United States v. H. Santos-Garcia ( 2002 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 01-3941
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    *
    v.                               *
    *
    Humberto Santos-Garcia,                *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ____________                               Appeals from the United States
    District Court for the
    No. 02-1583                                District of Nebraska
    ____________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    *
    v.                               *
    *
    Mario Sanchez-Nunez,                   *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 7, 2002
    Filed: December 27, 2002
    ___________
    ____________
    Before McMILLIAN, LAY and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
    Humberto Santos-Garcia (Santos) and Mario Sanchez-Nunez (Sanchez) appeal
    from judgments entered in the district court1 following their convictions arising from
    a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Santos challenges the district court's
    denial of his suppression motion. Sanchez challenges the district court's denial of his
    motion to dismiss the indictment, denial of motion for judgment of acquittal or new
    trial, and imposition of his sentence. We affirm the judgments.
    BACKGROUND
    On September 2, 2000, Nebraska State Trooper Kenneth Ayers stopped a 1991
    Dodge Dynasty with Nevada license plates for speeding. Santos was the driver of
    the car and Roberto Arreguin-Rivera (Arreguin) was the passenger. Ayers asked
    them for driver's licenses and vehicle registration. Santos produced a Nevada driver's
    license and registration for the car; Arreguin produced a California driver's license.
    Ayers, who noticed a strong unidentifiable odor coming from the car, asked Santos
    to step out of the Dodge and to stand at the rear of the car, which he did. Ayers asked
    Santos several questions, including his relationship with Arreguin and the purpose
    of trip. Santos said they were going to Omaha to see a friend and to stay a few days
    to look for work. Ayers then questioned Arreguin, who was still in the car. Arreguin
    said they were going to Omaha to visit a friend and thought they would stay a week.
    Ayers confirmed that the car belonged to Santos and that he had no criminal
    background and decided to issue a written warning.
    1
    The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District
    of Nebraska.
    -2-
    After returning Santos's license and registration and explaining the warning,
    Ayers asked Santos if drugs were in the car. Santos said no, and Ayers asked Santos
    for permission to search the car. Santos consented and signed a consent to search
    form. Ayers then approached Arreguin, who was seated in the Dodge, asking if he
    had luggage and, if he did, would he consent to a search of it. Arreguin said he had
    luggage, but, apparently because of poor English skills, did not understand Ayers's
    request to search his luggage. After Santos translated Ayers's request, Arreguin
    consented to a search. Ayers then asked Santos to open the trunk of the Dodge.
    Santos retrieved the keys and opened the trunk. Ayers discovered 19 packages of
    methamphetamine, weighing a total of about 22 pounds, located in rocker panels of
    the car.
    Ayers arrested Santos and Arreguin and took them to the state patrol office in
    Lexington, Nebraska. After obtaining a Miranda waiver, around 10 p.m., Investigator
    Gary Eng questioned Santos. Initially, Santos denied knowing that methamphetamine
    was in the car, telling Eng that he was being paid $1500 to drive the Dodge from
    Reno, Nevada, to Omaha, Nebraska , for an individual named Mario. Eng told Santos
    that his story did not make sense and asked if Santos had children. Santos, who was
    twenty years old, said yes. Eng told Santos that, given the amount of
    methamphetamine, under the federal sentencing guidelines, his sentence would be
    about fifteen years and that his children would be driving by the time he was released
    from prison. Santos then admitted he knew methamphetamine was in the car,
    explaining Mario had directed them to call him after they checked into a motel near
    a highway and he would then pick up the methamphetamine. Eng also told Santos
    that if he cooperated, his sentence might be reduced, but explained to cooperate
    meant he would have to admit his knowledge of the methamphetamine and participate
    in a controlled delivery of the drugs to Mario in Omaha. Santos agreed to cooperate.
    At the end of Eng's interrogation of Santos, Investigator Michael Dowling
    came into the room and confirmed that Santos had been advised of his Miranda rights.
    -3-
    Dowling then drove Santos to Grand Island, Nebraska, for a polygraph examination.
    At the beginning of the seventy-mile trip, Dowling reminded Santos of his Miranda
    rights. Santos told Dowling that he understood his rights and had waived them, again
    confessing to transporting the methamphetamine from Reno, Nevada, to Omaha,
    Nebraska, for Mario.
    Dowling and Santos arrived in Grand Island around 5:30 a.m. Before the
    polygraph examination, Investigator Vincent Hernandez advised Santos of his
    Miranda rights and Santos signed a waiver and a polygraph release. Santos then
    made incriminating statements.
    After the polygraph examination, Hernandez accompanied Santos to the state
    patrol office in Omaha to participate in the controlled delivery. Ayers drove the
    Dodge from the patrol office to a Motel 6 near a highway and placed a package of
    methamphetamine in a rocker panel of the car. Hernandez and other law enforcement
    officers accompanied Santos and Arreguin to the motel. At the motel, Santos placed
    a telephone call to a number, which had been found in Arreguin's wallet, and talked
    to Mario. Santos told Mario that he and Arreguin were staying at a Motel 6 near a
    highway. Mario wanted to talk to Arreguin, but Santos told him Arreguin would call
    him back. Arreguin called Mario and told him that they would put the keys to the
    Dodge in the visor on the driver's side. Shortly thereafter, a white Mustang pulled
    into the motel parking lot. Sanchez got out of the Mustang, opened the driver's side
    door of the Dodge, and took the keys from the visor. Sanchez then drove the Dodge
    to a trailer park, where he parked it. He left the Dodge and, without taking the
    package of methamphetamine, got into the white Mustang, which was waiting for
    him. As the Mustang was leaving the trailer park, officers stopped it and arrested
    Sanchez and two other men in the car.
    Santos, Arreguin, and Sanchez were charged with conspiracy to distribute
    methamphetamine and with possession with the intent to distribute
    -4-
    methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846.2 Santos filed a
    suppression motion, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The
    district court denied the motion as to the methamphetamine, holding that Ayers had
    reasonable suspicion to search the Dodge. In the alternative, the district court held
    that Santos had voluntarily consented to the search of the car. The district court
    granted the motion as to Santos's confession to Eng, reasoning that it was involuntary
    because it was coerced by Eng's comment that Santos's children would be driving by
    the time he finished his sentence. However, the district court denied the motion as
    to Santos's statements to Dowling and Hernandez, holding that the subsequent
    statements were sufficiently attenuated from the coercive conduct of Eng.
    Santos then entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with
    misprision of a felony, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
    , and was sentenced to time
    served. Santos testified for the government at Sanchez's trial. On redirect
    examination, Santos testified that while he was in jail, Sanchez offered to get him an
    attorney and help his family, if he took responsibility for the drugs. Sanchez moved
    for a mistrial because the government had not disclosed Santos's testimony
    concerning the attempted bribe. The district court granted the motion because of
    unfair surprise, but held that the government had not violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 or
    the Jencks Act. Sanchez then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on double
    jeopardy grounds, which the district court denied. At the second trial, Santos again
    testified for the government, stating that Mario had paid him to transport the Dodge
    from Nevada to Omaha, Nebraska. Santos also repeated his testimony that Sanchez
    had tried to bribe him to take responsibility for the methamphetamine. The jury
    convicted Sanchez of possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine and
    conspiracy. At sentencing, based on Santos's testimony concerning the attempted
    2
    Arreguin pled guilty to the conspiracy charge and was sentenced to 97 months.
    His conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal. United States v. Arreguin-
    Rivera, No. 02-1087, 
    2002 WL 1610887
     (8th Cir. July 23, 2002) (unpublished).
    -5-
    bribe, the district court imposed an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. After refusing Sanchez's requests for a role-in-the-offense
    reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and for a downward departure under § 5K2.0, the
    district court sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment.
    DISCUSSION
    Santos
    Santos argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion.
    "We review the district court's conclusions of law regarding the denial of a motion
    to suppress de novo, and review its findings of fact for clear error." United States v.
    Booker, 269 F.3 930,931 (8th Cir. 2001).
    We first address Santos's arguments concerning the search of the Dodge.
    Santos concedes that the stop of the car for speeding was lawful, and, incident to the
    stop, Ayers was entitled to conduct a reasonable investigation, including asking him
    to step out of the car and question him and Arreguin about the purpose of the trip.
    See United States v. White, 
    81 F.3d 775
    , 778 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1011
    (1996). However, Santos argues that during the investigation Ayers had not
    developed reasonable suspicion to search the car. We need not address this argument.
    "Even if [Ayers] had no suspicion that [Santos] was engaged in criminal activity, if
    the encounter after the completion of the traffic stop was consensual, then the Fourth
    Amendment would not prohibit Trooper [Ayers] from asking questions unrelated to
    the traffic stop, [and] from seeking consent to search the [car]." United States v.
    Jones, 
    269 F.3d 919
    , 925 (8th Cir. 2001).
    Santos argues that, after the completion of the stop, his encounter with Ayers
    was not consensual, but was a seizure. We disagree. "Although there is no litmus test
    for determining" whether an encounter is consensual or constitutes a seizure,
    -6-
    "circumstances indicative of a seizure may include 'the threatening presence of
    several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
    person . . . , or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with
    the officer's request might be compelled.'" White, 
    81 F.3d at 779
     (quoting United
    States v. Angell, 
    11 F.3d 806
    , 809 (8th Cir. 1993)). Contrary to his argument, Santos
    was "no longer seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after [Ayers]
    returned [his] identification and issued a warning ticket." 
    Id.
     Ayers did not display
    a weapon, and, as the district court found, "the tone of the entire exchange was
    cooperative." 
    Id.
     "Moreover, at the time [Ayers] asked to search the vehicle [Santos]
    had everything he needed to lawfully proceed on his journey." Id.; see also United
    States v. Drayton, 
    122 S. Ct. 2105
    , 2112 (2002) (bus passengers were not seized when
    officers boarded bus where "[t]here was no application of force, no intimidating
    movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking
    of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice").
    Also, contrary to Santos's argument, "[t]he fact that [Ayers] had not explicitly
    said they could leave does not establish that the conversation . . . was not
    consensual." United States v. Morgan, 
    270 F.3d 625
    , 630 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
    
    123 S. Ct. 192
     (2002). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly "rejected in specific
    terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to
    refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search." Drayton,
    
    122 S. Ct. at
    2113 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 
    519 U.S. 33
    , 39-40 (1996); Schneckloth
    v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 227 (1973)). In Drayton, the Court explained that "[i]n
    a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a
    weight and dignity of its own." Id. at 2114. "Although [Ayers] did not inform
    [Santos] of [his] right to refuse the search, [Ayers] did request permission to search,
    and the totality of the circumstances indicates [Santos's] consent was voluntary, so
    the search[] w[as] reasonable." Id.
    -7-
    The district court also did not err in refusing to suppress Santos's statements
    to Dowling and Hernandez. As previously noted, the district court suppressed
    Santos's confession to Eng, but refused to suppress his subsequent statements,
    holding that they were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of Eng's coercive
    conduct. Santos argues that the district court erred in holding that the statements
    were sufficiently attenuated because there was no "break in the stream of events"
    from his confession to Eng to his subsequent statements.
    We need not address Santos's "break-in-the-stream" argument. "It is a well-
    settled principle that we may affirm a district court's judgment on any basis supported
    by the record." United States v. Pierson, 
    219 F.3d 803
    , 807 (8th Cir. 2000). The
    district court held that Santos's confession to Eng was involuntary because it was
    coerced by Eng's comment that Santos's children would be driving by the time he was
    released from prison. However, we believe that Eng's comment was "not so coercive
    as to deprive [Santos] of [his] ability to make an unconstrained decision to confess."
    United States v. Astello, 
    241 F.3d 965
    , 967 (8th Cir.) (internal quotation omitted),
    cert. denied, 
    533 U.S. 962
     (2001). To state the obvious, "interrogation of a suspect
    will involve some pressure because its purpose is to elicit a confession." 
    Id.
     "[T]he
    fact that the tactics produced the intended result . . . does not make [a] confession
    involuntary." 
    Id. at 968
    . In other words, "there is nothing inherently wrong with
    efforts to create a favorable climate for confession." United States v. LeBrun, 
    306 F.3d 545
    , 555 (8th Cir. 2002)(internal quotation omitted). "'[Q]uestioning tactics such
    as a raised voice, deception, or a sympathetic attitude on the part of the interrogator
    will not render a confession involuntary unless the overall impact of the interrogation
    caused the defendant's will to be overborne.'" Astello, 
    241 F.3d at 967
     (quoting
    Jenner v. Smith, 
    982 F.2d 329
    , 334 (8th Cir. 1993)). Nor will a promise of leniency,
    an "expressed disbelief in the statements of a suspect . . ., or lie[s] to the accused
    about the evidence against him" necessarily render a confession involuntary. Wilson
    v. Lawrence County, 
    260 F.3d 946
    , 953 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
    Rather, the coercive conduct must be "such that the defendant's will was overborne
    -8-
    and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired." Astello, 
    241 F.3d at 967
    (internal quotation omitted).
    To determine whether a confession is voluntary or the product of undue
    coercion, we look to the totality of the circumstances. 
    Id.
     Here, considering all the
    circumstances, including that Eng advised Santos of his rights and that the interview
    was about twenty minutes long, Eng's statement that Santos's children would be
    driving by the time he would be released from prison was not unduly coercive.
    Rather, it was merely an "accurate representation[] of [Santos's] predicament."
    United States v. Gallardo-Marquez, 
    253 F.3d 1121
    , 1123 (8th Cir.) (statement that
    defendant could receive life sentence not unduly coercive), cert. denied, 
    122 S. Ct. 570
     (2001). As the late Judge Henley, sitting by designation, observed, "'telling [the]
    defendant in a noncoercive manner of the realistically expected penalties and
    encouraging [him] to tell the truth is no more than affording [him] the chance to
    make an informed decision with respect to [his] cooperation with the government.'"
    United States v. Nash, 
    910 F.2d 749
    , 753 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v.
    Ballard, 586 .2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1978)).
    Even assuming that Eng's comment about Santos's children was unduly
    coercive, the district court did not err in rejecting Sanchez's "break-in-the stream"
    argument. Santos relied on the pre-Miranda case of Clewis v. Texas, 
    386 U.S. 707
    (1967) (Clewis). His reliance on Clewis was misplaced. In Clewis, the Supreme
    Court held that a defendant's written confession was involuntary because there was
    "no break in the stream of events" from the time of an illegal arrest to a written
    confession nine days later. 
    Id. at 710
    . In finding that the confession was involuntary,
    the Supreme Court noted that, although Miranda was not directly applicable, it was
    nonetheless relevant to a voluntariness determination. 
    Id. at 709
    . The Court
    concluded that the subsequent confession was involuntary because, during the nine
    days the defendant had been held in custody, he had never been advised he could
    consult with an attorney, have one appointed, if necessary, and remain silent. 
    Id.
     at
    -9-
    711. The Court also had "substantial concern" whether the defendant's "faculties [had
    been] impaired by inadequate sleep and food, [and] sickness." 
    Id. at 712
    . Those
    factors are not present here. To the contrary, "the law enforcement authorities
    displayed a painstaking regard for [Santos] rights from the time of his arrest to his
    confession[s]." Reese v. Delo, 
    94 F.3d 1177
    , 1184 (8th Cir.) (internal quotation
    omitted), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1011
     (1996). Santos had been repeatedly advised and
    reminded of his Miranda rights and had voluntarily waived them. Before confessing
    to Eng, Santos had waived his rights; Dowling confirmed that Santos had been
    advised of his rights and reminded Santos of his rights during the seventy-minute car
    trip; and Hernandez re-advised Santos of his rights, and Santos again waived them.
    Moreover, as the government notes, Santos slept and ate a snack during the car trip
    with Dowling.
    Sanchez
    Sanchez first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
    dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Reviewing the district court's
    decision de novo, United States v. Beeks, 
    266 F.3d 880
    , 882 (8th Cir. 2001) (per
    curiam), we hold the district court did not err. When, as here, "a defendant's motion
    gives rise to a mistrial, reprosecution is prevented only if the prosecution's 'conduct
    giving rise to the successful motion for mistrial was intended to provoke the
    defendant into moving for a mistrial,' and thus to make an end run around the Double
    Jeopardy Clause." 
    Id.
     (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 
    456 U.S. 667
    , 675-76 (1982)).
    Sanchez does not argue, and there is no evidence to suggest, that the government
    intended to provoke him into moving for a mistrial. Rather, Sanchez argues that the
    district court should have dismissed the indictment because of governmental
    misconduct in failing to disclose Santos's testimony concerning Sanchez's attempted
    bribe. As the government notes, the district court granted Sanchez's motion for a
    mistrial because of unfair surprise, not because of governmental misconduct. In any
    -10-
    event, "[a]bsent intent to provoke a mistrial, . . . even extensive [prosecutorial]
    misconduct do[es] not prevent reprosectuion." 
    Id.
    Sanchez also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
    judgment of acquittal, asserting that there was insufficient evidence supporting the
    conspiracy and possession verdicts. In reviewing this claim, "we view the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept as established all reasonable
    inferences supporting the verdict." United States v. Maggard, 
    156 F.3d 843
    , 846 (8th
    Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 1170
     (1999). The
    district court did not err. Although Sanchez argues that there was insufficient
    evidence because Santos's testimony was incredible, "[i]t is well-established that 'it
    is the sole province of the jury to weigh the credibility of a witness.''' 
    Id. at 847
    (quoting United States v. Wright, 
    119 F.3d 630
    , 634 (8th Cir. 1997)). Nor did the
    district court err in denying his motion for new trial based on the weight of the
    evidence. See United States v. Campos, 
    306 F.3d 577
    , 578 (8th Cir. 2002). Sanchez
    also asserts that he is entitled to a new trial, because there was a material variance
    between jury instruction 14 and the indictment. However, he offers no supporting
    argument and citation, in violation of Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A), and thus we do not
    address his assertion. See United States v. Echols, 
    144 F.3d 584
    , 585 n.2 (8th Cir.
    1998).
    Sanchez also challenges his 235-month sentence. He argues that the district
    court erred in imposing an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
    3C1.1, which was based on Santos's trial testimony that Sanchez had tried to bribe
    him into taking responsibility for the methamphetamine. "In reviewing the
    enhancement for obstruction of justice, we accept as true the district court's factual
    findings, unless they are clearly erroneous." United States v. Armstrong, 
    992 F.2d 171
    , 174 (8th Cir. 1993). Sanchez argues that Santos's testimony concerning the
    attempted bribe was incredible, noting that on cross-examination, Santos admitted
    that a December 2000 investigative report noted that Santos had accused Arreguin,
    -11-
    not Sanchez, of attempting to bribe him into taking responsibility for the drugs.
    However, at trial Santos testified that the report was incorrect, explaining that he
    thought he had told the investigator that Arreguin had tried to bribe him while they
    were in Lexington, Nebraska, and that Sanchez had attempted to bribe him while they
    were in jail. While Santos's trial testimony was not supported by the investigative
    report, he was vigorously cross-examined about the matter. As the government notes,
    we must "give due regard to the district court's opportunity to judge the credibility of
    the witnesses." 
    Id. at 174
    . Indeed, we have stated that a district court's credibility
    finding is "'virtually unreviewable on appeal.'" United States v. Womack, 
    191 F.3d 879
    , 885 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Candie, 
    974 F.2d 61
    , 64 (8th Cir.
    1992)). Thus, we cannot say the district court erred in relying on Santos's trial
    testimony in finding that Sanchez has attempted to obstruct justice. Nor, as Sanchez
    argues, did the district court err, much less commit plain error, under Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), by failing to submit the obstruction-of-justice issue
    to the jury. As the government notes, a finding that Sanchez obstructed justice did
    not increase the statutory maximum sentence.
    The district court also did not err in denying Sanchez's request for a role-in-the-
    offense reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. At sentencing, Sanchez argued that he
    was entitled to a reduction because he was a mere courier for a single transaction.
    However,"[a] role as a courier does not automatically entitle a defendant to a
    downward adjustment." United States v. Alverez, 
    235 F.3d 1086
    , 1090 (8th Cir.
    2000), cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 1031
     (2001). In addition, as the government notes, the
    evidence indicates that Sanchez had organized and supervised the criminal activity.
    Sanchez also argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
    grant his request for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 based on a
    combination of factors. However, "[t]he district court understood it had authority to
    depart downward and simply decided that a departure was not warranted." United
    States v. Larry, 
    126 F.3d 1077
    , 1079 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Thus, "the district
    -12-
    court's refusal to grant [Sanchez's] motion for downward departure is unreviewable."
    
    Id.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    -13-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-3941

Filed Date: 12/27/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

Authorities (24)

United States v. Christopher G. White , 81 F.3d 775 ( 1996 )

johnny-lee-wilson-v-lawrence-county-mo-david-tatum-individually-and-in , 260 F.3d 946 ( 2001 )

United States v. Drayton , 122 S. Ct. 2105 ( 2002 )

Clewis v. Texas , 87 S. Ct. 1338 ( 1967 )

United States v. Andre Ricardo Pierson, Also Known as ... , 219 F.3d 803 ( 2000 )

Apprendi v. New Jersey , 120 S. Ct. 2348 ( 2000 )

United States v. Erick Arias Campos , 306 F.3d 577 ( 2002 )

United States v. Donald H. Jones , 269 F.3d 919 ( 2001 )

United States v. Arlie D. Maggard, United States of America ... , 156 F.3d 843 ( 1998 )

United States v. Cardell Larry, Also Known as Larry Cardell , 126 F.3d 1077 ( 1997 )

Debra Sue Jenner v. James Smith, Superintendent, ... , 982 F.2d 329 ( 1993 )

United States v. Jimmie A. Armstrong , 992 F.2d 171 ( 1993 )

Donald E. Reese v. Paul Delo, Superintendent, Potosi ... , 94 F.3d 1177 ( 1996 )

United States v. William Dennis Echols, Also Known as ... , 144 F.3d 584 ( 1998 )

United States v. Jesus Gallardo-Marquez , 253 F.3d 1121 ( 2001 )

United States v. Reynaldo F. Alverez , 235 F.3d 1086 ( 2000 )

United States of America v. Ramiro Astello , 241 F.3d 965 ( 2001 )

United States v. Alex E. Womack, Eastern Division , 191 F.3d 879 ( 1999 )

United States v. John H. Candie , 974 F.2d 61 ( 1992 )

United States v. Earl Wayne Nash , 910 F.2d 749 ( 1990 )

View All Authorities »