John Searcy v. Charles Clawson , 70 F. App'x 907 ( 2003 )


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  •                        United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-1299
    ___________
    John E. Searcy, III,                     *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Charles E. Clawson, Jr., individually    *
    and in his official capacity as Judge of *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    the Chancery Court of Van Buren          *
    County, Arkansas, Third Division,        *
    Twentieth Judicial District,             *
    *
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 11, 2003
    Filed: July 2, 2003
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, MELLOY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    John E. Searcy, III, appeals the District Court’s1 dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action against Judge Charles E. Clawson, Jr., of the Chancery Court of Van
    Buren County, Arkansas, who presided over a quiet-title action involving property
    1
    The Honorable G. Thomas Eisele, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas.
    the Internal Revenue Service had seized from Searcy. Having carefully reviewed the
    record, we affirm. See Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 
    222 F.3d 488
    , 492 (8th Cir.
    2000) (noting court reviews questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction de novo),
    cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 1183
     (2001).
    We agree with the District Court that Searcy’s claims are barred by the Rooker-
    Feldman doctrine.2 Searcy’s due process claims would have required the District
    Court to determine the propriety of Judge Clawson’s rulings on jurisdiction,
    evidentiary issues, and the merits of the quiet-title action. See Ballinger v. Culotta,
    
    322 F.3d 546
    , 548 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting with the exception of habeas corpus
    petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state
    court judgments; jurisdictional bar applies to straightforward appeals as well as to
    "indirect attempts by federal plaintiffs to undermine state court decisions"). Further,
    this court has previously rejected the void-judgment argument Searcy urges on
    appeal. See Snider v. City of Excelsior Springs, Mo., 
    154 F.3d 809
    , 812 (8th Cir.
    1998) (noting that under Rooker-Feldman rule, "no federal district court has
    jurisdiction to decide that the state court judgment was void").
    Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    2
    See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    , 476
    (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    , 416 (1923).
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-1299

Citation Numbers: 70 F. App'x 907

Judges: Bowman, Melloy, Per Curiam, Smith

Filed Date: 7/2/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024