United States v. Robert E. Collier , 191 F. App'x 514 ( 2006 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-4386
    ___________
    United States of America,                 *
    *
    Appellant,                   * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    v.                                  * Eastern District of Missouri.
    *
    Robert E. Collier,                        *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                    *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 18, 2006
    Filed: August 10, 2006
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Robert E. Collier pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine
    base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court determined that Collier's
    advisory guidelines range was one hundred eighty-eight months to two hundred thirty-
    five months, then sentenced him to seventy-two months. The government appeals the
    sentence as unreasonable. We remand.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Collier and the government recommended
    that Collier be sentenced for possession of 22.81 grams of cocaine base. The
    Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) set the base offense level at twenty-eight.
    From that, the PSR deducted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. Collier's
    criminal history placed him in Category IV, and the guidelines range stood at eighty-
    four to one hundred five months.
    However, because Collier's crime was a controlled substance offense, and he
    had two prior controlled substance state felony convictions, the PSR classified Collier
    as a career offender, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1. The
    career-offender classification changed Collier's base offense level to thirty-four.
    Applying the three-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility, Collier's total
    offense level was thirty-one. In addition to the increase in total offense level, the
    career-offender classification also raised Collier's criminal history category to VI.
    With the career-offender enhancements, Collier faced a guidelines range of one
    hundred eighty-eight to two hundred thirty-five months.
    At sentencing, Collier did not object to the PSR, and the district court adopted
    the PSR without change. Collier acknowledged that he was facing sentencing as a
    career offender, but argued that he was not the "typical" career offender. Collier
    pointed out that he was a high school graduate, had served four years active duty in
    the United States Army, had suffered depression since childhood, maintained a work
    history, tried to support his family, had a good relationship with his daughter, and was
    fairly successful in pre-trial drug treatment. Defense counsel also pointed out that
    Collier had participated in drug treatment on his own at least four times.
    The district court remarked that Collier's main problem was his drug addiction.
    The district court warned told Collier that the next time he came to court, he would
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    spend the rest of his life in jail. The district court noted that one of the problems was
    that Collier had not received significant time for his previous state drug convictions,
    which would have made Collier realize the seriousness of his problems. In addition,
    no drug quantity information was provided from those previous convictions, but that
    the quantities were likely small because Collier served very short amounts of time.
    The district court sentenced Collier to seventy-two months, citing Collier's
    military history and drug addiction. The government appeals the sentence as
    unreasonable.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    At sentencing, the district court must determine the applicable guidelines range.
    United States v. Haack, 
    403 F.3d 997
    , 1003 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 276
    (2005). Once this range is determined, the court must determine if a traditional
    departure is appropriate to arrive at a "guidelines sentence." 
    Id. After determining
    the
    guidelines sentence, the court must apply the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing
    the 
    sentence. 403 F.3d at 1003
    .
    We engage in a two-step inquiry on review. United States v. Mashek, 
    406 F.3d 1012
    , 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2005). We review the district court's determination of the
    guidelines sentence de novo and findings of fact for clear error. 
    Id. at 1017.
    We then
    review a decision to sentence outside of the guidelines range for abuse of discretion,
    and the ultimate sentence imposed for reasonableness, taking into account the factors
    present in 18 U.S.C. § 
    3553(a). 406 F.3d at 1017-18
    .
    In this case, the district court correctly determined the "applicable guidelines
    range," as required by 
    Haack. 403 F.3d at 1003
    . The district court then abruptly
    sentenced Collier to a sentence significantly lower than this range, giving only a
    cursory explanation, pointing to Collier's cocaine addiction, the lenity of previous
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    state court sentences, and his military service. Though we do not require "robotic
    incantations" from sentencing judges, United States v. Lamoreaux, 
    422 F.3d 750
    , 756
    (8th Cir. 2005), non-guidelines sentences "'are reasonable so long as the judge offers
    appropriate justification under the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). How
    compelling that justification must be is proportional to the extent of the difference
    between the advisory range and the sentence imposed.'" United States v. Claiborne,
    
    439 F.3d 479
    , 481 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
    427 F.3d 423
    ,
    426-27 (7th Cir. 2005)).
    The district court failed to elucidate its reasoning sufficiently for this court to
    affirm Collier's sentence, which is significantly lower than the sentencing range. We
    also note that Collier urged the district court not to sentence him as a career offender,
    and the actual sentence imposed was well below the guidelines range. Yet, on the
    record before us, the district court did not consider whether a traditional departure was
    appropriate in determining the "guidelines sentence." 
    Haack, 403 F.3d at 1003
    .
    Because the court sentenced Collier significantly below the applicable guidelines
    range, without either considering a traditional departure or detailing a compelling
    justification for a non-guidelines sentence, we remand for resentencing.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    This matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ______________________________
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