Charles Gassoway v. Metropolitan ( 2000 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 99-3030
    ___________
    Charles Gassoway,                        *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    *
    v.                                 * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Eastern
    Metropolitan St. Louis                   * District of Missouri.
    Psychiatric Center,                      *
    *         [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 12, 2000
    Filed: July 10, 2000
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and
    PANNER,1 District Judge.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Charles Gassoway sued the Metropolitan St. Louis Psychiatric Center (MPC),
    claiming, as relevant here, that he was terminated on the basis of his race in violation
    of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), and of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C.
    1
    The Honorable Owen M. Panner, United States District Judge for the District
    of Oregon, sitting by designation.
    § 2000e-2(a), § 2000e-5(f). The district court2 dismissed the Title VII claim because
    Mr. Gassoway did not file his action within 90 days of receiving his right-to-sue letter
    from the EEOC, as § 2000e-5(f) requires, and the factual record completely supports
    the district court's action.
    The district court dismissed Mr. Gassoway's § 1981 claim on the ground that the
    MPC was an arm of the state of Missouri, and thus entitled to eleventh amendment
    immunity, because its sole source of funding was from the state and because officers
    of the state managed its operations in every particular. See Sherman v. Curators of
    the University of Missouri, 
    16 F.3d 860
    , 863-64 (8th Cir. 1994). The factual record
    completely supports this conclusion as well.
    Mr. Gassoway argues that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1981 claim
    with prejudice, evidently wishing to file it, if he can, in state court at some point. Since
    a dismissal on the basis of subject-matter jurisdiction, however, with or without
    prejudice, cannot act as a bar to a later suit in the Missouri courts, see Kulinski v.
    Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 
    112 F.3d 368
    , 373, 373 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997), see also
    18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
    Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4436, at 339 (1981), we detect no error here.
    We therefore affirm the district court in every respect. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    2
    The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-3030

Filed Date: 7/10/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015