United States v. Clarence Robinson ( 2002 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 01-3038
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * District of Nebraska.
    Clarence Robinson,                     *
    also known as Fuzzy,                   *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 16, 2002
    Filed: August 23, 2002
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, RILEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Clarence Robinson appeals from the District Court's1 denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of
    Nebraska.
    In 1995, after a jury trial in federal district court, Robinson was convicted of
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and sentenced to life imprisonment.2
    Subsequently, Robinson brought his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion to vacate, set aside, or
    correct his sentence, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel Following a
    hearing, the District Court denied relief and this Court granted Robinson's application
    for a certificate of appealability. Because Robinson's claim of ineffective assistance
    of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact, we review it de novo. United States
    v. Reed, 
    179 F.3d 622
    , 624 (8th Cir. 1999). The underlying facts as found by the
    district court are reviewed for clear error. 
    Id.
    In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Robinson
    must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    688, 691 (1984). To show prejudice, Robinson must show a reasonable probability
    that absent the alleged errors of counsel he would have been found not guilty. See
    Garrett v. United States, 
    78 F.3d 1296
    , 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 956
    (1996). We may decide this appeal without reaching the question of deficiency if we
    find that the performance of Robinson's attorney did not prejudice Robinson. See
    United States v. Apfel, 
    97 F.3d 1074
    , 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
    Robinson asserts numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel by his
    attorney, William Eustice.3 We turn first to Robinson's argument that Eustice failed
    2
    The facts underlying Robinson's convictions are discussed thoroughly by this
    Court in our opinion affirming Robinson's conviction on direct appeal. United States
    v. Robinson, 
    110 F.3d 1320
     (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 975
     (1997). We see no
    need to restate them here.
    3
    We address the arguments that Robinson makes most forcefully in his briefs
    but note that he lists numerous deficiencies of counsel, inter alia: failure to file a
    motion in limine (or any pre-trial motions); failure to "have a theory of the case"; the
    decision to make no opening statement; failure to call Robinson as a witness; failure
    -2-
    to investigate prior to trial a minor witness, Brian Duke, who along with other
    witnesses testified to Robinson's involvement in the conspiracy. Robinson claims
    that Duke's testimony was untruthful and could have easily been impeached by
    Eustice if more pretrial investigation had been undertaken. We agree with the District
    Court that even if Duke's testimony had been impeached the remainder of the
    evidence clearly demonstrates Robinson's involvement in the conspiracy, and we
    conclude Robinson has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
    trial would have been different absent the alleged deficiency of counsel's
    performance.
    Robinson also argues that Eustice did not reveal that he shared office space
    with a lawyer who represented Duke, which Robinson claims was a conflict in
    representation. Specifically, Robinson argues this conflict of interest compelled
    Eustice to fail to find and call Duke as a witness. This alleged conflict based on
    shared office space resembles the alleged conflict we addressed in Amrine v.
    Bowersox, 
    238 F.3d 1023
     (8th Cir.) (§ 2254), cert. denied, 
    122 S. Ct. 372
     (2001). In
    Amrine, we rejected the argument that the defendant's lawyer had a conflict of interest
    when a lawyer from his office represented a witness in the case, where there was no
    evidence that the alleged conflict affected counsel's performance. 
    Id.
     at 1030 n.4.
    Robinson presented no evidence that the conflict of interest alleged here affected
    Eustice's performance, and both Eustice and Duke's lawyer testified that they did not
    discuss the case. Also, because the witness in question is Duke and we already have
    to object to the government's planned use of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
    evidence; and a few others. Br. of Appellant at 27. We held that admission of the
    404(b) evidence was proper in the previous direct appeal. Robinson, 
    110 F.3d at 1325
    . As the District Court accurately stated, the numerosity of the alleged
    deficiencies does not demonstrate by itself the necessity for habeas relief. See
    Wainwright v. Lockhart, 
    80 F.3d 1226
    , 1233 (8th Cir.) (rejecting the argument that
    cumulative effect of errors alone demonstrated a deprivation of fair trial), cert. denied,
    
    519 U.S. 968
     (1996). We have reviewed all of the claimed deficiencies of counsel
    and find no merit in any of them.
    -3-
    held that the failure to locate him did not result in prejudice to Robinson, we agree
    with the District Court there was no prejudice to Robinson as a result of the purported
    conflict.
    Robinson claims that Eustice was ineffective in failing to submit proposed jury
    instructions, especially a "theory of the case" instruction. Br. of Appellant at 16. We
    note, as the District Court did, that the instructions given to the jury were model
    Eighth Circuit instructions for conspiracy cases. These included instructions for
    evaluating the credibility and motivation of co-conspirator testimony and the law on
    aiding and abetting. Robinson fails to persuade us that the lack of a "theory of the
    case" instruction was prejudicial to his case.
    Next, Robinson makes claims of ineffectiveness based on Eustice's closing
    statement. Eustice had called no witnesses and had chosen instead to rely on
    impeaching the prosecution witnesses and arguing that Robinson's "mere presence"
    with members of the conspiracy was insufficient to prove his guilt.4 Consequently,
    during the closing statement, Eustice placed Robinson in the company of some of the
    co-conspirators on certain occasions, just as the evidence indicated and the
    prosecution asserted.5 Eustice argued, however, that Robinson was not involved in
    the conspiracy despite his presence among the co-conspirators. Eustice's decision to
    argue that Robinson may have innocently been in the presence of the co-conspirators
    was made in the context of significant prosecution testimony of Robinson's presence
    and circumstances implying his involvement, including 404(b) evidence that
    4
    Eustice's strategy included seeking and receiving a "mere presence" instruction
    for the jury.
    5
    In Robinson's direct appeal, we addressed Eustice's failure to object to the
    prosecution's closing statements regarding the presence of Robinson with the co-
    conspirators. We determined that this failure to object did not prejudice Robinson.
    Robinson, 
    110 F.3d at 1327
    .
    -4-
    Robinson had been involved with crack-cocaine possession. Eustice made the
    judgment that as a matter of trial strategy it was better to maintain that Robinson was
    innocent of the conspiracy than to deny Robinson's association with the co-
    conspirators. We cannot say that Eustice's strategy as reflected in his closing
    argument resulted in prejudice to Robinson.
    Robinson additionally argues that the District Court improperly denied his
    motion for the appointment of an expert to offer opinion evidence on Robinson's
    claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not address this issue inasmuch as
    it is not included in the certificate of appealability. See Fields v. United States, 
    201 F.3d 1025
    , 1026 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that issues beyond the scope of
    certificate of appealability are not properly before the court).
    Having considered all of Robinson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    we affirm the District Court's denial of Robinson's § 2255 motion.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -5-