United States v. Gene E. Dudley ( 2000 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 99-2823
    ___________
    United States of America,                 *
    *
    Appellee,                    *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                  * District Court for the
    * Western District of Missouri.
    Gene E. Dudley,                           *
    *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 5, 2000
    Filed: September 13, 2000
    ___________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Gene E. Dudley appeals from the district court’s1sentence imposed upon his
    guilty plea to multiple counts of drug-trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
    (b)(1)(c) and (d), and to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, Dudley objected to his designation as
    a career offender, arguing that one of the predicate felony convictions--offering
    violence to a correctional officer, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.385 (1982)--was
    1
    Honorable D. Brook Bartlett, late a United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri.
    not sufficiently serious to constitute a crime of violence for purposes of U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a) (1998), particularly because he had not intended to harm
    the correctional officer and had merely “shoved” him. The district court overruled
    Dudley’s objection and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 140 months and
    60 months, and 3 years supervised release. On appeal, he renews his argument against
    career-offender status. We affirm.
    Under section 217.385 as it existed at the time of Dudley’s state conviction, it
    was a crime for an inmate to “offer to commit violence to an officer or employee of a
    correctional institution.” We agree with the district court that the use or threatened use
    of physical force is an inherent element of this crime, and thus that it is a crime of
    violence for purposes of career-offender status, notwithstanding Dudley’s subjective
    intent. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1) (1998) (stating in
    relevant part that “crime of violence” is any offense under federal or state law,
    punishable by imprisonment for term exceeding one year, that has as element “use,
    attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”);
    United States v. Leeper, 
    964 F.2d 751
    , 753 (8th Cir. 1992) (manslaughter by definition
    includes use of force and thus constitutes crime of violence under § 4B1.2; crimes of
    violence for purposes of § 4B1.2 are not limited to intentional acts); United States v.
    Wright, 
    957 F.2d 520
    , 521 (8th Cir.) (“Courts can examine [the facts of] an underlying
    offense [rather than the elements of the offense alone] only when that offense can be
    committed without violence within the meaning of section 4B1.1.”) (internal citations
    and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 856
    (1992).
    In a pro se supplemental brief filed with leave of this court, Dudley argues that
    the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider his pro se “objections” to
    the presentence report. We see no abuse of discretion, as Dudley attempted to raise
    these matters without obtaining leave from the district court to proceed pro se or as co-
    counsel. See United States v. Einfeldt, 
    138 F.3d 373
    , 378 (8th Cir.) (no right to hybrid
    representation exists; decision to permit defendant to proceed as co-counsel with
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    appointed attorney rests in discretion of trial court), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 851
    (1998);
    United States v. Swinney, 
    970 F.2d 494
    , 498 (8th Cir.) (district court did not abuse its
    discretion in requiring defendant to address court through court-appointed attorney),
    cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 1011
    (1992) and 
    507 U.S. 1007
    (1993). The remaining
    arguments in Dudley’s pro se brief are not properly before us, as they were not
    properly raised and decided below. See Cavegn v. Twin City Pipe Trades Pension
    Plan, No. 99-3518, 
    2000 WL 1166323
    , at *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 18, 2000) (court of appeals
    reviews only final decisions of district court and will not address issues district court
    did not consider).
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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