John W. Parker v. Sid Canham , 82 F. App'x 503 ( 2003 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-1800
    ___________
    John William Parker,                  *
    *
    Appellant,               *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                              * District Court for the
    * District of Minnesota
    Sid Canham, individually and as an    *
    employee of Mahnomen County;          *    [UNPUBLISHED]
    Richard Rooney, Sheriff, individually *
    and as Sheriff of the County of       *
    Mahnomen; County of Mahnomen,         *
    Minnesota,                            *
    *
    Appellees.               *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 24, 2003
    Filed: December 9, 2003
    ___________
    Before RILEY, McMILLIAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    John William Parker, a member of the White Earth Band of Chippewa (Band),
    appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court for the District of
    Minnesota upon an adverse grant of summary judgment in his action asserting
    constitutional and state law claims arising out of a traffic stop. For reversal Parker
    argues that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. For the
    reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court in part and
    reverse in part.
    In January 2000, Sheriff’s Deputy Sid Canham stopped Parker’s vehicle,
    pursuant to a law enforcement agreement between the Band and Mahnomen County,
    for exceeding the speed limit. According to Parker, he and Canham argued over
    whether Canham had jurisdiction to stop him, because the stop occurred on the
    Band’s reservation. Canham allegedly used profanity and a racial slur, and threatened
    to “beat the hell out of” Parker with a club he was holding. Parker was frightened,
    but Canham cooled down and told Parker he would receive a ticket from the Band
    police.
    We agree with the district court that summary judgment was appropriate on
    Parker’s constitutional claims against Sheriff Richard Rooney and Mahnomen
    County. See Heisler v. Metro. Council, 
    339 F.3d 622
    , 626 (8th Cir. 2003) (summary
    judgment standard of review). Parker offered no evidence that his constitutional
    rights were violated as a result of the Sheriff’s own actions, see Ottman v. City of
    Independence, 
    341 F.3d 751
    , 761 (8th Cir. 2003), and we conclude that the law
    enforcement agreement between the Band and Mahnomen County was not an
    unconstitutional policy or custom, see Liebe v. Norton, 
    157 F.3d 574
    , 578-79 (8th
    Cir. 1998).
    We also find that Parker did not establish a constitutional claim against
    Canham, because (1) Canham had authority to make a traffic stop under the law
    enforcement agreement and did not violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping Parker
    after observing him exceeding the speed limit, see United States v. Linkous, 
    285 F.3d 716
    , 719 (8th Cir. 2002); (2) the duration of the stop was not unconstitutional,
    see United States v. Long, 
    320 F.3d 795
    , 801 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.
    $404,905.00, 
    182 F.3d 643
    , 647 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
    528 U.S. 1161
     (2000);
    -2-
    (3) there was no evidence that Canham did not stop similarly situated non-Native
    Americans under similar circumstances, see Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 
    152 F.3d 859
    , 862 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 1142
     (1999); and (4) Canham’s
    alleged verbal threat and use of a racial epithet are not cognizable under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , see Hopson v. Fredericksen, 
    961 F.2d 1374
    , 1378 (8th Cir. 1992); Martin v.
    Sargent, 
    780 F.2d 1334
    , 1338 (8th Cir. 1985).
    In addition, we conclude that Parker’s Minnesota Human Rights Act claim was
    time-barred, see 
    Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.14
    , subd. 1(a)(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 2003);
    and Parker did not offer evidence sufficient to support his state law claims for false
    imprisonment and abuse of process, see Guite v. Wright, 
    976 F. Supp. 866
    , 871 (D.
    Minn. 1997); Kittler & Hedelson v. Sheehan Prop., Inc., 
    295 Minn. 232
    , 
    203 N.W.2d 835
    , 840 (1973).
    With regard to Parker’s state law assault claim, however, we conclude that
    there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether Canham made an unlawful
    threat to do bodily harm with the present ability to carry the threat into effect. See
    Dahlin v. Fraser, 
    205 Minn. 476
    , 
    288 N.W. 851
    , 852 (1939). Further, based upon
    Parker’s deposition testimony, there remains a genuine issue of material fact whether
    Canham acted maliciously or willfully, which precludes summary judgment based
    upon Minnesota’s official immunity doctrine, see Johnson v. Morris, 
    453 N.W.2d 31
    ,
    41 (Minn. 1990), and the record does not support summary judgment for the County
    and Sheriff Rooney on an assault claim based upon respondeat superior, see 
    Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.02
     (West 2001).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, except
    with regard to Parker’s state law assault claim, as to which we reverse the grant of
    summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ______________________________
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