United States v. Larry A. Pierce ( 2004 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 04-1191
    ________________
    United States of America,                  *
    *
    Appellee,                     *
    *      Appeal from the United States
    v.                                   *      District Court for the
    *      Western District of Missouri.
    Larry A. Pierce,                           *
    *             [PUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                    *
    ________________
    Submitted: October 29, 2004
    Filed: November 9, 2004
    ________________
    Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
    ________________
    PER CURIAM.
    Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Larry Pierce pleaded guilty to possessing
    anhydrous ammonia for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation
    of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
    18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In the plea agreement, the parties anticipated that the counts
    would be grouped under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 3D1.2, Pierce
    would have a base offense level of 30 based on being held responsible for 35-50
    grams of actual methamphetamine, he would receive a 2-level enhancement under
    USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a firearm in connection with the drug offense, he
    would receive a 3-level reduction under USSG § 3E1.1 for acceptance of
    responsibility, and he would face a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.
    The presentence report also calculated that Pierce’s maximum prison sentence
    would be 10 years, although his Guidelines range was higher. At sentencing,
    however, the district court1 noticed that this was an error: the parties and the
    probation officer had overlooked USSG § 5G1.2, which governs sentencing on
    multiple counts of conviction. The district court adjourned the sentencing hearing to
    allow the parties and the probation officer to research this issue. The probation
    officer filed an addendum acknowledging his error and noting that, under § 5G1.2(d),
    the sentence on the drug count and the sentence on the firearm count had to run
    consecutively to the extent necessary to achieve the total punishment determined
    under the Guidelines. As such, Pierce’s maximum prison sentence would be 10 years
    on each count, for a total of 20 years.
    As relevant to this appeal, Pierce raised two objections to the presentence
    report. First, he disagreed with the recommendation that he should receive a 2-level
    enhancement under USSG § 3C1.2 for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death
    or serious bodily injury to others while fleeing from law enforcement. Second, he
    argued that it was impermissible double-counting to assess the 2-level enhancement
    under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a firearm in connection with the drug offense
    because the same firearm formed the basis of his firearm conviction.
    When sentencing reconvened two months later, the government called
    Lieutenant Shawn Collie of the Buchanan County, Missouri Drug Strike Force to
    testify regarding Pierce’s conduct while fleeing from law enforcement. He testified
    as follows. During surveillance, police observed anhydrous ammonia being loaded
    1
    The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri.
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    into Pierce’s pickup truck. Pierce drove away, and police followed. Collie pulled his
    vehicle in front of Pierce’s truck, and another officer pulled his vehicle behind
    Pierce’s truck. They activated their lights and attempted to apprehend Pierce. Pierce
    then rammed Collie’s vehicle with his truck two or more times before veering off and
    striking parked cars. Pierce ran from his truck and was apprehended by a canine
    officer. On the basis of this testimony, the district court overruled Pierce’s objection
    to the § 3C1.2 enhancement.
    After hearing argument, the district court also rejected Pierce’s double-
    counting claim regarding the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Pierce’s total offense level
    was 31, resulting in a Guidelines imprisonment range of 135-168 months. The
    district court sentenced him to 168 months in prison–structured as a 120-month
    sentence on the drug conviction and a consecutive 48-month sentence on the firearm
    conviction–and three years of supervised release.
    Pierce appeals, renewing the two arguments he presented below. We reject
    each argument and affirm.
    First, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying the
    § 3C1.2 enhancement because, when Pierce rammed Lieutenant Collie’s vehicle with
    his truck multiple times and then collided with parked cars, he recklessly created a
    substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to others. See United States v. Cook,
    
    356 F.3d 913
    , 917 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of review); United States v. Miner, 
    108 F.3d 967
    , 970 (8th Cir.) (applying the enhancement where the defendant rammed his
    car into a police roadblock and engaged in other pursuit-related conduct that created
    a substantial risk of serious injury to others), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 904
    (1997).
    -3-
    Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that Pierce’s double-counting
    claim is not foreclosed by his acknowledgment in the plea agreement that he would
    receive the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, but see United States v. Fairchild, 
    189 F.3d 769
    , 780 (8th Cir. 1999), we reject this argument on its merits after de novo review.
    In calculating a defendant’s offense level for a drug conviction, it does not constitute
    impermissible double-counting to apply a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, even though
    the defendant has also been convicted under § 922(g)(1) for possessing the same
    firearm. See United States v. Taylor, 
    248 F.3d 506
    , 517 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 981
    (2001); United States v. Gibbs, 
    190 F.3d 188
    , 216 (3d Cir. 1999), cert.
    denied, 
    528 U.S. 1131
    and 
    529 U.S. 1030
    (2000); United States v. Campos-Banos,
    86 Fed. App. 225, 227 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, but we modify it to
    correct a clerical error. The district court structured Pierce’s sentence as a 120-month
    sentence on the drug conviction and a consecutive 48-month sentence on the firearm
    conviction. The correct way to structure Pierce’s sentence is as a 120-month sentence
    on the drug conviction and a 120-month sentence on the firearm conviction, with 48
    months of the sentence on the firearm conviction to be served consecutively to
    Pierce’s service of the sentence on the drug conviction. See USSG § 5G1.2,
    comment. (n.1) (to the extent possible, “the total punishment is to be imposed on each
    count”); United States v. Evans, 
    314 F.3d 329
    , 332 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Had the district
    court applied Part 5G, it would have first imposed the statutory maximum sentence
    on each count, because each was less than the total punishment. Then, applying §
    5G1.2(d), the court would have made 156 months of the second 240-month maximum
    sentence consecutive to the first 240-month maximum sentence, producing the
    -4-
    396-month total punishment.”), cert. denied, 
    539 U.S. 916
    (2003). We so modify the
    judgment of the district court and, as modified, we affirm the judgment.2
    ______________________________
    2
    Subsequent to briefing, Pierce indicated he would like to file a supplemental
    brief in light of Blakely v. Washington, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    (2004). The court will not
    entertain briefing on Blakely issues until after the Supreme Court issues its opinions
    in United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan. See Administrative Order
    Regarding Blakely Cases, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Sept.
    27, 2004.
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