United States v. Tammy Peters ( 2006 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-4092
    ___________
    Tammy Peters,                            *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the Northern
    * District of Iowa.
    United States of America,                *
    * [PUBLISHED]
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 29, 2006
    Filed: October 6, 2006
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Tammy J. Peters appeals the 104-month sentence imposed after her plea of
    guilty to distributing methamphetamine. This court affirms.
    Peters was indicted on June 6, 2003. On June 17 she surrendered and was
    released on her own recognizance after signing a pre-trial release agreement in which
    she promised not to use illegal drugs and to submit to drug testing at the direction of
    her Pretrial Services Officer. Peters tested positive for meth on June 26, July 10, and
    July 23. She twice admitted to her PSO that indeed she had used meth, in violation
    of the agreement.
    Peters pled guilty on September 29. As part of the plea agreement, Peters
    promised not to "violate any local, state or federal law," aside from speeding or
    parking tickets. Later that day, she was arrested for driving while barred. Peters
    failed to provide required urinalysis samples on October 2 and again on October 7.
    She missed a scheduled meeting with her PSO on October 8, who filed a
    Noncompliance Memo with the district court.1 A revocation-of-presentence-release
    hearing was set for the following Tuesday, which Peters also did not attend. After a
    continuance was granted, the district court revoked her pre-sentence release on
    October 16.
    At the (first) sentencing hearing the government requested and received a two-
    level enhancement for obstruction of justice. Peters was sentenced to 110 months.
    This court reversed, finding that her conduct did not qualify as obstruction of justice
    under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Peters, 
    394 F.3d 1103
    , 1106-07
    (8th Cir. 2005).
    On November 15, 2005, Peters was re-sentenced to 104 months, six months less
    than the first sentence and the middle of the 92-to-115-month range for a person with
    her criminal history category (IV) and base offense level (26). Peters argues that the
    district court erred in not granting a two-level reduction for acceptance of
    responsibility.
    The Guidelines suggest eight "appropriate considerations" relevant to an
    acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, including "voluntary termination or
    withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations" and "post-offense rehabilitative
    efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment)." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
    §3E1.1, cmt. n. 1 (2005).
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Judge, United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Iowa.
    -2-
    Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined
    with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of
    conviction...will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of
    responsibility.... However, this evidence may be outweighed by conduct
    of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance of
    responsibility. A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an
    adjustment under this section as a matter of right.
    USSG §3E1.1, comment. (n.3).
    This court reviews "a district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility
    adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for clear error." United States v. Winters, 
    416 F.3d 856
    , 860 (8th Cir. 2005). "The sentencing judge is in a unique position to
    evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination
    of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review." USSG §3E1.1,
    comment. (n.5). The burden is on the defendant to establish entitlement to a
    downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Honken, 
    184 F.3d 961
    , 968 (8th Cir. 1999).
    After pleading guilty Peters continued her criminal conduct by driving while
    barred that same day, which alone could support a denial of the acceptance-of-
    responsibility reduction. See United States v. Ngo, 
    132 F.3d 1231
    , 1233 (8th Cir.
    1998) (upholding denial of acceptance-of-responsibility reduction for defendant who
    was charged with driving while intoxicated after pleading guilty to possession of
    counterfeit securities). In addition, the district court relied on other conduct including:
    the missed meeting on October 8; Peters's failure to appear at the October 10
    revocation hearing; her repeated use of meth; and her failure to remit two urinalysis
    samples in violation of her pre-trial release agreement.
    -3-
    Peters argues that the driving-while-barred conduct is irrelevant to a drug
    offense, and that her other transgressions are either excusable or too petty to justify
    denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Unlawful conduct, however, need
    not be directly related to the underlying offense to preclude an acceptance-of-
    responsibility reduction. See United States v. Byrd, 
    76 F.3d 194
    , 197 (8th Cir. 1996)
    ("Guideline § 3E1. 1 does not preclude the sentencing judge, in the exercise of his or
    her discretion, from considering unlawful conduct unrelated to the offense of
    conviction in determining whether a defendant qualifies for an adjustment for
    acceptance of responsibility."); see also 
    Ngo, 132 F.3d at 1233
    . In view of the
    repeated violations of Peters's pre-trial and plea agreements, the district court properly
    rejected her explanations.
    Peters's 104-month sentence was within the Sentencing Guideline of 92-to-115
    months, and therefore is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Lincoln, 
    413 F.3d 716
    , 717 (8th Cir. 2005). This presumption can be overcome by showing that
    the sentencing court relied on some "improper or irrelevant factor." United States v.
    Haack, 
    403 F.3d 997
    , 1004 (8th Cir. 2005).
    Peters objects that this court previously held that her failure to attend the
    October 10 revocation hearing was not willful, and therefore the district court
    committed "clear error" by giving this factor "significant weight" in its decision. This
    court previously held only that "the district court erred in finding that Peters willfully
    obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
    justice." 
    Peters, 394 F.3d at 1106
    . This court did not hold that her conduct could not
    be considered by the district court in deciding whether to reduce the sentence for
    acceptance of responsibility.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-