Medtronic, Inc. v. U.S. Xpress, Inc. ( 2003 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 02-2863
    ___________
    Medtronic, Inc.,                        *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    *
    v.                                * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    U.S. Xpress, Inc.,                      * District of Minnesota.
    *
    Appellee.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 14, 2003
    Filed: September 5, 2003 (Corrected: 09/19/03)
    ___________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    Medtronic, Inc. ("Medtronic") filed suit against U.S. Xpress, Inc. ("USX")–a
    contract carrier–after USX denied its claim for damages to several shipments of
    medical equipment it sent via the Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx"). USX filed
    a motion for summary judgment, which the district court1 granted. The district court
    determined that USX's denial of Medtronic's claim was proper based on the clear and
    unambiguous language in FedEx's Service Guide. On appeal, Medtronic argues that
    1
    The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District
    Court for the District of Minnesota.
    the district court erred because the limited liability provision of the Service Guide is
    ambiguous and therefore, under Minnesota contract law, should be construed in its
    favor. Finding no ambiguity, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
    judgment.
    I. Background
    In May 2000, Medtronic tendered three bundles of medical equipment to
    FedEx for shipment from Phoenix, Arizona, to Memphis, Tennessee. Medtronic did
    not declare a value on the airbills. Thus, according to the terms of the airbills, FedEx's
    liability for each of the shipments was limited to $100.2 Medtronic asserts that the
    actual value of the goods shipped was $439,928.
    FedEx tendered Medtronic's medical equipment to USX for truck shipment to
    Memphis. USX is a shipping company that contracts with FedEx to provide "through
    shipping services." USX has no direct contractual relationship with FedEx customers.
    USX picks up trailers–pre-loaded and sealed by FedEx–and drives them to the
    contracted FedEx destination. When the trailers have reached their destination, FedEx
    unloads the trailers and routes the FedEx freight within the FedEx system to its
    ultimate destination.
    During the shipment, a fire destroyed the truck and Medtronic's goods, which
    the truck carried. Medtronic then sued USX seeking damages for the loss. Medtronic's
    suit alleged that USX is strictly liable for the loss under the Carmack Amendment to
    the Interstate Commerce Act. 
    49 U.S.C. §14706
    . On summary judgment, USX argued
    its liability could not exceed the limitation of liability amount contained in FedEx's
    Service Guide because it was a contract carrier.
    2
    FedEx paid Medtronic for two lost shipments based on this per package
    limitation. No claim was made for the third shipment.
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    The district court agreed with USX. The court found that USX was a FedEx
    contract carrier and that the FedEx Service Guide governed Medtronic's loss. The
    district court found that the Service Guide specifically limits liability to $100 unless
    a higher value is declared. Because Medtronic neither declared a higher value nor
    paid a premium for greater coverage, the district court enforced the contract liability
    limitation as written. Medtronic now appeals, asserting that the limitation of liability
    is ambiguous and must be read to exclude contract carriers such as USX.
    II. Discussion
    A. Standard of Review
    Rule 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted only
    if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When considering a
    motion for summary judgment, we must view the evidence and the inferences that
    may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 
    92 F.3d 743
    , 747 (8th Cir. 1996).
    The burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact
    rests on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323 (1986). If the
    moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate the
    existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson
    v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 256 (1986); Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 
    47 F.3d 953
    , 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
    B. Alleged Ambiguity
    Medtronic argues that an ambiguity in the Service Guide invalidates the
    Guide's liability limitation provision. The Service Guide governs the relationship
    -3-
    between Medtronic and FedEx.3 As relevant to this case, the Service Guide states:
    Except with respect to FedEx Express Freight services, our liability with
    regard to any package is limited to the sum of $100 unless a higher
    value is declared on the airbill for the package at the time of tender, and
    a greater charge paid as provided in paragraph (c) below . . .
    ***
    The terms "we", [sic] "our", [sic] and "FedEx" refer to Federal Express
    Corporation and its contractors, employees and agents (but not including
    cartage agents who shall be considered independent contractors) and
    to our subsidiaries and their employees and agents.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    Specifically, Medtronic argues that the parenthetical language, stating "but not
    including cartage agents who shall be considered independent contractors," excludes
    not only cartage agents,4 but also independent contractors–like USX–from the Service
    Guide liability limits. As Medtronic sees it, this "contradictory" language creates an
    ambiguity that should be resolved in its favor.
    The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law.
    Boat Dealers' Alliance, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 
    182 F.3d 619
    , 620 (8th Cir.
    1999). The cardinal purpose of construing a contract is to give effect to the intention
    3
    FedEx and Medtronic signed a transportation agreement that incorporates
    by reference the "terms and conditions of the FedEx Service Guide in effect at the
    time of shipment."
    4
    Cartage means to "move by cart." Cartage agents, as "agents" under the
    Service Guide, provide pick up and delivery service to areas outside of FedEx's
    primary service area. In contrast, contractors such as USX perform services for FedEx
    as an extension of and within the FedEx system.
    -4-
    of the parties as expressed in the plain and ordinary language used in drafting the
    whole contract. Maurice Sunderland Architecture, Inc. v. Simon, 
    5 F.3d 334
    , 337 (8th
    Cir. 1993); Art Goebel, Inc. v. North Suburban Agencies, Inc., 
    567 N.W.2d 511
    , 515
    (Minn. 1997). Intent is not ascertained by interpreting words or phrases in isolation,
    but rather from a process of synthesis in which meaning is assigned to the words and
    phrases in accordance with the apparent purpose of the contract as a whole. 
    Id.
    "Divergent interpretations do not necessarily create ambiguity, especially when an
    interpretation contradicts the language of the contract." Boat Dealers' Alliance, 
    182 F.3d at 620
    .
    The provision that Medtronic contests is not ambiguous. The Service Guide
    unambiguously states that the liability protection extends to FedEx contractors,
    employees, and agents. Thus, the phrase "but not including cartage agents who shall
    be considered independent contractors," merely excludes cartage agents as
    independent contractors, not "cartage agents and independent contractors." If FedEx
    had intended to create a separate class for contractors like USX, it could have done
    so by inserting a simple modifier to indicate that intent.
    Medtronic argues that the Guide should have excluded cartage agents without
    assigning them independent contractor status. By so doing, Medtronic asserts, the
    Guide "re-defines" a cartage agent as an independent contractor. However, this
    argument does not make sense when we examine the relationship between cartage
    agents and shippers. See Mori Seki USA, Inc. v. M.V. Alligator Triumph, 
    990 F.2d 444
    , 448 (9th Cir. 1993) (proper analysis requires examination of the relationship
    between the customer and the carrier as well as the nature of the services performed).
    If an entity such as Medtronic elects to make shipping arrangements (for pick
    up or delivery) with a cartage agent, then that customer is aware that a cartage agent
    is involved in the transportation of the shipper's goods because such agents pick up
    or deliver directly from the customer's place of business. In contrast, FedEx
    -5-
    customers are not always aware that a contractor, such as USX, is involved in the
    transportation of the goods.
    This difference is critical when faced with liability for damaged cargo. FedEx
    denies all responsibility for service failures as a result of a cartage agent's pick up or
    delivery, and the customer remains responsible for charges from the cartage agent.
    However, FedEx continuously retains responsibility for damage incurred by virtue of
    its contractors' errors. Contractor liability in turn triggers the Service Guide's limited
    liability provision.
    Based on the limited and unique nature of a cartage agent's responsibilities, the
    Service Guide modifies the term "agent" to exclude cartage agents as independent
    contractors in relation to the customer. The obvious intent of the language is to
    further ensure FedEx protection against customer claims in the event a cartage agent
    operating out of FedEx's primary service area fails to perform. The language of the
    provision, whether considered by itself or when read in context with the rest of the
    Service Guide, does not expressly or impliedly contemplate the creation of a separate
    class of entities. Rather, the use of the term "independent contractors" simply
    modifies the definition of a certain type of "agent" defined in the Service Guide.
    "Independent contractor" does not operate to modify "contractor" as used in the
    provision.
    Thus, after assigning meaning to the words and phrases in accordance with the
    clear purpose of the liability limitation outlined in the FedEx Service Guide, we find
    no ambiguity and affirm the district court's grant of USX's summary judgment
    motion.
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    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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