Orion Financial Corp. v. American Foods Group, Inc. ( 2000 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    Nos. 98-3968 & 98-3969
    ___________
    Orion Financial Corp. of South Dakota, *
    a South Dakota corporation,            *
    *
    Plaintiff-Appellee/        *
    Cross-Appellant,           *
    * Appeals from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * District of South Dakota.
    American Foods Group, Inc.,            *
    a Delaware corporation,                *
    *
    Defendant-Appellant/       *
    Cross-Appellee.            *
    ___________
    Submitted: January 3, 2000
    Filed: January 13, 2000
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, LAY and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    LAY, Circuit Judge.
    The agreement at the heart of this dispute provided that Orion Financial Corp.
    of South Dakota (Orion) would assist American Foods Group, Inc. (American Foods)
    in procuring financing in the form of grants and loans and, in exchange, Orion would
    be compensated for its services. The compensation was to be in the form of a base fee
    plus percentages of the financing obtained during the term of the agreement. These
    percentages were known as success fees and the agreement capped the amount
    recoverable through these fees at $350,000. In October of 1994, Orion sent American
    Foods a letter invoice requesting payment for services. American Foods paid a portion
    of the requested payment. The parties then terminated the relationship under the
    agreement. Subsequently, Orion demanded payment in a sum equal to the amount
    remaining under the agreement’s success fee cap. The parties, however, disputed the
    amount owing.
    Orion brought this suit on June 12, 1995, alleging breach of contract by
    American Foods and seeking damages in the sum of $255,500 plus interest and
    collection costs.1 On July 13, 1995, American Foods filed its answer and a
    counterclaim alleging it had overpaid Orion by $33,250. On April 2, 1997, Orion
    moved for summary judgment on the complaint and counterclaim. The district court2
    entered a partial summary judgment on January 12, 1998, granting Orion damages in
    the sum of $231,318 plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $32,820.81. Due to
    American Foods’ earlier payments and the parties’ agreed upon cap on recovery, the
    partial summary judgment left only $24,182 available to Orion as success fees.
    Recognizing this, and in order to make the issue immediately appealable, the parties
    entered into two stipulations. The stipulations provided for an additional money
    judgment and the entry of final judgment. Specifically, the first stipulation, dated
    March 1998, addressed the relevant date of a $3 million accommodation and the proper
    characterization of five capital leases. The second stipulation, dated April 1998,
    addressed the amount of attorney’s fees at stake and whether or not such fees were
    reasonable. Incorporating the prior partial summary judgment and the stipulations, the
    district court entered judgment against American Foods on October 22, 1998.
    1
    Suit was originally filed in South Dakota state court but was subsequently
    removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.
    2
    The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the
    District of South Dakota, presiding.
    -2-
    The parties now disagree as to the meaning of these stipulations and their legal
    import to this appeal and any subsequent litigation. According to American Foods, the
    stipulations were intended to operate such that if this court affirmed the district court’s
    ruling on the original partial summary judgment, American Foods would agree to be
    bound by the stipulations and this matter would be closed. However, if this court
    overturned those rulings adverse to American Foods, the stipulations would become
    null and void and the entire matter would be remanded for a full and fair hearing on the
    merits. Orion disagrees with this interpretation of the stipulations and urges that all
    legal issues have been decided and that there are no factual disputes remaining.
    The parties’ briefs best articulate their views on the stipulations. For example,
    American Foods explicitly concedes that the stipulations were entered into solely to
    obtain an appeal: “[t]he stipulation of the parties removed this issue [the date of the
    relevant accommodation] solely for the purpose of allowing the matters decided in the
    original order to proceed to appeal,” American Foods’ Corrected Reply Br. at 15, and
    “[t]he parties’ April, 1998 stipulation dealt with this issue [the attorney’s fees] only in
    order to allow this matter to proceed to appeal.” Id. at 19. Yet, despite recognizing
    the existence of the stipulations, American Foods consistently maintains in its briefs
    that there are material issues of fact outstanding and that all issues, including those
    stipulated to, should be remanded for a full hearing.
    In effect, what the parties attempt to do is to agree upon a judgment for the
    purposes of appealability and then the parties (at least American Foods) attempt to
    challenge that judgment on both issues of fact and law that were never raised before the
    district court. This not only violates the final judgment rule but contravenes the basic
    principle that one cannot raise issues on appeal that have not been raised before the
    district court. Although we accept the stipulations in good faith, we nevertheless find
    that this approach plays fast and loose with the limited appellate resources that we
    have. We also appreciate that Orion disagrees with American Foods’ analysis and
    argues that the stipulations are final and cannot now be factually or legally attacked on
    -3-
    appeal. We doubt, however, if counsel for American Foods was so gullible as to enter
    into such an agreement. More importantly, we cannot read the stipulation with that
    understanding.
    Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over “all final decisions of the district
    courts.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     (emphasis added). “The finality requirement . . . embodies
    a strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstructing or
    impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals.” United States v.
    Nixon, 
    418 U.S. 683
    , 690 (1974). In cases involving multiple claims or parties, Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows a court to enter a final judgment “as to one or
    more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that
    there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
    judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The sole purpose of a Rule 54(b) order is to provide
    an opportunity to appeal claims affecting some but not all of the parties or some but not
    all of the issues. Another avenue to appeal is 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (b), which allows a
    district court to certify an order if it “involves a controlling question of law as to which
    there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from
    the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation . . . .” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (b).
    In this case, the parties have not attempted to proceed in accordance with either
    Rule 54(b) or § 1292(b). As is detailed above and evidenced by the briefs, the parties
    have a basic disagreement as to the meaning of the stipulations and their effect upon
    this appeal and subsequent litigation. We feel this case falls within the prohibitive
    scope of Cheng v. Commissioner Internal Revenue Service, 
    878 F.2d 306
     (9th Cir.
    1989). The parties in Cheng entered into a stipulation following entry of a partial
    summary judgment in order to obtain an appealable final order. The stipulation
    provided for entry of a final order but noted that Cheng “is not conceding the remaining
    undecided issues and should a decision be entered in favor of [Cheng] on appeal and
    the case remanded . . . [he] will, on remand, be permitted to present additional evidence
    -4-
    and arguments . . . .” 
    Id. at 308
    . The Ninth Circuit held that the order following the
    stipulation did not conclusively end the litigation on the merits because the stipulation
    allowed for the resurrection of stipulated claims depending upon the outcome of the
    initial appeal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.3
    In the present case the parties wish to challenge on appeal issues that are still
    within the lawsuit and, if successful, challenge them again in further litigation. This
    approach defeats the very purpose of finality and Rule 54(b). Consequently it is clear
    that the order is not final and that only a partial judgment has been rendered from the
    previous proceedings. Under the circumstances the court has no alternative other than
    to dismiss the appeal as lacking finality in the judgment.
    The claims and cross-claims are hereby ordered dismissed without prejudice to
    the parties so that the district court may enter a final judgment on all issues. Finality
    3
    The Ninth Circuit distinguished Cheng in the case of Horn v. Berdon, Inc.
    Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 
    938 F.2d 125
     (9th Cir. 1991). In Horn, the parties
    stipulated to dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim without prejudice and the appellate
    court found jurisdiction. This is similar to our recent case, Great Rivers Cooperative
    of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., Nos. 98-2527, 98-2528, 
    1999 WL 1191459
     (8th Cir. 1999), in which this court refused to follow Cheng. In Great Rivers,
    this court held that a dismissal of certain claims without prejudice does not necessarily
    defeat the rule of finality as to the remaining claims. A close reading of Cheng,
    however, demonstrates that it is distinguishable from Great Rivers and Horn. In Cheng
    the court observed: “[a] plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the remainder of his claim(s)
    after a partial summary judgment has been entered against him and then appeal the
    partial summary judgment.” Cheng, 
    878 F.2d at 311
    . However, the court noted that
    Cheng had not taken this path and had instead elected to retain his undecided claim and
    defenses in case of a favorable outcome on appeal.
    We feel the present case is most closely aligned with Cheng.
    -5-
    of judgment is required and is a prerequisite under the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure.
    Appeal dismissed without prejudice. Each party to pay own costs.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-3968, 98-3969

Judges: Bowman, Lay, Wollman

Filed Date: 1/13/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2024