Cheryl Mearing v. Jo Anne Barnhart ( 2004 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-2612
    ___________
    Cheryl L. Mearing,                   *
    *
    Appellant,               *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                             * District Court for the
    * Western District of Arkansas.
    Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner    *
    Social Security Administration,      *        [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 6, 2004
    Filed: February 12, 2004
    ___________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Cheryl L. Mearing appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of
    supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. Having carefully
    reviewed the record, see Wheeler v. Apfel, 
    224 F.3d 891
    , 894 (8th Cir. 2000)
    (standard of review), we affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Beverly Stites Jones, United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
    consent of the parties pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    In her June 1999 applications and related documents, Ms. Mearing alleged
    disability since May 1999 from learning disabilities, depression, headaches, and
    menstrual problems. Ms. Mearing revised her onset date to June 2000 at the
    May 2001 hearing, where a vocational expert (VE) testified in response to a
    hypothetical the administrative law judge (ALJ) posed. After the ALJ considered the
    findings of a posthearing consultative examination of Ms. Mearing by a psychiatrist,
    the ALJ determined that Ms. Mearing’s dysthmic and anxiety disorders, and her
    borderline intellectual functioning, were severe impairments but not of listing-level
    severity, either alone or combined; and that she could perform her past relevant work
    (PRW).
    Ms. Mearing contends the ALJ erred by not considering her obesity. We
    disagree. The obesity listing was deleted in 1999, and in any event, Ms. Mearing
    would not have met its requirements, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 9.09,
    Table II (1998); currently, obesity is relevant primarily in the musculoskeletal,
    cardiovascular, respiratory, and mental disorders listings, see Social Security Ruling
    (SSR) 02-01p, 
    2000 WL 628049
    , at *1 (SSA, Sept. 12, 2002), and Ms. Mearing never
    sought care for respiratory, cardiovascular, or musculoskeletal problems, and her
    depression was reportedly well controlled by medication; and most important, she did
    not claim obesity as a basis for disability before the ALJ or the Appeals Council, nor
    did she testify about or report weight-related work limitations, cf. Mitchell v. Shalala,
    
    48 F.3d 1039
    , 1041 (8th Cir. 1995) (in declining to consider new evidence of
    claimant’s reading problems, it was significant that claimant did not raise illiteracy
    as disabling factor in application for benefits or at hearing).
    As to Ms. Mearing’s headaches, the ALJ did not err in finding them not severe.
    Ms. Mearing testified that they occurred primarily during her menses and that her
    physician had recommended only over-the-counter medications to treat them. See
    Haynes v. Shalala, 
    26 F.3d 812
    , 814 (8th Cir. 1994) (lack of strong pain medication
    is inconsistent with disabling pain). There is, in fact, no medical evidence indicating
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    she sought treatment for them, see Shannon v. Chater, 
    54 F.3d 484
    , 486 (8th Cir.
    1995) (failure to seek treatment may be inconsistent with disability), or was denied
    treatment for lack of funds, cf. Riggins v. Apfel, 
    177 F.3d 689
    , 693 (8th Cir. 1999)
    (alleged pain and disability are inconsistent with failure to seek low-cost or no-cost
    medical treatment).
    We also reject Ms. Mearing’s assertion that the ALJ erred in failing sufficiently
    to explain his determination that she and her mother were not credible. The ALJ gave
    multiple valid reasons for finding Ms. Mearing’s alleged limitations not entirely
    credible, see Hogan v. Apfel, 
    239 F.3d 958
    , 962 (8th Cir. 2001) (deference to ALJ is
    appropriate when he explicitly discredits claimant and gives good reasons for doing
    so), and although he did not specifically address the credibility of Ms. Mearing’s
    mother, the reasons the ALJ gave for discrediting Ms. Mearing would have served as
    bases for discrediting her mother, see Young v. Apfel, 
    221 F.3d 1065
    , 1068 (8th Cir.
    2000) (ALJ’s failure to give specific reasons for disregarding testimony of claimant’s
    husband was inconsequential, as same reasons ALJ gave to discredit claimant could
    serve as basis for discrediting husband).
    Ms. Mearing challenges the ALJ’s determination that she could do her PRW,
    in part, because the record showed that she held a number of short-term jobs.
    However, the record also showed that some of the reasons she gave for leaving those
    jobs were unrelated to her allegedly disabling conditions; and as the ALJ noted, she
    held some jobs for a significant period of time despite her borderline intelligence and
    periods of depression. See Naber v. Shalala, 
    22 F.3d 186
    , 189 (8th Cir. 1994)
    (condition that is not disabling during years of work and has not worsened cannot
    serve as basis for proving present disability).
    Ms. Mearing’s remaining arguments provide no basis for reversal.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ______________________________
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