United States v. Philip E. Roberts ( 2001 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 00-3405
    ___________
    United States of America,                 *
    *
    Appellee,                    * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    v.                                  * Western District of Arkansas
    *
    Philip E. Roberts,                        * [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 10, 2001
    Filed: May 16, 2001
    ___________
    Before HANSEN and BYE, Circuit Judges, and MELLOY,1 District Judge.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    A jury convicted Philip Roberts of willfully failing to file income tax returns for
    the years 1993 and 1994. The district court2 sentenced Roberts to 16 months in prison
    and a one-year term of supervised release. The court also imposed restitution of
    1
    The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    2
    The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Arkansas.
    $58,868.19, a $30,000 fine, and a $50 special assessment. Roberts now appeals
    several aspects of his conviction and sentence. We affirm.
    In 1987, Roberts opened a chiropractic clinic in Forth Smith, Arkansas. For the
    next three years, Roberts paid federal and state income taxes. Starting in 1990,
    however, Roberts didn’t file federal income tax returns or pay taxes. In 1993, Roberts
    earned approximately $123,000 in gross income, and in 1994, Roberts earned roughly
    $207,000. In March 2000, a grand jury indicted Roberts on two counts of failing to file
    income tax returns for the 1993 and 1994 tax years, violations of 
    26 U.S.C. § 7203
    .
    Roberts proceeded to trial in late June 2000; following a three-day trial, the jury
    convicted him on both counts.
    Roberts raises five categories of claims in this appeal. We find that none of
    these claims of error has merit.
    1. Roberts contends that the requirement to file a tax return under penalty of
    perjury violates his Fifth Amendment rights. He argues that if he had filed returns for
    1993 and 1994, he would essentially have incriminated himself by demonstrating
    knowledge of the filing requirements for the other years when he failed to file a return,
    1990, 1991, and 1992. We reject this argument because “[a] taxpayer cannot rely on
    the privilege against self-incrimination to refuse to disclose any information or to fail
    to file a tax return.” Ueckert v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
    721 F.2d 248
    , 250 (8th
    Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Sullivan, 
    274 U.S. 259
    , 263-64 (1927)).
    2. Roberts alleges that his indictment was defective because it failed to cite the
    statute requiring him to pay income taxes, 
    26 U.S.C. § 6012
    . An indictment is
    ordinarily sufficient if it states each material element of the offenses charged. See
    Hamling v. United States, 
    418 U.S. 87
    , 117 (1974). Though Roberts’s indictment did
    not mention § 6012, the document cited 
    26 U.S.C. § 7203
    , which explicitly imposes
    punishment for willfully failing to file a tax return, and recited the various elements of
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    § 7203. Roberts was fully aware of the charges he faced because, in addition to the
    plain language in the indictment, the district court required the government to file a bill
    of particulars. Thus Roberts received constitutionally proper notice of the charges
    levied against him. See United States v. Vroman, 
    975 F.2d 669
    , 670-71 (9th Cir. 1992)
    (“The government was not required to cite [] § 6012 in the indictment in order to give
    [defendant] notice of the charges filed against him.”); United States v. Kahl, 
    583 F.2d 1351
    , 1355 (5th Cir. 1978) (same).
    3. Roberts contends that the district judge should have recused himself. Roberts
    recites a laundry list of “bad acts”: the district judge denied bail for improper reasons,
    dismissed related civil tax suits brought by Roberts without justification, improperly
    reviewed the magistrate judge’s reports and recommendations, limited Roberts’s
    objections at trial and at sentencing, and made improper comments at arraignment.
    Roberts also claims that the district judge “acted as an accuser” by listing the statutes
    Roberts had violated. These accusations amount to disagreements with court rulings,
    which do not form a proper basis for recusal. Harris v. State of Mo., 
    960 F.2d 738
    , 740
    (8th Cir. 1992). We have reviewed the record in this case and we conclude that the
    district judge presided in a fair and impartial manner. The district judge therefore
    properly declined to recuse himself.
    4. Roberts argues that the district court miscalculated the tax loss and imposed
    too harsh a sentence. We disagree. “[T]he guidelines contemplate that the court will
    simply make a reasonable estimate [of the tax loss] based on the available facts.”
    U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, app. n.1. The Presentence Report calculated the total tax loss at
    $18,771 for 1993 and $40,096 for 1994, and IRS Special Agent Tom Bryan testified
    to these amounts at the sentencing hearing. Roberts objected, and he cross-examined
    Agent Bryan at the hearing. After considering both the evidence and the objections,
    the district court adopted the tax loss estimate contained in the Presentence Report as
    its finding. Roberts has not shown that the court’s findings were erroneous; he has only
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    claimed (oddly) that the government suffered no loss as a consequence of his failure
    to pay income taxes. We find that the court’s tax loss calculations were not in error.
    Roberts also argues that his sentence is erroneous because the IRS failed to
    submit a formal assessment of his tax liability. A valid, formal assessment was not
    required in this instance, and we therefore reject Roberts’s argument. See United
    States v. Dack, 
    747 F.2d 1172
    , 1174-76 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
    5. Finally, Roberts raises a farrago of (mostly) constitutional claims of error.
    He charges that the government violated his rights to compel the attendance of, and to
    cross-examine, certain government witnesses; that the district court lacked venue; that
    the jury instructions, the composition of the jury pool, and the court’s conduct during
    voir dire were improper; and that the court erred in ruling on a variety of related
    matters. We have reviewed the record and we believe that Roberts’s claims of error
    are unfounded. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    AFFIRMED.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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