Carol Palmer v. Kim Nordin ( 2003 )


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  •            United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ______
    No. 03-6044WA
    ______
    In re:                                *
    *
    Kim L. Nordin and Tracey A. Nordin, *
    *
    Debtors.                        *
    *
    Carol Palmer,                         *
    *
    Creditor-Appellant,             *       Appeal from the United States
    *       Bankruptcy Court for the
    v.                        *       Western District of Arkansas
    *
    Kim L. Nordin and Tracey A. Nordin, *
    *
    Debtors-Appellees.              *
    ______
    Submitted: October 10, 2003
    Filed: October 16, 2003
    ______
    Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, SCHERMER and DREHER, Bankruptcy Judges.
    ______
    KRESSEL, Chief Judge.
    Carol Palmer, appeals from an order of the bankruptcy court1 denying her
    motion to extend the time to file a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a
    debt.2 Because we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND3
    On January 27, 2003, the debtors filed a Chapter 7 case. Notice establishing
    February 27, 2003 as the date for the meeting of creditors, and setting April 28, 2003
    as the deadline to file a complaint objecting to the discharge of the debtor or to
    determine the dischargeability of certain debts, was mailed. The date for the meeting
    of creditors was later changed to March 20, 2003.
    At the March 20, 2003 meeting of creditors, the trustee continued the meeting
    of creditors to April 17, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the bankruptcy court sent notice to
    all creditors notifying them of the continued date for the meeting of creditors.
    On May 1, 2003, Palmer wrote a letter to the bankruptcy judge. In the letter,
    Palmer claimed that she did not receive adequate notice regarding the original
    deadline. The court treated this letter as a motion to extend the time to file
    dischargeability complaints.
    1
    The Honorable Richard D. Taylor, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the
    Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas.
    2
    Palmer consistently refers to “objecting to discharge of debt.” It is clear from
    her pleadings that what she wants is a determination that her debt is excepted from
    discharge.
    3
    Both parties have included facts in their briefs and other submissions which
    do not appear in the record. We limit our discussion to the facts that appear in the
    record.
    2
    On July 1, 2003, a hearing on Palmer’s motion was held and on July 9, 2003,
    the bankruptcy court entered an order denying Palmer’s motion. It is from that order
    that Palmer appeals. Because we conclude that the bankruptcy court had no authority
    to extend the time, we affirm.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Since the disposition of the motion is based solely on an interpretation of law,
    we review the bankruptcy court’s decision de novo. Blackwell v. Lurie (In re Popkin
    & Stern), 
    223 F.3d 764
    , 765 (8th Cir. 2000); Wendover Fin. Servs. v. Hervey (In re
    Hervey), 
    252 B.R. 763
    , 765 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000).
    DISCUSSION
    Of the nineteen exceptions to discharge in 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a), all but four are
    self effectuating. That is, most of the debts are excepted from discharge by operation
    of § 523(a) and simply survive the discharge.4 However, a creditor who has a debt of
    the kind described in subsections (2), (4), (6) or (15) of § 523 must file a complaint
    and have the debt’s dischargeability determined by the bankruptcy court. That is
    because 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (c)(1) provides:
    Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section,
    the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind
    specified in paragraph (2), (4), (6), or (15) of subsection (a)
    of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom
    such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court
    determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under
    paragraph (2), (4), (6), or (15), as the case may be, of
    subsection (a) of this section.
    4
    Of course, frequently the parties disagree about whether a certain debt falls
    within one of those exceptions, and a court will have to make a determination of the
    debt’s dischargeability.
    3
    Rule 4007(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides that a
    complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (c),
    “shall be filed not later than 60 days following the first date set for the meeting of
    creditors.” Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4007(c). The rule further states: “On motion of a party in
    interest, after hearing on notice, the court may for cause extend the time fixed under
    this subdivision. The motion shall be filed before the time has expired.” 
    Id.
     “Rule
    4007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure establish[es] time limits for filing
    complaints...[to determine] the dischargeability of a debt. These rules are analogous
    to statutes of limitations and are strictly construed.” In re Perkins, 271 B.R. at 611
    (quoting KBHS Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Sanders (In re Bozeman), 
    226 B.R. 627
    , 630
    (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998)). Since Palmer’s motion was not filed before the deadline, the
    bankruptcy court had no authority under the rules to grant an extension and properly
    denied her motion.
    This result is enforced by Rule 9006(b) which deals with the court’s authority
    to enlarge time. As a general proposition, the court can grant a request for an
    enlargement of time made after the original time has expired if the movant can
    demonstrate excusable neglect. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(1). However, that authority
    is limited by subdivision (3) which provides: “The court may enlarge the time for
    taking action under Rules 1006(b)(2), 1017(e), 3002(c), 4003(b), 4004(a), 4007(c),
    8002, and 9033, only to the extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.”
    Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3) (emphasis added).
    Palmer’s principal argument is that she had insufficient notice. The Bankruptcy
    Code provides a remedy under such circumstances. 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a)(3) provides
    an exception to discharge for any debt:
    neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this
    title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor
    to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit-
    4
    (B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4),
    or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim
    and timely request for a determination of dischargeability
    of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such
    creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time
    for such timely filing and request.
    
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a)(3)(B). There is no deadline in the rules for the filing of a
    complaint under § 523(a)(3).
    CONCLUSION
    The order of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE
    PANEL, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    5