United States v. Taras Wallace ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 04-1265
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellee,      *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Missouri.
    Taras Wallace,                         *
    *        [PUBLISHED]
    Defendant - Appellant.     *
    ___________
    Submitted: December 14, 2004
    Filed: May 23, 2005
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, BRIGHT, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    The government charged Taras Wallace with being a convicted felon in
    possession of a firearm. Wallace pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Wallace
    objected to the presentence investigation report’s recommendation of a four-level
    increase for using or possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense.
    At sentencing, the district court1 overruled Wallace’s objections regarding the
    government’s use of out-of-court statements made by Antionette Jordan, finding the
    statements reliable. The district court applied the four-level increase and sentenced
    1
    The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    Wallace to 110 months imprisonment. Wallace appeals and argues the district court
    erred in using hearsay evidence in accessing an upward adjustment, violated his right
    of confrontation in using the hearsay evidence to enhance his offense level, and
    committed plain error in sentencing him in violation of United States v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005). We affirm.
    I.    Background
    The government charged Wallace with being a convicted felon in possession
    of a firearm. Wallace pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The presentence
    investigation report recommended a four-level increase because Wallace possessed
    or used the firearm in connection with another felony offense. Wallace objected to
    the presentence investigation report’s recommendation of the four-level increase.
    At sentencing, Officer Michael Stewart testified that Antionette Jordan told
    him that Wallace choked her and struck her in the back of the head with a firearm.
    The government presented a copy of Jordan’s written statement that she prepared in
    the presence of Detective James Lisziewski of the Domestic Abuse Response Team.
    Jordan’s written statement noted that Wallace hit her in the back of the head with a
    gun. The government also played Jordan’s 911 call for the district court. Jordan did
    not attend sentencing.
    The district court overruled Wallace’s objections and found the out-of-court
    statements Jordan made were reliable and Wallace used or possessed the firearm in
    connection with a felony assault. The district court added the four-level increase
    finding Wallace used or possessed a firearm in connection with a felony offense. The
    district court granted Wallace a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
    The district court then sentenced Wallace to a 110-month term of imprisonment.
    Wallace appeals.
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    II.   Discussion
    Wallace argues the district court erred in using hearsay evidence in sentencing
    him and accessing the four-level increase. As a “general proposition, a sentencing
    judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either
    as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may
    come.” Nichols v. United States, 
    511 U.S. 738
    , 747 (1994) (quotations omitted). The
    commentary in the Sentencing Guidelines expressly allows reliable hearsay evidence
    at sentencing, and courts have concluded hearsay is admissible in sentencing as long
    as it bears some indicia of reliability. United States v. Shevi, 
    345 F.3d 675
    , 679 (8th
    Cir. 2003) (reliable hearsay evidence may be considered at sentencing), cert. denied,
    
    124 S. Ct. 1182
     (2004).
    Here, the district court heard the following hearsay evidence at sentencing:
    Jordan’s 911 call, Jordan’s victim statement form, and Jordan’s sworn grand jury
    testimony. In all of these statements Jordan asserted Wallace had hit her in the head
    with a firearm. In addition to the above evidence, the government presented Officer
    Stewart’s testimony (regarding Jordan’s statement that Wallace hit her on the head
    with a firearm) and a photograph of Jordan showing marks around her neck. We
    affirm, because all of this evidence has an indicia of reliability. See United States v.
    Williams, 
    10 F.3d 910
    , 914 (1st Cir. 1993) (grand jury testimony is often considered
    reliable hearsay evidence in light of the fact that it is testimony given under oath,
    under penalty of perjury); United States v. Corbin, 
    998 F.2d 1377
    , 1386-87 (7th Cir.
    1993) (stating the statements are made more reliable when a person who testified had
    the opportunity to personally observe the witness who made the out-of-court
    statement); United States v. Farnsworth, 
    92 F.3d 1001
    , 1010 (10th Cir.) (holding a
    declarant’s out-of-court statements bear an indicia of reliability when a police officer
    interviewed the declarant immediately after the altercation and the officer had the
    opportunity to form an opinion as to the veracity of the statements), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1034
     (1996).
    -3-
    Wallace next argues the district court violated his right of confrontation by
    using out-of-court statements to enhance his offense level. This court has determined
    that the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings. See United
    States v. Due, 
    205 F.3d 1030
    , 1033 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the out-of-court
    information relative to the circumstances of the crime bears an indicia of reliability,
    then the sentencing court can consider it without providing the defendant with a right
    to confrontation. United States v. Atkins, 
    250 F.3d 1203
    , 1212-13 (8th Cir. 2001)
    (noting that the sentencing court has wide discretion as to the kind of information
    considered or its source). As noted above, the information the district court relied on
    has an indicia of reliability. No error is shown on this issue.
    Finally, Wallace argues the district court violated Booker in enhancing his
    offense level by finding he used or possessed the firearm in connection with a felony
    assault. Wallace objected to the facts underlying the Booker issue (that the district
    court relied on unreliable, hearsay evidence in finding he used a weapon in the
    commission of another offense). Wallace’s objection did not preserve the Booker
    error, because he did not couple his objection with a specific reference to Apprendi,
    Blakely, or the Sixth Amendment; therefore, our review of Wallace’s Booker issue
    is for plain error. See United States v. Pirani, No. 03-2871, 
    2005 WL 1039976
     at *4
    (8th Cir. Apr. 29, 2005) (noting that a defendant must couple an objection with a
    specific reference to Apprendi, Blakely, or the Sixth Amendment in order to preserve
    the Booker error).
    To meet the plain error test, Wallace must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3)
    that affects substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-36 (1993).
    If all three conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited
    error only if the error also seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
    of judicial proceedings. 
    Id.
    -4-
    As Pirani noted, it “is undisputed that the first two Olano factors are satisfied
    here. The district court (understandably) committed Booker error by applying the
    Guidelines as mandatory, and the error is plain, that is, clear or obvious, at this time.”
    Pirani, 
    2005 WL 1039976
     at *4. In order for Wallace to show the error affected his
    substantial rights, he “must show a ‘reasonable probability,’ based on the appellate
    record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received a more favorable
    sentence.” Id. at *6.
    We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and determine that Wallace
    cannot show the error affected his substantial rights as he cannot show a reasonable
    probability he would have received a more favorable sentence. We affirm.
    III.   Conclusion
    Affirmed.
    BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring.
    I concur. I write separately because I believe it important to observe that, as
    the Pirani opinion indicates, other courts disagree about the interpretation and
    application of the plain error rule to the Sixth Amendment violation under Booker.
    As a panel of the Eighth Circuit, we are bound by the Pirani interpretation and
    construction of plain error for the Sixth Amendment violation under Booker until the
    Supreme Court might rule otherwise.
    ______________________________
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