United States v. James A. Anderson , 158 F. App'x 750 ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-1389
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                  * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    v.                                * District of Minnesota.
    *
    James Anthony Anderson,                 * [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: December 12, 2005
    Filed: December 16, 2005
    ___________
    Before BYE, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    James Anthony Anderson appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1
    as unreasonable under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). We affirm.
    Pursuant to a guilty plea, Anderson was convicted of escape from custody in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 751
    (a). Based upon Anderson’s criminal history, the district
    court determined Anderson’s sentencing range was thirty-seven to forty-six months.
    1
    The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District
    of Minnesota.
    Anderson moved for a variance from the guideline range under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and asked the district court to impose a sentence of twelve months. The
    district court, upon consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, determined Anderson was
    a recidivist who was likely “to continue to repeat crime.” The district court concluded
    Anderson’s case did not justify variance from the sentencing range and denied
    Anderson’s motion, sentencing him to thirty-seven months of imprisonment and two
    years of supervised release, both to run consecutive to his prior sentence. A sentence
    within the sentencing range established by the United States Sentencing Guidelines
    is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Lincoln, 
    413 F.3d 716
    , 717 (8th
    Cir. 2005).
    In determining whether a sentence is reasonable, we consider how the sentence
    measures against the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). United States v.
    Marcussen, 
    403 F.3d 982
    , 985 (8th Cir. 2005). “To make the reasonableness
    determination, we ask whether the district court abused its discretion.” United States
    v. Pizano, 
    403 F.3d 991
    , 995 (8th Cir. 2005).
    Anderson first argues his sentence is unreasonable because it creates a disparity
    between his sentence and that of his co-defendant. He argues his entitlement to a
    twelve-month sentence to ensure parity with his co-defendant. He further argues the
    reasonableness of a twelve-month sentence is supported by the government’s position
    “[a] sentence of not less than twelve months consecutive would be a reasonable
    sentence.” In its determination of the ultimate reasonableness of a sentence, the
    district court need not give weight to the government’s position. Further, the district
    court is not obligated to ensure parity among co-defendants with different criminal
    histories. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(6). We conclude it was neither unreasonable, nor
    an abuse of discretion, to impose a sentence higher than received by Anderson’s
    co-defendant given the different criminal histories of the two men.
    -2-
    Second, Anderson argues his sentence fails to sufficiently account for his
    history and characteristics, including his upbringing, and is therefore unreasonable.
    The district court considered Anderson’s criminal history and background and
    concluded Anderson’s case was not sufficiently unusual to justify variance from the
    presumptively reasonable guideline range. Although Anderson’s upbringing is
    disheartening and warrants consideration, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1), we cannot say the
    district court imposed an unreasonable sentence considering the other § 3553(a)
    factors, including Anderson’s recidivism and violent criminal history.
    Finally, Anderson argues his original sentence was excessive because the
    Bureau of Prisons did not credit some of his time served. This claim was rejected by
    the district court. Anderson argues a reasonable sentence for the instant offense
    should account for the Bureau of Prisons’ error. This argument is without merit. The
    subjective belief a prior sentence is invalid is no justification for committing the
    offense of escape, nor is it a valid basis for adjusting the sentence of a subsequent
    offense. Cf. United States v. J.L.K., Jr., 
    880 F.2d 993
    , 994 (8th Cir. 1989) (per
    curiam) (holding defendant’s failure to utilize administrative and legal remedies to
    challenge his sentence precluded his use of the defenses of necessity and duress to a
    charge of escape from custody).
    We conclude the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable and
    therefore affirm the district court.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-1389

Citation Numbers: 158 F. App'x 750

Judges: Bye, Beam, Gruender

Filed Date: 12/16/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024