Larkin v. St. Louis Housing Authority Development Corp. ( 2004 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 02-3228
    ___________
    Jeanette Larkin,                          *
    *
    Plaintiff/Appellant,       *
    *
    Jeanette Larkin, Estate of Mauritius      *
    Larkin, deceased, by personal             *
    representative,                           *
    *
    Plaintiff,                 *   Appeal from the United States
    *   District Court for the
    v.                                 *   Eastern District of Missouri.
    *
    St. Louis Housing Authority               *
    Development Corporation, a                *
    Municipal Corporation,                    *
    *
    Defendant/Appellee,        *
    *
    Wayman Smith, III, in his individual      *
    capacity as a member of the Board of *
    Police Commissioners; Edward Roth, *
    in his individual capacity as a member *
    of the Board of Police Commissioners; *
    Mark W. Smith, in his individual          *
    capacity as a member of the Board of *
    Police Commissioners; Leslie Bond,        *
    Sr., Dr., in his individual capacity as a *
    member of the Board of Police             *
    Commissioners; Clarence Harmon,           *
    Mayor, in his individual capacity as a *
    member of the Board of Police             *
    Commissioners; John Johnson,            *
    *
    Defendants.                *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 11, 2003
    Filed: January 23, 2004
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Jeanette Larkin (Larkin) appeals from the district court’s1 entry of summary
    judgment in favor of the St. Louis Housing Authority Development Corporation
    (Authority). We affirm.
    I.
    This case arises out of the shooting death of Mauritius Larkin (Mauritius) by
    Authority armed security guard John Johnson (Johnson) on the grounds of Cochran
    Gardens, an Authority housing project. Larkin, Mauritius’s mother, sued under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , alleging that the Authority violated Mauritius’s due process rights
    through its policy of failing adequately to train its security guards.
    A. The August 16, 1999, Incident
    On the evening of August 16, 1999, Johnson was on duty at the Cochran
    Gardens complex. He and another security guard responded to a call from a third
    guard informing them that a fight was in progress in the courtyard and requesting that
    1
    The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    -2-
    they assist him in dispersing the crowd. At the time of the incident, Johnson wore his
    uniform and utility belt and he carried his standard-issue handcuffs and .38 caliber
    Smith & Wesson revolver.
    The three security guards approached the assembled group. At this point,
    accounts of what happened vary greatly. The guards stated that a fight was
    underway; that Mauritius and Johnson struggled when Johnson attempted to separate
    some of the combatants; that Mauritius repeatedly stuck Johnson; that Mauritius
    reached for Johnson’s gun and Johnson resisted; and that during the struggle over the
    gun, Johnson shot and killed Mauritius. Other witnesses stated that Mauritius and the
    others allegedly involved in the fight were actually just “play boxing” and that
    Johnson shot Mauritius without justification simply because Mauritius would not
    follow Johnson’s directions.
    St. Louis police took statements from the security guards and numerous other
    witnesses. Johnson was taken into custody and later pled guilty to voluntary
    manslaughter. At his plea hearing, he admitted that he “knowingly or with the
    purpose to cause serious physical injury to Mauritius Larkin, caused his death by
    shooting him.”
    B. The Authority Training Policy
    Johnson began his employment as a security guard at the Cochran Gardens
    complex in 1996. In 1998, the Authority took over control of Cochran Gardens and
    Johnson became an Authority employee. At the time of the incident, Johnson was a
    armed security guard, having been licensed by the St. Louis City or County Police
    Departments since 1993.2
    2
    Johnson was licensed from 1993 to the time of the incident by the St. Louis
    City Police Department, the St. Louis County Police Department, or both. The
    licensure requirements for both departments are the same.
    -3-
    At the time of the incident, the Authority employed only off-duty police
    officers and licensed armed security guards. The Authority did not require or provide
    additional training for its guards. Johnson had no other training than that which he
    received when initially licensed and when he periodically renewed his license.
    Johnson received his license after taking a three-day course, which included
    both classroom and firearms training and testing. At the time of this initial training,
    and with each renewal of his license, Johnson received a copy of the licensing
    authority’s rules and regulations for security guards, which outlines the duties and
    powers of private security guards. The rules and regulations incorporate the Missouri
    regulation governing the use of deadly force by security guards, which states that a
    security guard may discharge his firearm only when necessary to defend himself or
    another person from death or serious bodily injury when attacked.
    II.
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing the
    facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party: in this case, Larkin.
    Thompson v. Hubbard, 
    257 F.3d 896
    , 898 (8th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is
    appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
    Id.
    The Authority can be liable under Section 1983 for constitutional violations
    resulting from its failure adequately to train its employees, City of Canton v. Harris,
    
    489 U.S. 378
    , 380 (1989); S.J. v. Kansas City Public School Dist., 
    294 F.3d 1025
    ,
    1029 (8th Cir. 2002), if the failure to train rises to the level of “deliberate
    indifference” to the people’s rights. S.J., 
    294 F.3d at 1029
     (quoting Thelma D. ex.
    rel. Delores A. v. Board of Educ., 
    934 F.2d 929
    , 934 (8th Cir. 1991)). For her claims
    to survive a motion for summary judgment, Larkin must provide evidence that the
    Authority was on notice that its training procedures “were inadequate and likely to
    result in violation of constitutional rights.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Thelma D., 
    934 F.2d at 934
    ).
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    If on notice of the inadequacy, the Authority’s failure to address it amounts to
    deliberate indifference. There are two ways Larkin may prove notice. First, she may
    show that the failure to train “is so likely to result in a violation of constitutional
    rights that the need for training is patently obvious.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Thelma D., 
    934 F.2d at 934
    ). Second, she may show that “a pattern of misconduct indicates that the
    [Authority’s] responses to a regularly recurring situation are insufficient to protect the
    [people’s] constitutional rights.” 
    Id.
     (quoting P.H. v. School Dist. of Kansas City,
    
    265 F.3d 653
    , 660 (8th Cir. 2001)).
    We are concerned with the Authority’s training policy, not with how Johnson
    absorbed the training. “That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will
    not alone suffice to fasten liability on the [Authority], for the officer’s shortcomings
    may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program. It may be, for
    example, that an otherwise sound program has occasionally been negligently
    administered.” City of Canton, 
    489 U.S. at 390-91
     (internal citations omitted). “The
    issue in a case like this one … is whether the training program is adequate; and if it
    is not, the question becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said
    to represent ‘city policy.’” 
    Id. at 390
    . We must focus “on the adequacy of the
    training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform.” 
    Id.
    In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the district court assumed that
    a constitutional violation had occurred. It then turned to the question whether the
    assumed violation was the result of an inadequate training policy. In determining
    whether there was evidence that the Authority was on notice that the training was
    inadequate given the particular circumstances faced by the officers at Cochran
    Gardens, the district court held that Larkin had failed to establish an issue of material
    fact. The district court noted that Larkin’s expert did not know if anyone other than
    Mauritius had been shot at Cochran Gardens and that there was no testimony that
    security guards at Cochran Gardens were regularly faced with such situations. The
    district court accordingly concluded that, as a matter of law, “it was reasonable for
    -5-
    the Housing Authority to rely on the adequacy of the training provided for licensing.”
    We agree.
    Because the Constitution may require more training for some officers than for
    others, the Authority may not be protected from liability simply by relying on the
    requirements of the licensing agency. 
    Id.
     (holding that we must look to “adequacy
    of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officer[] must perform”).
    But the burden is on Larkin to proffer evidence establishing that conditions were such
    that the officers at Cochran Gardens needed additional training. She has failed to
    meet this burden. Johnson testified at his deposition that his duties at Cochran
    Gardens included patrolling in the complex’s buildings and facilities, interdicting
    drug activities, and protecting tenants from harmful situations. He stated that he had
    the authority to arrest those who committed crimes, to search for and seize evidence
    in connection with an arrest, and to use lethal force where there “would be bodily
    harm or more serious” harm. But there was no evidence that these tasks were any
    different from those which all armed security guards are expected to be able to
    perform, and are, in fact, trained to perform.
    Dr. James Fyfe, Larkin’s expert in criminal justice, testified that security guards
    at housing projects in New York, Oakland, and Philadelphia receive many times the
    amount of training required for licensure and employment as an Authority armed
    security guard in St. Louis, but he did not testify that conditions in those cities were
    comparable to those at Cochran Gardens. Furthermore, he did not testify that the
    additional training received by security guards in New York, Oakland, and
    Philadelphia was necessary in relation to their duties.
    Johnson stated that Cochran Gardens was a dangerous place, where violent
    crimes, drug crimes, and burglary often occurred. But these were general assertions
    that lacked any reference to particular crimes occurring at particular times.
    Conclusory statements about the conditions at Cochran Gardens and the duties of its
    -6-
    security guards are not sufficient for Larkin to meet her burden at summary judgment.
    Accordingly, we conclude that a reasonable juror could not find that the Authority’s
    reliance on the training provided for licensure was inadequate, given the lack of
    evidence that Cochran Gardens’ officers were required to perform unusually
    challenging duties under unusually challenging conditions.
    Turning to the “patently obvious” prong of the City of Canton analysis, we
    disagree with Larkin’s contention that the district court failed to consider all of the
    evidence bearing on her claim that the Authority’s decision to rely on the training
    given at licensing was “so likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights that
    the need for training is patently obvious.” S.J., 
    294 F.3d at 1029
     (quoting Thelma D.,
    
    934 F.2d at 934
    ). We read the district court’s review of the evidence as rejecting the
    possibility that the inadequacy was so obvious that actual notice was not necessary.
    There is no evidence that Cochran Garden’s security guards are expected to perform
    more difficult tasks under more difficult circumstances than those all licensed armed
    security guards are expected to be able to perform. A reasonable juror could not find,
    from the evidence provided, that a violation of constitutional rights was inevitably
    going to occur at Cochran Gardens. Although Dr. Fyfe did testify that the three days
    of training Johnson received, when coupled with the type of situations he could
    expect to see at Cochran Gardens, made “it inevitable that those situations will be
    mishandled and that a tragedy will occur,” he never testified that the inevitability
    would have been patently obvious to the Authority. Thus, no reasonable juror could
    find, after considering the evidence regarding the nature of the property and the
    circumstances regularly faced by the security guards, that the Authority had actual or
    constructive notice of any inadequacy of the training it provided to the guards.
    The summary judgment order is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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