Spann v. Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration ( 2004 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-2693
    ___________
    George Spann,                        *
    *
    Appellant,               *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                              * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Arkansas Department of Finance and   *
    Administration,                      *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 7, 2004
    Filed: April 9, 2004
    ___________
    Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    George Spann (Spann), who is African American, sued his employer, the
    Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration (ADFA), after he was denied a
    position upgrade and raise. Spann claimed race and gender discrimination under Title
    VII. After a bench trial, the district court1 entered judgment for ADFA. Spann
    appeals, and we affirm. See Johnson v. Ark. State Police, 
    10 F.3d 547
    , 552 (8th Cir.
    1
    The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas.
    1993) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which provides factual findings are reviewed for
    clear error, and due regard shall be given to trial judge’s credibility determinations).
    We agree with the district court that Spann presented little evidence of race
    discrimination, and we reject Spann’s attempt on appeal to recast his lawsuit as one
    based on combined race and gender discrimination. We also agree with the district
    court that Spann did not prove that ADFA’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
    denying Spann an upgrade and raise in May 2001--i.e., Spann’s suspension in
    February 2001 made him ineligible under established policy--was a pretext for gender
    discrimination. See 
    id. at 551
     (ultimate burden of persuading trier of fact that
    defendant intentionally discriminated remains with plaintiff). Contrary to Spann’s
    assertions on appeal, his female coworkers who were disciplined differently or who
    received position upgrades or bonuses were not similarly situated to him. See
    Marquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
    353 F.3d 1037
    , 1038 (8th Cir. 2004) (per
    curiam) (plaintiff must point to individuals who have dealt with same supervisor,
    have been subject to same standards, and who engaged in same conduct without
    mitigating or distinguishing circumstances). While one of the policies at issue was
    unwritten and Spann’s female supervisors exercised some discretion in determining
    the appropriate discipline, these facts were insufficient to establish pretext. See
    Edmund v. MidAm. Energy Co., 
    299 F.3d 679
    , 686 (8th Cir. 2002) (federal courts do
    not sit as super-personnel departments reviewing wisdom or fairness of employer’s
    judgments, unless they were intentionally discriminatory); cf. Taylor v. White, 
    321 F.3d 710
    , 717 (8th Cir. 2003) (unwritten nature of salary-retention policy, or presence
    of subjectivity or informality in structure or administration of policy, alone, cannot
    support inference of discrimination).
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ______________________________
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