Bouapha Phommasoukha v. John Ashcroft ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 04-1084
    ________________
    Bouapha Phommasoukha,                    *
    *
    Petitioner,                  *    Petition for Review of
    *    an Order of the United States
    v.                                 *    Board of Immigration Appeals.
    *
    Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General       *
    of the United States,1                   *
    *
    Respondent.                  *
    ________________
    Submitted: February 18, 2005
    Filed: June 3, 2005
    ________________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit
    Judges.
    ________________
    GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
    1
    Alberto Gonzales has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the
    United States and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Rule 43(c) of the Federal
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Bouapha Phommasoukha, a 71-year-old native and citizen of the Lao People’s
    Democratic Republic (“Laos”),2 petitions for review of a final order of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“Board”). The Board affirmed without opinion the decision
    of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Phommasoukha’s applications for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against
    Torture. We remand to the Board for a determination of whether conditions in Laos
    have sufficiently changed to overcome the presumption that Phommasoukha has a
    well-founded fear of future persecution.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    Bouapha Phommasoukha, a native and citizen of Laos, entered the United
    States as a non-immigrant visitor on August 18, 1997, and remained beyond his
    authorized stay. On August 21, 1998, Phommasoukha filed an application for asylum
    with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) Asylum Office.3 An asylum
    officer interviewed Phommasoukha and, after deciding that Phommasoukha did not
    qualify for a grant of asylum because of changed country conditions, referred the
    application to the immigration court. The INS then initiated removal proceedings
    2
    Laos is a landlocked country in Southeast Asia between Vietnam and
    Thailand. It has a population of 5.2 million. In 1975, the Communist movement
    known as the Pathet Lao overthrew the U.S.-backed government, ending a
    six-century-old monarchy. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Country
    Report on Human Rights Practices, Laos remains an authoritarian, Communist state
    under the control of a single political party, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party.
    Laos is gradually moving toward economic and political liberalization.
    3
    In March 2003, the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
    were transferred to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
    See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 
    116 Stat. 2135
     (Nov. 25,
    2002).
    -2-
    against Phommasoukha by issuing a Notice to Appear, which alleged that he was
    removable from the United States as an alien who remained in the United States
    longer than permitted.
    In removal proceedings before the IJ on March 1, 2000, Phommasoukha
    admitted the charges in the Notice to Appear and conceded removability. The IJ
    designated Laos as the country of removal. Phommasoukha renewed his requests for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and protection pursuant to Article 3 of the United
    Nations Convention Against Torture, or, in the alternative, voluntary departure.
    Following an evidentiary hearing on May 1, 2002, the IJ concluded that
    Phommasoukha did not prove that his imprisonment in a concentration camp
    constituted persecution or that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution.
    Accordingly, the IJ denied relief but granted Phommasoukha voluntary departure.
    The Board affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion. Phommasoukha filed this
    timely petition for review.
    Phommasoukha’s request for asylum is based on allegations of past persecution
    and a well-founded fear of future persecution. Phommasoukha served in the Laotian
    Royal Armed Forces from 1960 until the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Laotian
    government by the Pathet Lao in 1975. During his service with the Royal Armed
    Forces, Phommasoukha apparently worked with the United States Central
    Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) to locate and monitor the Vietnamese army. After the
    Pathet Lao assumed control of Laos, however, Phommasoukha was sent to a
    concentration camp for “reeducation.” Phommasoukha testified at the evidentiary
    hearing that he was kept in an underground cell, subjected to political indoctrination,
    required to perform forced labor, and denied contact with family or other prisoners.
    This testimony was corroborated by Paul Chanthalongsy Dao Heuang, a fellow
    inmate at the concentration camp.
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    Phommasoukha was released from the concentration camp in 1980 or 1981 and
    was allowed to return to his family in the village of Savannakhet. Though the Pathet
    Lao government apparently continued to monitor his activities, Phommasoukha was
    allowed to work on the rice farm owned by his family. Phommasoukha testified that
    he was, however, forced to serve as the local tax collector for the Laotian
    government.
    In 1996, Phommasoukha apparently used 20,000 Kips4 of tax revenue to buy
    medicine for those who had assisted the CIA. When the Laotian government
    discovered the misappropriation of money, it apparently brought corruption charges
    against Phommasoukha. Though the administrative record does not contain
    corroborating or other independent evidence of a conviction, Phommasoukha testified
    that he was jailed for two days. Sometime later, he left Laos, allegedly fearing further
    persecution arising out of his military service, his assistance to the CIA, and the
    corruption charge. Phommasoukha left behind a wife and several children.
    Phommasoukha seeks review of the Board’s decision to uphold the IJ’s denials
    of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United
    Nations Convention Against Torture.
    II.      DISCUSSION
    An alien is eligible for asylum as a refugee if he is unable or unwilling to return
    to his home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
    based on one of the five statutorily protected grounds. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 4
    At present currency-exchange rates, 20,000 Kips is worth approximately
    $1.97.
    -4-
    1101(a)(42)(A).5 The burden of proving past persecution or a well-founded fear of
    future persecution rests with the alien applying for asylum. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (a)
    (2005). If the alien establishes that he suffered past persecution, then he is entitled
    to a rebuttable presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (b)(1). The burden then shifts to the DHS to show by a
    preponderance of the evidence that there has been a fundamental change in
    circumstances in the alien’s home country such that the alien no longer has a well-
    founded fear of persecution. 
    Id.
     “If the DHS does not satisfy this burden of rebuttal,
    the applicant is eligible for asylum.” De Brenner v. Ashcroft, 
    388 F.3d 629
    , 636 (8th
    Cir. 2004).
    In his petition for review, Phommasoukha argues that the Board erred when it
    found that his imprisonment in a concentration camp failed to rise to the level of
    persecution. As a result of this error, Phommasoukha argues, the Board also erred
    when it misallocated to him the burden of proving a well-founded fear of future
    persecution. When the Board affirms an IJ’s decision without an opinion, we will
    treat the IJ’s decision as a final agency action. Al Tawm v. Ashcroft, 
    363 F.3d 740
    ,
    743 (8th Cir. 2004). Therefore, “[w]e apply substantial evidence review to the
    [agency’s] factual findings and de novo review to its legal determinations.”
    Amador-Palomares v. Ashcroft, 
    382 F.3d 864
    , 866 (8th Cir. 2004).
    5
    Section 1101(a)(42)(A) defines a refugee as:
    [A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the
    case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
    person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
    is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
    country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
    account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
    or political opinion[.]
    -5-
    Phommasoukha provided credible evidence that he served in the Royal Armed
    Forces during the Laotian civil war and that he was imprisoned in a Pathet Lao
    concentration camp after his military service. The IJ, however, found that
    Phommasoukha’s imprisonment in a concentration camp does not constitute past
    persecution. The IJ also found that Phommasoukha failed to carry his burden of
    proving that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the IJ
    denied Phommasoukha’s application for asylum under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    .
    We believe the IJ’s conclusion that Phommasoukha’s imprisonment in a Pathet
    Lao concentration camp does not constitute past persecution is not supported by
    substantial evidence. See Lau May Sui v. Ashcroft, 
    395 F.3d 863
    , 869 (8th Cir. 2005)
    (reviewing the Board’s factual finding of no past persecution under the substantial-
    evidence standard). The purpose of Phommasoukha’s imprisonment was to make him
    more compliant to the political dogma of the authoritarian government. As part of the
    Communist reeducation regimen, Phommasoukha was subjected to “indoctrination
    meetings,” denied contact with his family, and required to perform forced labor. His
    imprisonment by the Pathet Lao regime continued for approximately four to six years
    with little change in treatment or conditions. See Manivong v. INS, 
    164 F.3d 432
    , 433
    (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the petitioner, a citizen of Laos who spent almost one
    year in a labor camp because of his anti-Communist opinions, “was at one time the
    victim of persecution”). The IJ, however, erroneously focused solely on the apparent
    lack of physical harm to Phommasoukha at the concentration camp. Based on his
    lengthy imprisonment in a concentration camp operated by a brutal authoritarian
    regime and the substantial deprivations he suffered during his internment, we simply
    cannot agree with the IJ’s factual finding that Phommasoukha did not suffer past
    persecution due to his protected status of political dissident. See Mikhael v. INS, 
    115 F.3d 299
    , 303 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that persecution is broader than merely
    physical harm).
    -6-
    As a result of this erroneous factual determination, the IJ improperly placed the
    burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution on Phommasoukha.
    De Brenner, 
    388 F.3d at 638-39
    . Phommasoukha, an alien who suffered past
    persecution due to his political opinions, should have been entitled to a presumption
    of having a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (b)(1) (“An
    applicant who has been found to have established such past persecution shall also be
    presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original
    claim.”). The burden then should have shifted to the DHS to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that conditions in Laos have undergone a fundamental
    change from the time of the persecution such that the basis for Phommasoukha’s
    well-founded fear of future persecution has been eliminated. 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13
    (b)(1) and 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). From the IJ’s order, however, we understand
    that the burden of proving a well-founded fear of future persecution improperly
    remained on Phommasoukha throughout the proceedings.
    “When the BIA applies an incorrect legal standard, the proper remedy typically
    is to remand the case to the agency for further consideration in light of the correct
    standard.” De Brenner, 
    388 F.3d at 639
     (quoting Corado v. Ashcroft, 
    384 F.3d 945
    ,
    948 (8th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation omitted). The IJ applied the incorrect legal
    standard based on the erroneous conclusion that Phommasoukha’s confinement in a
    concentration camp does not rise to the level of past persecution. Therefore, in light
    of Phommasoukha’s credible claim of past persecution, we remand this case for a
    determination of whether conditions in Laos are sufficiently changed to overcome the
    presumption that Phommasoukha has a well-founded fear of future persecution.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Bouapha Phommasoukha’s imprisonment in a Communist-run concentration
    camp constitutes past persecution based on his political opinion. Accordingly, the
    burden of proving a fundamental change in the conditions of Laos such that
    -7-
    Phommasoukha does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution is on the
    DHS. We reverse and remand to the Board for further proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    ______________________________
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