Sanders v. Fayetteville City Police Department , 160 F. App'x 542 ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 04-3258
    ___________
    Maurice Sanders,                       *
    *
    Appellant,               *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * Western District of Arkansas.
    Fayetteville City Police Department;   *
    Capt. Tabor; Tim Helder, Assistance    *         [UNPUBLISHED]
    Chief of Police; Darren Moss,          *
    Patrolman; Chris W. Weber, Patrolman; *
    Sgt. Brown; Dan Coody, Mayor,          *
    Fayetteville, Arkansas; Rick Hoyt;     *
    Lori Shue, Prosecutor Coordinator,     *
    *
    Appellees.               *
    ___________
    Submitted: December 8, 2005
    Filed: December 13, 2005
    ___________
    Before ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Arkansas inmate Maurice Sanders brought a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action for
    damages and other relief against the Fayetteville Police Department (FPD), its Chief
    of Police, its Assistant Chief of Police, Officers Darren Moss and Chris Weber,
    Sergeant Brown, Captain Tabor, the Mayor of Fayetteville, and Lori Shue, a
    prosecutor. Mr. Sanders’s claims arise from his two arrests in 2002. The district
    court1 dismissed all of the claims prior to service except Mr. Sanders’s claims against
    Sergeant Brown, and dismissed those claims without prejudice after the United States
    Marshals Service was unable to locate and serve him. We affirm the district court’s
    orders.
    Specifically, the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Sanders could not
    maintain his claims against the FPD, because it is not capable of being sued;
    Ms. Shue, because of prosecutorial immunity; the Chief and Assistant Chief of Police,
    and the Mayor of Fayetteville, because Mr. Sanders sought to hold them liable based
    solely on their general supervisory responsibilities; and Captain Tabor, because his
    purportedly inadequate investigation of Mr. Sanders’s treatment during his arrest and
    detention did not deprive Mr. Sanders of “any rights, privileges, or immunities”
    giving rise to a claim under section 1983.
    Further, the dismissal of Sergeant Brown was compelled by the Marshals’
    inability to locate and serve him. The dismissal of Mr. Sanders’s claim that Officer
    Weber threw his tools into the bed of his truck was also proper, because Mr. Sanders
    did not allege any resulting loss. As to Mr. Sanders’s claim that he was improperly
    denied a blood alcohol test and a breath test, the police have no constitutional duty
    to provide such tests, see Arizona v. Youngblood, 
    488 U.S. 51
    , 59 (1988), and we
    also find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to entertain Mr. Sanders’s
    request for injunctive relief as to his then-pending state criminal proceedings, see
    Norwood v. Dickey, 
    409 F.3d 901
    , 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (under abstention doctrine of
    Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
     (1971), federal courts abstain from hearing cases
    1
    The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the Western District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the
    Honorable Beverly Stites Jones, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western
    District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    involving ongoing state judicial proceeding that implicates important state interests
    and affords adequate opportunity to raise federal questions).
    Finally, Mr. Sanders’s remaining claims that Officer Moss misrepresented the
    working condition of his seat belts, and that Mr. Sanders’s first arrest resulted from
    a racially motivated stop without reasonable suspicion, are barred by Heck v.
    Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994). See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law,
    
    411 F.3d 427
    , 451-52 (3d Cir. 2005) (stop based solely on pattern and practice of
    racial profiling, without any reasonable suspicion, is unlawful and evidence
    discovered excludable, and thus implies conviction was improper, triggering Heck
    bar); Smithart v. Towery, 
    79 F.3d 951
    , 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (allegations
    that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought unfounded criminal
    charges challenge validity of conviction and are Heck-barred).
    Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny the pending
    motions on appeal.
    ______________________________
    -3-