    * Appeal from the United States
    City of Sioux Falls, a Municipality      * District Court for the
    Chartered under the Constitution of      * District of South Dakota.
    the State of South Dakota; Ryder/ATE, *
    Inc., a Delaware Corporation,            *
    *   [UNPUBLISHED]
    Defendants,                *
    *
    SuTran, Inc., a South Dakota             *
    corporation,                             *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 27, 2000
    Filed: December 5, 2000
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    SuTran, Inc. (SuTran) appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary
    judgment and declaratory judgment after an evidentiary hearing in an action by Donald
    Bass and his Union, the Amalgamated Transit Workers Union, Local 1356 (Union), to
    compel arbitration. We affirm.
    Bass was terminated in November 1995, and after Ryder/ATE, Inc. (Ryder)
    denied the grievances challenging Bass’s discharge, the Union president requested
    arbitration. Ryder took no action on the Union’s request for arbitration prior to
    SuTran’s succession on March 1, 1996, and Bass and the Union filed suit to compel
    arbitration in January 1997. After the district court granted summary judgment to Bass
    and the Union, this court remanded the case to the district court to determine when, if
    ever, SuTran clearly articulated its refusal to arbitrate the Union’s grievance concerning
    Bass’s discharge. See Bass v. City of Sioux Falls, No. 98-3669, slip op. at 6-7 (8th
    Cir. Aug. 10, 1999).
    On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, and found, based on
    the testimony and documentary evidence presented, that although SuTran did not intend
    to arbitrate Bass’s grievances, it did not ever clearly articulate to the Union its refusal
    to arbitrate the grievances. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
    Bass and the Union, and entered a declaratory judgment that SuTran must arbitrate
    Bass’s grievances regarding his suspension and termination, in accordance with the
    collective bargaining agreement. SuTran appealed, arguing that it unequivocally
    refused to arbitrate more than six months prior to the time the Union filed its action to
    compel arbitration, and therefore the action is time-barred.
    We conclude that “[a] cause of action to compel arbitration under a collective
    bargaining agreement accrues when one party clearly articulates its refusal to arbitrate
    1
    The Honorable Lawrence J. Piersol, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the District of South Dakota.
    -2-
    the dispute,” United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 88 v. Middendorf
    Meat Co., 
    794 F. Supp. 328
    , 332 (E.D. Mo. 1992), aff’d, 
    1993 WL 96905
    (8th Cir.
    April 5, 1993) (unpublished per curiam), and the district court did not clearly err in
    finding that SuTran never clearly articulated its refusal to arbitrate, see Local Joint
    Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, Bartenders Union Local 165 v. Exber, Inc., 
    994 F.2d 674
    ,
    676 (9th Cir. 1993) (for employer to make clear that it refuses to arbitrate, it must make
    unequivocal, express rejection of union’s request for arbitration; constructive notice not
    sufficient; employer’s failure to respond to union’s letter requesting arbitration was
    insufficient to qualify as rejection). Therefore, the action is not time-barred.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-1124

Filed Date: 12/5/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015